Keith DeRose

In epistemology, “contextualism” denotes a wide variety of more‐or‐less closely related positions according to which the issues of knowledge or justification are somehow relative to context. I will proceed by first explicating the position I call contextualism, and distinguishing that position from some closely related positions in epistemology, some of which sometimes also go by the name of “contextualism.” I'll then present and answer what seems to many the most pressing of the objections to contextualism as I construe it, and also indicate some of the main positive motivations for accepting the view. Among the epistemologists I've spoken with who have an opinion on the matter, I think it's fair to say a majority reject contextualism. However, the resistance has to this point been largely underground, with little by way of sustained arguments against contextualism appearing in the journals,1 though I have begun to see various papers in manuscript form which are critical of contextualism. Here, I'll respond to the criticism of contextualism that, in my travels, I have found to be the most pervasive in producing suspicion about the view.

The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the way, the following are all explained and defended: Moorean methodological approaches to skepticism, on which one seeks to defeat, rather than refute, the skeptic; contextualist responses to skepticism; contextualist substantive Mooreanism; the basic safety approach to knowledge and the double-safety picture of what knowledge is; insensitivity accounts of various appearances of ignorance; the closure principle for knowledge; and the claim that our knowledge that we are not brains in vats is a priori, despite its being knowledge of a deeply contingent fact.

Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuses mainly on a counterexample he offers to my account of the operation of the “Rule of Sensitivity.” The reply to Elke Brendel focuses mainly on objections to contextualism from the phenomena of disagreement and retraction. The reply to Peter Baumann concerns several of his comments about my treatment of the Harman lottery puzzle.

Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuses mainly on a counterexample he offers to my account of the operation of the “Rule of Sensitivity.” The reply to Elke Brendel focuses mainly on objections to contextualism from the phenomena of disagreement and retraction. The reply to Peter Baumann concerns several of his comments about my treatment of the Harman lottery puzzle.

The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the way, the following are all explained and defended: Moorean methodological approaches to skepticism, on which one seeks to defeat, rather than refute, the skeptic; contextualist responses to skepticism; contextualist substantive Mooreanism; the basic safety approach to knowledge and the double-safety picture of what knowledge is; insensitivity accounts of various appearances of ignorance; the closure principle for knowledge; and the claim that our knowledge that we are not brains in vats is a priori, despite its being knowledge of a deeply contingent fact.

In Chapter 1, I defend contextualism--the view that the standards for knowing that a subject must live up to in order for sentences attributing knowledge to her to be true vary according to various features of the contexts in which these sentences are uttered. ;In Chapter 2, I propose and defend a hypothesis as to the truth conditions of epistemic modal statements; I argue that if it is epistemically possible from a subject's point of view that not-p, then she does not know that p; and, since, according to my analysis, epistemic possibilities largely have to do with what is and is not known by various people, I extend the contextualist treatment of knowledge to cover epistemic possibilities. ;An external world skeptic may claim that whenever we attribute external world knowledge to someone, we are saying something false. In Chapter 3, I investigate the arguments which might be thought to support this bold sceptical claim. Such an argument, if it is good, presents us with a puzzle: its premises together with the negation of its conclusion form an inconsistent set of propositions, all of which seem plausible. I argue that contextualism provides the best resolution of these sceptical puzzles. We, therefore, have more reason to accept contextualism. And since this contextualist resolution is better than the sceptic's, the arguments do not support the sceptic's conclusion. ;Alternatively, an external world sceptic might accept contextualism and admit that we may be saying something true when, in everyday life, we claim to know this or that, but then claim that she is using 'know' in a philosophical setting in which the standards for knowledge are very high, and that, therefore, she is saying something true when she denies that we know anything about the external world. In Chapter 4, I argue that this philosophical sceptic's denials of knowledge don't have any of the interest they initially appear to have.

The author suspects that hardly anyone, if anyone at all, knows whether God exists. In this chapter he explains, and to some extent defends, this suspicion. His focus is limited to exploring what seems to be the most promising proposal as to how it might be that at least some people could know whether God exists—which turns out to be a way by which some theists might know that God does indeed exist: by means of religious experience. The author explains why it looks to him as if, at least in almost all cases, even if these people are right about God’s existence, the way in question fails to be a way by which they know that God exists.

I should be clear at the outset about what I'll mean -- and won't mean -- by "universalism." As I'll use it, "universalism" refers to the position that eventually all human beings will be saved and will enjoy everlasting life with Christ. This is compatible with the view that God will punish many people after death, and many universalists accept that there will be divine retribution, although some may not. What universalism does commit one to is that such punishment won't last forever. Universalism is also incompatible with various views according to which some will be annihilated (after or without first receiving punishment). These views can agree with universalism in that, according to them, punishment isn't everlasting, but they diverge from universalism in that they believe some will be denied everlasting life. Some universalists intend their position to apply animals, and some to fallen angels or even to Satan himself, but in my hands, it will be intended to apply only to human beings. In short, then, it's the position that every human being will, eventually at least, make it to the party.

Virtually all monotheistic religions profess that there is a divine being who is extremely powerful, knowledgeable, and good. The evils of this world present various challenges for such religions. The starkest challenge is directed toward views that posit a being whose power, knowledge, and goodness are not just immense, but are as great as can be: an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being (for short, an oopg being). For it would seem that such a being would have the power, the knowledge, and the moral disposition to prevent any evil whatsoever, and from this one might readily conclude that if there were such a being, there would be no evil at all. On one version of this challenge, the coexistence of evil with a God defined in this way is claimed to be logically impossible. This has come to be called the logical problem of evil. Another is that the existence of such a God is improbable given the evils of this world, or at least that the existence of these evils significantly lowers the probability that such an oopg God exists. The concern expressed is that these evils provide good evidence against the existence of such a God. This version is known as the evidential problem of evil.