University of Sheffield
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2003
Sheffield, South Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
  •  250
    This paper takes another look at Davidson's paratactic theory of indirect discourse and evaluates some revisions to it, proposed recently by Ian Rumfitt (Mind, 1993). Davidson's original version of the theory – according to which indirect speech reports refer to token utterances – has a problem dealing with ambiguity. Rumfitt suggests that we can solve this problem by supposing that the immediate objects of verbs in indirect speech are token representations of disambiguated LF tree-structures. I…Read more
  •  137
    What Forms Could Introspective Systems Take? A Research Programme
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (9): 13-48. 2023.
    We propose a new approach to the study of introspection. Instead of asking what form introspection actually takes in humans or other animals, we ask what forms it could take, in natural or artificial minds. What are the dimensions along which forms of introspection could vary? This is a relatively unexplored question, but it is one that has the potential to open new avenues of study and reveal new connections between existing ones. It may, for example, focus attention on possible forms of intros…Read more
  •  30
    Toward dual-process theory 3.0
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46. 2023.
    This commentary is sympathetic to De Neys's revision of dual-process theory but argues for a modification to his position on exclusivity and proposes a bold further revision, envisaging a dual-process theory 3.0, in which system 1 not only initiates system 2 thinking but generates and sustains it as well.
  • Inner speech and outer thought
    In Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustín Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: New Voices, Oxford University Press. 2018.
  •  87
    Illusionism is no trick
    Human Affairs 32 (3): 321-327. 2022.
  •  13
    Technology and the Human Minds
    In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts, Springer Verlag. pp. 65-82. 2021.
    According to dual-process theory, human cognition is supported by two distinct types of processing, one fast, automatic, and unconscious, the other slower, controlled, and conscious. These processes are sometimes said to constitute two minds – an intuitive old mind, which is evolutionarily ancient and composed of specialized subsystems, and a reflective new mind, which is distinctively human and the source of general intelligence. This theory has far-reaching consequences, and it means that rese…Read more
  •  49
    Galileo's Real Error
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10): 141-146. 2021.
    Goff argues that Galileo erred in denying that sensory qualities are present in the physical world and that we should correct his error by supposing that all matter has an intrinsic conscious aspect. This paper argues that we should be open to another theoretical option. Galileo's real error, I argue, was not about the location of sensory qualities, but about their very existence. Like most people, Galileo assumed that sensory qualities are instantiated somewhere. I argue that this is a theoreti…Read more
  •  34
    In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond (edited book)
    with Jonathan St B. T. Evans
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    This book explores the idea that we have two minds - one automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. It brings together leading researchers on dual-process theory to summarize the state of the art highlight key issues, present different perspectives, and provide a stimulus to further work.
  •  148
    Panpsychism and the Depsychologization of Consciousness
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 95 (1): 51-70. 2021.
    The problem of consciousness arises when we depsychologize consciousness—that is, conceptualize it in terms of phenomenal feel rather than psychological function. Panpsychism offers an elegant solution to the problem, which takes depsychologization seriously. In doing so, however, it also illustrates the perils of depsychologization. Nagasawa highlights one dead end for panpsychism, and I shall argue that there are more. Panpsychism consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo where it is beyo…Read more
  •  231
    The Meta-Problem is The Problem of Consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 83-94. 2019.
    The meta-problem of consciousness prompts the metaquestion: is it the only problem consciousness poses? If we could explain all our phenomenal intuitions in topic-neutral terms, would anything remain to be explained? Realists say yes, illusionists no. In this paper I defend the illusionist answer. While it may seem obvious that there is something further to be explained -- consciousness itself -- this seemingly innocuous claim immediately raises a further problem -- the hard meta-problem. What c…Read more
  •  428
    The rationale of rationalization
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43. 2019.
    While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.
  •  35
    The Lure of the Cartesian Sideshow
    The Philosophers' Magazine 88 69-74. 2020.
  •  64
    Not Disllusioned: Reply to Commentators
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 256-289. 2016.
    This piece replies to commentators on my target article in this issue, 'Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness', building on the arguments offered there. It groups commentators together by their attitude to illusionism, classifying them as advocates, explorers, sceptics, and opponents. It expands on the case for illusionism, refines the position, and responds to objections.
  •  915
    Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 11-39. 2016.
    This article presents the case for an approach to consciousness that I call illusionism. This is the view that phenomenal consciousness, as usually conceived, is illusory. According to illusionists, our sense that it is like something to undergo conscious experiences is due to the fact that we systematically misrepresent them as having phenomenal properties. Thus, the task for a theory of consciousness is to explain our illusory representations of phenomenality, not phenomenality itself, and the…Read more
  •  49
    What Is It Like To Be A Bot?
    Philosophy Now 126 56-58. 2018.
  •  29
    Reasoning, argumentation, and cognition
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2): 79-80. 2011.
    This commentary does three things. First, it offers further support for the view that explicit reasoning evolved for public argumentation. Second, it suggests that promoting effective communication may not be the only, or even the main, function of public argumentation. Third, it argues that the data Mercier and Sperber (M&S) cite are compatible with the view that reasoning has subsequently been co-opted to play a role in individual cognition
  •  100
    Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6): 685-686. 2002.
    Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he argues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech.
  •  140
    Delusions: A two-level framework
    In Matthew R. Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 269--284. 2009.
    [About the book]: Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of …Read more
  •  25
    Mind - by Eric Matthews
    Philosophical Books 48 (2): 185-187. 2007.
    A review of Eric Matthews' *Mind: Key Concepts in Philosophy* (Bloomsbury 2005).
  •  265
    A matter of opinion
    Philosophical Psychology 11 (4): 423-442. 1998.
    This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of human psychology. It takes its start from Daniel Dennett
  •  62
    [About the book]: This volume is a state-of-the-art survey of the psychology of reasoning, based around, and in tribute to, one of the field's most eminent figures: Jonathan St B.T. Evans.In this collection of cutting edge research, Evans' collaborators and colleagues review a wide range of important and developing areas of inquiry. These include biases in thinking, probabilistic and causal reasoning, people's use of 'if' sentences in arguments, the dual-process theory of thought, and the nature…Read more
  •  255
    Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief
    In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief, Springer. pp. 75--93. 2009.
    There is a duality in our everyday view of belief. On the one hand, we sometimes speak of credence as a matter of degree. We talk of having some level of confidence in a claim (that a certain course of action is safe, for example, or that a desired event will occur) and explain our actions by reference to these degrees of confidence – tacitly appealing, it seems, to a probabilistic calculus such as that formalized in Bayesian decision theory. On the other hand, we also speak of belief as an unqu…Read more
  •  137
    Evolving the Linguistic Mind
    Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 9 206-214. 2010.
    It is sometimes suggested that we can think “in” natural language. According to this “cognitive” conception of language, we have a linguistic mind, or level of mentality, which operates by manipulating representations of natural language sentences. This paper outlines two evolutionary questions that the cognitive conception must address and looks at some versions of it to see which provides the best answers to them. The most plausible version, I argue, is the view that the linguistic mind is a v…Read more
  •  43
    Conscious thinking, acceptance, and self-deception
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1): 20-21. 2011.
    This commentary describes another variety of self-deception, highly relevant to von Hippel & Trivers's (VH&T's) project. Drawing on dual-process theories, I propose that conscious thinking is a voluntary activity motivated by metacognitive attitudes, and that our choice of reasoning strategies and premises may be biased by unconscious desires to self-deceive. Such biased reasoning could facilitate interpersonal deception, in line with VH&T's view
  •  56
    The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (edited book)
    with William M. Ramsey
    Cambridge University Press. 2014.
    Artificial intelligence, or AI, is a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding, modeling, and creating intelligence of various forms. It is a critical branch of cognitive science, and its influence is increasingly being felt in other areas, including the humanities. AI applications are transforming the way we interact with each other and with our environment, and work in artificially modeling intelligence is offering new insights into the human mind and revealing new forms mentality can take.…Read more
  • Review of Consciousness in Action, by Susan Hurley (review)
    Mind 115 156-9. 2006.
    Questions about the relation between mind and world have long occupied philosophers of mind. In _Consciousness in Action_ Susan Hurley invites us to adopt a ninety-degree shift and consider the relation between perception and action. The central theme of the book is an attack on what Hurley dubs the _Input-Output Picture_ of perception and actionthe picture of perceptions as sensory inputs to the cognitive system and intentions as motor outputs from it, with the mind occupying the buffer zone in…Read more