Kei Chiba

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle develops a theory of demonstration as a way of gaining causal knowledge of things or events under the general plan of constructing both an ideal structure for demonstrative science and a unified, comprehensive theory of heuristic inquiry. The Aristotelian idea of “demonstrative science” is derived from his attempt to characterize the conditions for “knowledge simpliciter,” that is, causal and necessary knowledge. This article first shows that Aristotle's inquiry theory is a heuristic theory and as such yields scientific knowledge within the scope of his theory of demonstration, and then examines the difficulties which arise concerning the relation between demonstration and definition. In particular, if demonstrations and definitions turn out to be unrelated in terms of their objects, predications, or methods, Aristotle's general plan will be a failure. The article explores how Aristotle attempts to construct a demonstration of what it is. Finally, by analysing his new theory of definition, the article considers how far he has succeeded in developing his heuristic demonstrative inquiry theory.

This chapter clarifies the meaning and role of ‘_to ti ên einai_’ (‘the what it was to be’) and its account called ‘_horos_’, which is translated as ‘defining-phrase’, in Aristotle's dialectic. It distinguishes the theory of dialectic — an attempt to systematize and improve on the Socratic method of dialogue on the basis of ‘the method of formal (_logikôs_) argument’ — from its _practice_, which is described using a different adverb ‘dialectically’ (_dialektikôs_). The chapter suggests that defining-phrase (_horos_) is a sub-component of the proposition which is used to express a definition. The phrase ‘the what it was to be’ (_to ti ên einai_) is designed to capture the ideal answer which Socrates was seeking for in his ‘What is F?’ question. Aristotle's distinctive phrase emerges from his reformulation of the Socratic ‘What is F?’ question in a context in which the interlocutor had overlooked what Socrates sought. The question ‘What was then it for F itself to be F?’, in using the past tense, reminds the interlocutor that he has overlooked _the thing F itself_ in his initial answer, offering, for instance, only an example of F.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The goal of this thesis is to offer a reading of Posterior Analytics as both philologically consistent and philosophically convincing, in order to resolve the various difficulties which have been raised by commentators since the Greeks. In Part I, I discuss the structure of Demonstrative Science. I argue that Aristotle distinguishes between philosophy of science and epistemology, by making a clear conceptual and terminological distinction between "demonstrative knowledge" and "Demonstrative Science". Aristotle distinguishes between an ultimate principle and the relative principles. The basis of the distinction is non-demonstrability. It is essential to distinguish immediate terms which are the non-demonstrable primary terms of a science from immediate propositions whose constituent terms are demonstrable with respect to their existence. Otherwise, the world would be full of inexplicable entities. I extract both the theoretical and pragmatic significance of his axiomatization of Demonstrative Theory. ;In Part II, I discuss Aristotle's methods of heuristic inquiry into essence. The method and the range of inquiry is determined by the complexity involved in discovery. Because of the complexity of any discovery involving necessary and essential properties, Aristotle finds no difficulty in identifying the inquiry into the existence of a substance with the inquiry into the existence of a middle term which requires two extreme terms. I investigate the nature of two types of causal entities both from the perspective of the structure of Demonstrative Science and from the metaphysical perspective. I argue that while the primary principles of a science and substantial form are concerned with the thing whose cause is identical with itself, the derivatives of primary principles and composite substance belong to the thing whose cause is different. I argue that inductive argument makes it possible to unify the various ingredients of a science under a common feature i.e. the primary term of a science which is shared by its ingredients.

A change in the evaluation of Nanga that is one of Chinese style painting symbolizes a transition of Japanese art thoughts that turned from nationalism to imperialism. In 1880's-90's, an establishment of the concept of national culture was an earnest problem. In those days, to separate Chinese element from Japanese culture was needed for an establishment of the "purity" of Japanese culture. Therefore, Nanga was attacked in art criticism. In 1910's, nanga was re-evaluated, because Japan's national policy had turned to imperialism and desired to possess China for obtaining the position as "a representative of the Orient." Toyozou Tanaka, an editor of "Kokka"magazine, wrote 'Nanga Shinron' to re-evaluate Nanga. He and his article had contributed to "Nanga boom" which came in 1910's. many critics and artists commented that Nanga was the essence of the Oriental art that is more excellent than the Occidental art, in this boom. A creation of such a new image about nanga might have been closely linked with creation of or support for Japan's new self-image in the "new era," the era of imperialism.