Kelli Christine Rudolph

We begin with an analysis of the persuasiveness of assertibles and arguments in the texts and fragments of Ancient Stoicism, with a particular focus on those in which Stoic logic is presented as the tool to avoid the persuasiveness of sophisms and the Stoic sage as the one who can efface this persuasiveness by his expertise in dialectics. We then critically assess the contemporary consensus on the interpretation of these texts (notably in Chiaradona, Sedley and Tieleman), according to which Chrysippus is interested in extra-logical forms of discourse. Tieleman further argues that Chrysippus uses persuasive premises for constructive purposes. We reject the thesis concerning Chrysippus' recognition of extra-logical truths, on the basis of the Stoic ideal of the sage, concluding instead that in Stoicism, (1) pithanon refers primarily to false assertibles, arguments and presentations and (2) the Stoic sage cannot be persuaded, but he can persuade his students in order to prepare their souls to receive the Stoic doctrines.

In this paper we concentrate our attention on the celebrated distinction between things up to us (eph’ hemin) and things not up to us (ouk eph’ hemin), surveying the distinction between the material (hyle) and its use. According to this distinction, all external things are not up to us and consequently have no intrinsic value, although, as materials for the capacity of choice, their use has value, since humans can use things well or badly. We argue that the use of the materials corresponds to the use of presentations (phantasiai), and link the use of material directly to the three essential preoccupations of Epictetus’ philosophy: the topic relative to desire, the topic relative to impulse and the topic relative to assent. The knowledge contained in these three topics constitute, for Epictetus, what we should know to make good use of presentations, and consequently, to achieve the human good, which is a capacity of choice according to nature that has at its disposal a comprehensive set of correct opinions about reality.

I argue that Democritus presents a theory of colour in which the predominance of atomic shapes and microstructural arrangements are necessary but not sufficient for colour vision. Focusing primarily on Democritus’ basic colours, I analyse his microstructural account, providing a new analysis of the natural and technological underpinnings of his method of explanation. I argue that the notion of predominance allows Democritus to account for both the variation and the repeatable correspondence of colour perception by setting limits on possible microstructures. This account, however, is complicated by the evidence for a Democritean theory of colour transformation and distorted vision, which arise from a dynamic interplay of features at the level of microstructures and at the level of perception.

Epictetus follows Stoic orthodoxy - and Zeno’s own definition - by emphasizing the importance of logic in detecting sophisms. He goes so far as to assert that it is a virtue that subsumes four others: carefulness, caution, irrefutability and seriousness. In this paper, we argue that Epictetus’ interest in the testing of presentations extends also to premises and arguments. We demonstrate how Epictetus, following Chrysippus, creates a systematic approach to understanding sophisms/arguments. The philosopher must understand the consequences of what has been granted, offer valid demonstrations, follow the demonstrations of his interlocutors, and ultimately be able to detect sophisms. These sophisms, as well as the premises and arguments connected with them, are often characterized by Epictetus as _pithanon_. We argue that what he means by this is that the sophisms and their components are deceptive, often deliberately so. To make such a judgement, however, the philosopher must master Stoic dialectics and the study of sophisms.

Este artigo é uma tentativa de esclarecer a relação entre a posição dissidente assumida por estoicos antigos em seu contexto social e a maneira corajosa como defenderam suas posições políticas a partir de alguns princípios do sistema estoico, o que levou muitos deles ao exílio e à morte durante o Período Imperial Romano (terceira fase da civilização romana, que se estendeu de 27 AEC a 476 EC). Sugerimos que a marginalização desses grupos, bem como a sua perseguição, posiciona os estoicos de maneira única, tanto em seu próprio tempo como no nosso.

Democritus' theory of vision combines the notions of images (??????) streaming from objects and air imprints, which gives him the resources to account for the perception of the relative size and distance of objects, not just their characteristics. This perspectival explanation of the visual theory accommodates important but overlooked evidence from Vitruvius. By comparing Democritus' theory with ancient developments in visual representation, my analysis provides a new approach to the evidence of atomist vision. I begin with the process of vision before turning to the Peripatetic objections, showing how a unified theory of vision takes into account all of the ancient testimony and provides possible atomist responses to the criticisms raised against it. I also identify the importance of vision via air imprints as an important metaphor for the conventionality of sensible qualities. Understanding these fundamental issues puts us in a better position to assess Democritus' place in the development of ancient optics and of atomist approaches to sense perception.

We begin with an analysis of the persuasiveness of assertibles and arguments in the texts and fragments of Ancient Stoicism, with a particular focus on those in which Stoic logic is presented as the tool to avoid the persuasiveness of sophisms and the Stoic sage as the one who can efface this persuasiveness by his expertise in dialectics. We then critically assess the contemporary consensus on the interpretation of these texts (notably in Chiaradona, Sedley and Tieleman), according to which Chrysippus is interested in extra-logical forms of discourse. Tieleman further argues that Chrysippus uses persuasive premises for constructive purposes. We reject the thesis concerning Chrysippus' recognition of extra-logical truths, on the basis of the Stoic ideal of the sage, concluding instead that in Stoicism, (1) pithanon refers primarily to false assertibles, arguments and presentations and (2) the Stoic sage cannot be persuaded, but he can persuade his students in order to prepare their souls to receive the Stoic doctrines.

Na primeira parte, fazemos um levantamento das ocorrências de pithanon (‘persuasivo’) e termos afins em textos e fragmentos do estoicismo antigo referentes à persuasão de asseríveis e argumentos e em textos e fragmentos em que a lógica estoica se apresenta como ferramenta para evitar a persuasão dos sofismas e o sábio estoico como aquele que capaz de vencer essa persuasão por sua perícia em dialética. Feito isso, consideramos criticamente as teses de Chiaradona, Sedley e Tieleman, para quem Crisipo está interessado em formas extralógicas de discurso. Avaliaremos também a tese de Tieleman segundo a qual Crisipo usa premissas persuasivas para fins construtivos. Em nossas conclusões, descartamos a tese sobre o reconhecimento de verdades extralógicas por Crisipo com base no ideal do sábio estoico. Concluímos que, no estoicismo, (1) pithanon refere-se principalmente a falsas afirmações, argumentos e representações e (2) que o sábio estoico não pode ser persuadido, mas pode persuadir seus ouvintes a fim de preparar suas almas para receber as doutrinas estoicas.

In this paper we will focus on the following points in Epictetus. First, we will concentrate our attention on the celebrated distinction between things up to us and things not up to us. Second, we will survey the distinction between the material and its use. According to this distinction, all external things are not up to us and consequently have no intrinsic value, although, as materials for the capacity of choice, their use has value, since humans can use things well or badly. Third, we will demonstrate that the use of the materials corresponds to the use of presentations. Finally, we will present the three topics of Epictetus’ philosophy: the topic relative to desire, the topic relative to impulse and the topic relative to assent, being the first concerned with judgments about things and our desires; the second, about impulses and adequate actions; and the third, about assent and persuasiveness of presentations. The knowledge contained in these three topics constitute, for Epictetus, what we should know to make good use of presentations and, consequently, to achieve the human good, which is a capacity of choice according to nature that has at its disposal a comprehensive set of correct opinions about reality.

I argue that Democritus presents a theory of colour in which the predominance of atomic shapes and microstructural arrangements are necessary but not sufficient for colour vision. Focusing primarily on Democritus’ basic colours, I analyse his microstructural account, providing a new analysis of the natural and technological underpinnings of his method of explanation. I argue that the notion of predominance allows Democritus to account for both the variation and the repeatable correspondence of colour perception by setting limits on possible microstructures. This account, however, is complicated by the evidence for a Democritean theory of colour transformation and distorted vision, which arise from a dynamic interplay of features at the level of microstructures and at the level of perception.