Kelin Emmett

This chapter argues against the view of Kantian freedom encapsulated in Henry Allison’s Incorporation Thesis, which has gained widespread support among Kantians. According to Allison, Kant thought that all action, even heteronomous action, requires an act of freedom. So construed, Kant’s disagreement with Hume was not simply about the freedom required for moral agency, but for all agency more generally, so that even if Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative were to fail, our agency could still be free in a morally neutral and limited sense. This chapter argues that this view is unable to meet the criterion necessary for its successful defense, and that attempts to do so face a trilemma as well as collapse Kant’s distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. It concludes that Kant locates freedom in the capacity to will autonomously—in accordance with the categorical imperative.

Moderata Fonte's dialogueThe Worth of Women(1600) contains stinging critiques of marriage and the dowry system as well as of women's inequality. I argue that Fonte's critique of male dominance, particularly in marriage, employs a modern method of argument, which anticipates the later contractarian critiques of political authority. Given that women are naturally men's equals, Fonte argues that men's de facto authority over women is illegitimate and based on force. Moreover, by treating marriage as an artificial institution rather than as a natural institution, Fonte anticipates later feminist arguments that criticize the modern contract tradition for its failure to extend its critique of other forms of authority to patriarchal marriage, instead positing a natural basis for women's subordination to men. In light of this history, Fonte's critique of patriarchy is especially interesting: it challenges the patriarchal family structure and the institutions that collude to diminish women's agency, and this challenge to male authority is similar to later (male) challenges to de facto political authority.