Influenced by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann’s 1926 Ethics theorizes an “axiological” dimension of Being populated by ideal objects he calls “values.” Like mathematical objects, they are essentially atemporal and immaterial, but they can be “actualized” in the spatio-temporal world. Truths about them and their hierarchical order are objective, and we can have a priori knowledge of them. In sensing values, we apprehend their “Ought-to-be,” a metaphysical tension which constitutes their “axiologica…
Read moreInfluenced by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann’s 1926 Ethics theorizes an “axiological” dimension of Being populated by ideal objects he calls “values.” Like mathematical objects, they are essentially atemporal and immaterial, but they can be “actualized” in the spatio-temporal world. Truths about them and their hierarchical order are objective, and we can have a priori knowledge of them. In sensing values, we apprehend their “Ought-to-be,” a metaphysical tension which constitutes their “axiological” character. We apprehend them with a unique faculty of “value-feeling,” which is irreducible to the intellect and includes an indispensable affective component. Within this framework, I offer an account of why and how art is uniquely equipped to disclose moral values. I contend that while moral values inhere only in persons and their acts, artifacts can disclose moral values whether or not they actualize them. Representational artifacts, I argue, do this primarily by facilitating acts of imagination whose objects instantiate moral values. After an important interlude on the role of affectivity in acts of value-feeling, I proceed to account for two major ways in which non-representational art can aid in the disclosure of moral values: namely, by simulating the affective states appropriate to their apprehension, and/or by bearing similar properties to them. Finally, I consider three major potential objections to my position.
