Up until very recently, I was an unaffiliated "armchair philosopher," but I'm currently at the U of A, filling in a few holes in my education with an eye toward grad school. I've given poster presentations at Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006 and 2008; the first concerned strange ontological and epistemological implications of materialist reductionism, while the second expanded on Diana Raffman's work on ineffability to suggest a fatal flaw in the materialist program, a diminished role for attention in consciousness, and the possibility of the long-sought "evidence that qualia exist." My current projects include an ontological and episte…
Up until very recently, I was an unaffiliated "armchair philosopher," but I'm currently at the U of A, filling in a few holes in my education with an eye toward grad school. I've given poster presentations at Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006 and 2008; the first concerned strange ontological and epistemological implications of materialist reductionism, while the second expanded on Diana Raffman's work on ineffability to suggest a fatal flaw in the materialist program, a diminished role for attention in consciousness, and the possibility of the long-sought "evidence that qualia exist." My current projects include an ontological and epistemic exploration of the hard problem and an analysis of the late David Foster Wallace's literary contributions to the consciousness debate, along with writings on Strawson-style panpsychism and phenomenal intentionality.