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11Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical HypothesesIn John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: Sensitivity Accounts — Direct and Indirect The Attack by Counterexample on Sensitivity Accounts — And Why SCA Seems on the Right Track Nonetheless Sosa's Safety Account Sosa's Account as a Sensitivity Account — and His Counterexamples Safety and the Problem of True/True Subjunctives Other Formulations of Safety Safety and Strength of Epistemic Position Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism Intuitive Complexity: Do We Know that We're Not Brains in Vats?
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70Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of ScepticismPhilosophical Review 102 (4): 604. 1993.
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18Moore and Wittgenstein on CertaintyPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 238-241. 1994.
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13The appearance of ignoranceOxford University Press. 2017.Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context.
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47Précis of The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 2International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1): 1-3. 2020.The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the w…Read more
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37Replies to CommentatorsInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1): 68-104. 2020.Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuse…Read more
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15Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 945-949. 1993.
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38Replies to CommentatorsInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3): 284-320. 2019.Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuse…Read more
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37Précis of The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 2International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3): 321-323. 2019.The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the w…Read more
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Solving the Skeptical ProblemIn Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader, Oxford University Press. 1999.
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Knowledge, Epistemic Possibility, and ScepticismDissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1990.In Chapter 1, I defend contextualism--the view that the standards for knowing that a subject must live up to in order for sentences attributing knowledge to her to be true vary according to various features of the contexts in which these sentences are uttered. ;In Chapter 2, I propose and defend a hypothesis as to the truth conditions of epistemic modal statements; I argue that if it is epistemically possible from a subject's point of view that not-p, then she does not know that p; and, since, a…Read more
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14The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2Oxford University Press. 2017.Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context.
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92Delusions of Knowledge Concerning God's ExistenceIn Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 288-301. 2018.
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123Can it be that it would have been even though it might not have been?Philosophical Perspectives 13 385-413. 1999.The score was tied in the bottom of the ninth, I was on third base, and there was only one out when Bubba hit a towering fly ball to deep left-center. Although I’m no speed-demon, the ball was hammered so far that I easily could have scored the winning run if I had tagged up. But I didn’t. I got caught up in the excitement and stupidly played it half way, standing between third and home until I saw the center fielder make his spectacular catch, after which I had to return sheepishly to third. Th…Read more
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269Sosa, safety, sensitivity, and skeptical hypothesesIn J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 22--41. 2004.Fortunately for those of us who work on the topic, Ernie Sosa has devoted much of his (seemingly inexhaustible) intellectual energy to the problem of philosophical skepticism. And to great effect. With the three exceptions of Peter Unger, whose 1975 Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism is a grossly under-appreciated classic of epistemology; Timothy Williamson, whose 2000 Knowledge and its Limits is, I hope, on its way to being a less underappreciated classic; and Thomas Reid, I have benefitted more …Read more
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33``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context"Philosophical Review 111 (2): 167-203. 2002.This paper brings together two positions that for the most part have been developed and defended independently of one another: contextualism about knowledge attributions and the knowledge account of assertion.
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9Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 238-241. 1998.
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280Ought we to follow our evidence?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 697-706. 2000.fits our evidence.[1] I will propose some potential counter-examples to test this evidentialist thesis. My main intention in presenting the “counter-examples” is to better understand Feldman’s evidentialism, and evidentialism in general. How are we to understand what our evidence is, how it works, and how are we to understand the phrase “epistemically ought to believe” such that evidentialism might make sense as a plausible thesis in light of the examples? Of course, we may decide that there’s n…Read more
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127Though he’s perhaps best known for his work on vagueness, Timothy Williamson also produced a series of outstanding papers in epistemology in the late 1980's and the 1990's. Knowledge and its Limits brings this work together. The result is, in my opinion, the best book in epistemology to come out since 1975.
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759Knowledge, assertion and lotteriesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4). 1996.In some lottery situations, the probability that your ticket's a loser can get very close to 1. Suppose, for instance, that yours is one of 20 million tickets, only one of which is a winner. Still, it seems that (1) You don't know yours is a loser and (2) You're in no position to flat-out assert that your ticket is a loser. "It's probably a loser," "It's all but certain that it's a loser," or even, "It's quite certain that it's a loser" seem quite alright to say, but, it seems, you're in no posi…Read more
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48``The Conditionals of Deliberation"Mind 119 (473): 1-42. 2010.Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between ‘straightforward’ future-directed conditionals like ‘If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby’ and ‘ “were”ed-u…Read more
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815Contextualism and knowledge attributionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 913-929. 1992.
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120Skepticism: a contemporary reader (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1999.Recently, new life has been breathed into the ancient philosophical topic of skepticism. The subject of some of the best and most provocative work in contemporary philosophy, skepticism has been addressed not only by top epistemologists but also by several of the world's finest philosophers who are most known for their work in other areas of the discipline. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader brings together the most important recent contributions to the discussion of skepticism. Covering major ap…Read more
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2Questioning evidentialismIn Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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22Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 238-241. 1998.
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239The problem with subject-sensitive invariantismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2). 2004.Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of “Assertion, Knowledge and Context” establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for “I know that P” vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the va…Read more
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291Gradable adjectives: A defence of pluralismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1): 141-160. 2008.This paper attacks the Implicit Reference Class Theory of gradable adjectives and proposes instead a ?pluralist? approach to the semantics of those terms, according to which they can be governed by a variety of different types of standards, one, but only one, of which is the group-indexed standards utilized by the Implicit Reference Class Theory
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