Keith Dyck

This paper examines how incorporating theoretical virtues in belief updating affects the long-term success of epistemic communities. Drawing on NK landscape models of the type used by Lazer and Friedman (2007), simulation results are used to show that when epistemic agents in a connected community factor in virtues like conservatism, modesty, and familiarity in theory selection, agents hold differing beliefs for longer periods of time. This increase in transient diversity typically leads to greater long-term communal epistemic success, a benefit that becomes more pronounced as interconnectedness between community members increases.

Howson (2000) contends that the No-Miracles argument fails as an argument in support of scientific realism because it commits the base-rate fallacy. Psillos (2009) has defended the argument by appealing to cases that involve conditional probabilities but where base-rate information can properly be ignored. I show that Psillos’s defense of the No-Miracles argument is inadequate and that the prospects for a purely probabilistic formulation of the argument are dim. I end by considering whether interpreting the argument as an inference to the best explanation might better serve the scientific realist, concluding that such an approach would limit the realist’s ability to effectively counter the Pessimistic Induction.

According to Fricker’s (2007) seminal account, an epistemic injustice is done when, based on prejudice, a hearer ascribes to a speaker a level of credibility below what they deserve. When prejudice results in credibility excess, however, Fricker contends no similar injustice takes place. In this paper, I will challenge the second of these claims. Using a modified version of Zollman’s (2007) two-armed bandit model, I will show how the systematic over-ascription of credibility within a dominant group can produce epistemic advantages for that group relative to non-group members.