Kelly Smith

Our capabilities in space are growing almost as fast as our ambitions. Many nations, companies, and private actors are currently vying to secure historic “firsts” in space, raising complex social and ethical questions. There is surprisingly little serious analysis of these issues, however, and they are rarely discussed in undergraduate class discussions, despite their popularity with students. To help correct this deficit, a student research team designed 11 case studies to help instructors across the curriculum introduce space into their classes. These are designed for ease of use, with self-contained background information, suggested readings/movies, and a series of juicy questions.

This book focuses on the emerging scientific discipline of astrobiology, exploring the humanistic issues of this multidisciplinary field. To be sure, there are myriad scientific questions that astrobiologists have only begun to address. However, this is not a purely scientific enterprise. More research on the broader social and conceptual aspects of astrobiology is needed. Just what are our ethical obligations toward different sorts of alien life? Should we attempt to communicate with life beyond our planet? What is “life” in the most general sense? The current volume addresses these questions by looking at different perspectives from philosophers, historians, theologians, social scientists, and legal scholars. It sets a benchmark for future work in astrobiology, giving readers the groundwork from which to base the continuous scholarship coming from this ever-growing scientific field.

Whatever we take “life” to mean, it must involve an attempt to describe the objective reality beyond scientists’ biases. Traditionally, this is thought to involve comparing our scientific categories to “natural kinds.” But this approach has been tainted with an implicit metaphysics, inherited from Aristotle, that does not fit biological reality. In particular, we must accept that biological categories will never be specifiable in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions or shared underlying physical structures that produce clean boundaries. Biology blurs all lines and failure to embrace this unique feature has blocked attempts to reach consensus on the meaning of “life.” Thus, while the three classical accounts all fall short of offering a complete definition, their advocates fail to realize that they share the same view of life’s ultimate, functional hallmark: its uniquely rich adaptive capacity. I develop an account of life as adaptive capacity that sidesteps debates about the relative importance of specific mechanisms and the precise location of boundaries to bring the three classical accounts together under a shared conceptual framework.

Introduction. Gene-centrism, the idea that the genome is the most important factor in biology, is currently the predominant view among both biologists and the lay public. But gene-centric views rest on erroneous assumptions concerning the heritable transmission of information and the nature of causal explanation. Such views must be replaced with more inclusive theories of natural selection and developmental causation. ;Chapter I. The gene-centric approach to biology is shown to be the latest in a long series of attempts to explain biological form as the effect of monistic formal causes: from Aristotle's notions of vital heat to medieval theories of preformation to the internal programs of Roux. Although Driesch and Spemann laid bare the poverty of such views in the nineteenth century, the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics and the rapid rise of the new science it made possible has cloaked the monists' ideas in a newly respectable guise. ;Chapter II. In evolutionary theory, gene-centrism finds expression in the genic selectionism of Williams and Dawkins. Genic selectionists argue that all of natural selection should be interpreted as acting not on organisms or groups of organisms, but on the genes. However, the arguments used to motivate such a move are all inadequate. Moreover, there are some population-level traits which defy explanation in terms of the interests of "selfish genes". ;Chapter III. The central dogma of gene-centric biology--the Weissman doctrine--is both theoretically and empirically suspect. More recent attempts to defend the primacy of the genes in terms of the notion of replicators are also inappropriate, given the facts of extra-genetic inheritance and the causal interdependence of genetic and epigenetic factors. ;Chapter IV. Several different philosophical techniques for making causal selections in complex systems are considered. None of them is adequate for according the genes the kinds of privileged status the gene-centrists require. Covariance analysis can indicate causal situations wherein selection may be appropriate, but selection in such cases will be highly relative. A more holistic picture of the causal systems involved in development and evolution is required and the developmental systems approach provides this, though there are still unresolved problems with its application

I. Introductory Comments   The Human Genome Project will be completed within 2 years, and “targeted†sequence data from the most promising sections of the genome will be released even sooner. Based on this wealth of information, at least 400 new genetic tests will become available within the next decade. The blending of microelectronic and genetic technology will make the “genetic report card†an affordable and routine part of medical care. The implicit assumption driving much of this push for genetic testing is that information is inherently good and patients should have the right to any information about themselves they desire. However, the informational content of genetic tests for most conditions is not known and may in fact be very low. Under such circumstances, it seems prudent to treat access to genetic testing the same way we currently treat access to other new medical procedures and drugs – that is, access is afforded only 1) in the context of a clinical trial or  2) after the safety and effectiveness of the treatment has been established. The fact is, genetic “information†of uncertain quality is not innocous. II. The Difficulty with Genetic Testing   Everyone is familiar with one difficulty posed by genetic testing: the possibility that a test may show either a “false positive†or a “false negativeâ€.  This is the problem of the analytic accuracy of testing. However, as our analytic techniques become more sophisticated, the incidence of such errors will steadily decline. If nothing else, administration of multiple tests is often (though not always) a simple and effective way of boosting analytic accuracy.   There is, however, a much more serious accuracy problem which has been largely overlooked in the literature..

Why is the academy in general, and philosophy in particular, not more involved in the fight against the creationist threat? And why, when a response is offered, is it so curiously ineffective? I argue, by using an analogy with the battle against the Black Knight from the movie Monty Python and the Holy Grail, that the difficulty lies largely in a failure to see the nature of the problem clearly. By modifying the analogy, it is possible to see both why large sections of the academy have remained unmoved and also why many of the reactions to the threat have been so unsuccessful. Finally, I offer some very broad suggestions as to how to modify our approach in light of this new perspective.

This paper evaluates and criticises the developmental systems conception of evolution and develops instead an extension of the gene's eye conception of evolution. We argue (i) Dawkin's attempt to segregate developmental and evolutionary issues about genes is unsatisfactory. On plausible views of development it is arbitrary to single out genes as the units of selection. (ii) The genotype does not carry information about the phenotype in any way that distinguishes the role of the genes in development from that other factors. (iii) There is no simple and general causal criterion which distinguishes the role of genes in development and evolution. (iv) There is, however, an important sense in which genes but not every other developmental factor represent the phenotype. (v) The idea that genes represent features of the phenotype forces us to recognise that genes are not the only, or almost the only, replicators. Many mechanisms of replication are involved in both development and evolution. (vi) A conception of evolutionary history which recognises both genetic and non-genetic replicators, lineages of replicators and interactors has advantages over both the radical rejection of the replicator/interactor distinction and the conservative restriction of replication to genetic replication.

What exactly is a genetic disease? For a phrase one hears on a daily basis, there has been surprisingly little analysis of the underlying concept. Medical doctors seem perfectly willing to admit that the etiology of disease is typically complex, with a great many factors interacting to bring about a given condition. On such a view, descriptions of diseases like cancer as geneticseem at best highly simplistic, and at worst philosophically indefensible. On the other hand, there is clearly some practical value to be had by classifying diseases according to theirpredominant cause when this can be accomplished in a theoretically satisfactory manner. The question therefore becomes exactly how one should go about selecting a single causal factor among many to explain the presence of disease. When an attempt to defend such causal selection is made at all, the standard accounts offered (Koch's postulates, Hill's epidemiological criteria, manipulability) are all clearly inadequate. I propose, however, an epidemiological account of disease causation which walks the fine line between practical applicability and theoretical considerations of causal complexity and attempts to compromise between patient-centered and population-centered concepts of disease. The epidemiological account is the most basic framework consistent with our strongly held intuitions about the causal classification of disease, yet it avoids the difficulties encountered by its competitors