Kelly Gawel

This interview, conducted over several months between Lauren Guilmette and Taylor (“Tay”) Rogers, in conversation with Amy Marvin, Qrescent Mali Mason, and Kelly Gawel, examines the creation and impact of a film that Rogers produced as part of their doctoral research in Continental philosophy. The film’s creation process is, itself, of interest to contemporary Continental philosophy: this process was collaborative, emergent, and based on music that Rogers composed. In the interview, the film’s philosophical import is explored, from its connections to canonical figures like Nietzsche and Lugones to emerging feminist voices in philosophy of humour, trans studies, critical race studies, and themes related to embodiment, grief, affect, and relational ontologies. Readers are introduced to research-creation as an arts-based practice of research that holds great, often untapped value for philosophical inquiry.

This interview, conducted over several months between Lauren Guilmette and Taylor (“Tay”) Rogers, in conversation with Amy Marvin, Qrescent Mali Mason, and Kelly Gawel, examines the creation and impact of a film that Rogers produced as part of their doctoral research in Continental philosophy. The film’s creation process is, itself, of interest to contemporary Continental philosophy: this process was collaborative, emergent, and based on music that Rogers composed. In the interview, the film’s philosophical import is explored, from its connections to canonical figures like Nietzsche and Lugones to emerging feminist voices in philosophy of humour, trans studies, critical race studies, and themes related to embodiment, grief, affect, and relational ontologies. Readers are introduced to research-creation as an arts-based practice of research that holds great, often untapped value for philosophical inquiry.

This article attends to the intimate contradictions that differentially shape and limit caring capacities and relations in a violent world, and the embodied ethical and political transformations at the heart of learning to care otherwise. From manifestos calling for ‘universal care’ in defiance of the state-sanctioned horrors of the pandemic era, to the abolitionist politics of care developed by BLM organizers through movement building and healing, and the proliferation of mutual-aid infrastructures to meet needs and distribute resources in the face of overwhelming crisis and neglect—these examples and so many others illustrate with undeniable clarity that radical care is finally on the agenda. In what follows, I hope to contribute to this urgent conversation by pointing to how care is shaped in fundamentally contradictory ways under conditions of entrenched structural violence, and the limitations of normative frameworks when confronting this reality. To unambiguously valorize care in ethical and political life is to risk occluding the constitutive violence of existing social structures and norms, its impact on the intimacies of caring relations, and ultimately the ways that communities mobilize alternate economies and practices of care towards healing and social change. While it is crucial to value care and work for a more caring society, I claim that efforts to transform patterns of relational harm and develop new sensibilities should also be highlighted as integral components of radical caring praxis.

This article claims that Asha Bhandary’s theory of justice in Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture is right to stress the interdependency of justice and care in addressing structural oppressions, but wrong in upholding liberalism’s capacity for doing so. Against her procedural mechanism of education for caregiving skills in particular, I point to the critical and generative methods of social reproduction feminism and Transformative Justice as models of radical praxis in the collective work of politically centering and radically transforming cultures of care.