Katja Crone

In this paper we will argue that interpretivism about institutional group agents - prominently discussed by Deborah Tollefsen - does not provide a sound argument for the claim that groups can be granted the status of genuine agents. A central problem we identify is that Tollefsen’s view does not convincingly show that using the interpretivist strategy (i.e. taking the so called intentional stance towards group behavior) is actually necessary to discern ‘real patterns’ of social behavior. Second, we argue that the difference between the interpretivist strategy towards groups and an explanation of group behavior based on methodological individualism seems less clear than the theory of Tollefsen seems to suggests.

Personen besitzen die Fähigkeit, ein Bewusstsein von sich selbst haben: von ihren mentalen Zuständen wie Gedanken, Gefühlen, Wahrnehmungen, von ihren Charaktereigenschaften, von ihren körperlichen Eigenschaften und Prozessen und von ihren Handlungen. Dieses auf sich gerichtete Bewusstsein wird in der Philosophie als ‚Selbstbewusstsein‘ bezeichnet. Im Zentrum der Debatten steht die Frage, wie sich dieses Phänomen adäquat beschreiben lässt. Kontroversen bestehen darüber, wie bzw. ob sich Selbstbewusstsein im Allgemeinen von Bewusstsein abgrenzen lässt, ob Selbstbewusstsein ein einheitliches Phänomen ist oder – damit verbunden – ob es Formen des Selbstbewusstseins gibt, die man auch Lebewesen, die (noch) nicht über Sprache verfügen, zuschreiben kann.

In this paper, we introduce the reader to current debates and theoretical disputes concerning minimal forms of shared intentionality. After briefly considering research on the phylogenetic origins of the human capacity to cooperate, we turn to minimal forms of shared intentionality observable in infants and young children. Based on these findings, we then briefly discuss whether dominant theories of shared intentionality adequately capture the full range of collective intentional phenomena or rely on overly complex cognitive assumptions. We conclude with an overview of the contributions to this special issue.

The paper focuses on the particular nature of the content of so-called generic memories, especially those of recurrent events from one's past. This way of remembering has two central features that seem to be in tension with each other: what is mentally represented seems to be both rather specific, as one typically simulates an event with audiovisual properties, and rather non-specific, as the represented event covers or represents a series of more or less similar past events. It is argued that the phenomenon can be adequately described as a mental state representing a personal event prototype. This description also allows for the dynamic process of remembering, in which different forms of personal remembering may come to the fore depending on the context.

In this paper I will argue in favor of the so-called content account of collective intentionality by critically discussing John Searle's approach. I will raise two objections against the view: it will be argued that the approach cannot adequately explain the difference between individual and collective intentional attitudes. Moreover, it will be shown that Searle's view has problems to account for a characteristic way in which collective mental states can fail. Both objections reveal crucial advantages of the content account. Finally, a modified version of this view is outlined that is able to overcome objections that have been raised against this type of theory.

This special issue of Grazer Philosophische Studien brings together a number of carefully selected and timely articles that explore the discussion of different facets of self-consciousness from multiple perspectives. The selected articles mainly focus on three topics of the current debate: (1) the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual ways of self-representation; (2) the role of intersubjectivity for the development of self-consciousness; (3) the temporal structure of self-consciousness. A number of previously underexposed, yet important connections between different approaches are explored. The articles not only represent the state of the art in their respective areas of research and make new insights available, but also provide an overview of different methodologies: ranging from philosophy of language and mind to phenomenology and cognitive science. The volume is of interest for philosophers, cognitive scientists and researchers in related disciplines who are concerned with investigating the nature and origin of self-consciousness.

The paper focuses on the particular structure of the content of so-called generic memories, specifically of those of recurring events from one's past. This way of remembering has two central features that are in tension to each other: what is mentally represented is both rather specific as one is typically simulating a scene and sufficiently abstract as the represented scene stands for a series of similar former events. It will be argued that the phenomenon can be adequately described as a mental state representing personal event prototypes. This description further allows to account for the dynamic process of remembering, in which, depending on the context, different forms of personal remembering may come to the fore.

This special issue of _Grazer Philosophische Studien _brings together a number of carefully selected and timely articles that explore the discussion of different facets of self-consciousness from multiple perspectives. The selected articles mainly focus on three topics of the current debate: (1) the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual ways of self-representation; (2) the role of intersubjectivity for the development of self-consciousness; (3) the temporal structure of self-consciousness. A number of previously underexposed, yet important connections between different approaches are explored. The articles not only represent the state of the art in their respective areas of research and make new insights available, but also provide an overview of different methodologies: ranging from philosophy of language and mind to phenomenology and cognitive science. The volume is of interest for philosophers, cognitive scientists and researchers in related disciplines who are concerned with investigating the nature and origin of self-consciousness.

What enables everyday collective attitudes such as the intention of two persons to go for a walk together? Most current approaches are concerned with full-fledged collective attitudes and focus on the content, the mode or the subject of such attitudes. It will be argued that these approaches miss out an important explanatory enabling feature of collective attitudes: an experiential state, called a “sense of us”, in which a we-perspective is grounded. As will be shown, the sense of us pre-structures collective intentional states and is thus relevant to an adequate understanding of collective attitudes. The argument receives indirect support by insights into distortions of interaction due to implicit stereotypes.

What enables everyday collective attitudes such as the intention of two persons to go for a walk together? Most current approaches are concerned with full-fledged col- lective attitudes and focus on the content, the mode or the subject of such attitudes. It will be argued that these approaches miss out an important explanatory enabling feature of collective attitudes: an experiential state, called a “sense of us”, in which a we-perspective is grounded. As will be shown, the sense of us pre-structures collective intentional states and is thus relevant to an adequate understanding of collective atti- tudes. The argument receives indirect support by insights into distortions of interaction due to implicit stereotypes.

The article explores the relation between personal identity and life-changing decisions such as the decision for a certain career or the decision to become a parent. According to L.A. Paul, decisions of this kind involve “transformative experiences”, to the effect that - at the time we make a choice - we simply don’t know what it is like for us to experience the future situation. Importantly, she claims that some new experiences may be “personally transformative” by which she means that one may become a “new kind of person” having a different subjective perspective and “identity”. The article discusses this understanding of a transformed future self. It will be argued that different notions of identity can be distinguished with respect to Paul’s claim: the notion of identity in the sense of a personality as well as the notion of numerical identity in the sense of sameness. By distinguishing these two notions it will become more clear how a future experience may indeed qualify as “personally transformative”. Moreover, it will be shown that the notion of a self-understanding of persons helps to further clarify the kind of change at issue.

Some narrative approaches assume a tight relation between narrative and selfhood. They hold that the self-understanding of persons as individuals possessing a set of particular character traits is above all narratively structured for it is constituted by stories persons tell or can tell about their lives. Against this view, it is argued that self-understanding is also characterized by certain non-narrative and invariant mental features. In order to show this, a non-narrative awareness of self-identity over time will be analyzed. It will be argued that this basic form of awareness plays a fundamental role for the possibility of a richer form of self-understanding.