Kelly Sorensen

Kant stated that there are three mental faculties: cognition, feeling, and desire. The faculty of feeling has received the least scholarly attention, despite its importance in Kant's broader thought, and this volume of new essays is the first to present multiple perspectives on a number of important questions about it. Why does Kant come to believe that feeling must be described as a separate faculty? What is the relationship between feeling and cognition, on the one hand, and desire, on the other? What is the nature of feeling? What do the most discussed Kantian feelings, such as respect and sublimity, tell us about the nature of feeling for Kant? And what about other important feelings that have been overlooked or mischaracterized by commentators, such as enthusiasm and hope? This collaborative and authoritative volume will appeal to Kant scholars, historians of philosophy, and those working on topics in ethics, aesthetics, and emotions.

One of the factors that contributes to an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness - his or her moral worth – is effort. On the one hand, agents who act effortlessly seem to have high moral worth. On the other hand, agents who act effortfully seem to have high moral worth as well. I explain this pair of intuitions and explore the contour of our views about cases in between them. This paper uses conceptual graphs for clarity and, in additional work I have done on value theory, as arguments. Conceptual graphs reflect a way of doing philosophy that is new and powerful, as reflected in work over the past several decades by Derek Parfit, Shelly Kagan, Larry Temkin, and Thomas Hurka.

Some say moral bioenhancements are urgent and necessary; others say they are misguided or simply will not work. I examine a class of arguments claiming that moral bioenhancements are problematic because they are self-subverting. On this view, trying to make oneself or others more moral, at least through certain means, can itself be immoral, or at least worse than the alternatives. The thought here is that moral enhancements might fail not for biological reasons, but for specifically morally self-referential reasons. I argue that moral bioenhancements, in a restricted set of cases, are self-subverting such that they are impermissible. Further, some moral bioenhancements would result in agents who are less admirable than they might have been through other means

Unit 731, a biological warfare research organisation that operated under the authority of the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 1940s, conducted brutal experiments on thousands of unconsenting subjects. Because of the US interest in the data from these experiments, the perpetrators were not prosecuted and the atrocities are still relatively undiscussed. What counts as meaningful moral repair in this case—what should perpetrators and collaborator communities do decades later? We argue for three non-ideal but realistic forms of moral repair: (1) a national policy in Japan against human experimentation without appropriate informed and voluntary consent; (2) the establishment of a memorial to the victims of Unit 731; and (3) US disclosure about its use of Unit 731 data and an apology for failing to hold the perpetrators accountable.

Actions are right or wrong; agents are good or bad. Most ethicists are interested in the first dimension. My work is about the second. Factors relevant to the first dimension include, for example, the action's consequences and whether the action is a harm. But many other morally compelling factors are neglected if we focus exclusively on right and wrong---factors such as motives, intentions, effort, and character. These are among the factors of a second dimension, moral worth: the goodness or badness of agents. We can perform right actions without being good agents. Knowing which actions are right only partially helps us answer the question of what it is to be good. ;I take it that what I have just said reflects ordinary moral intuitions. Nevertheless moral worth is a neglected topic in contemporary philosophical ethics. Others have written about specific virtues, or about "virtue ethics" as an alternative moral theory to consequentialism and deontology. But I know of no one else who has attempted a close analysis of the general factors that constitute praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. An account of these factors is relevant to any of the three leading contemporary ethical theories. ;My examination of these factors yields a surprising wealth of possible positions. I map out these positions and argue for the best of them. My specific topics include the nature of motives, Kantian views about the motive of duty, the relative weight of first-order and second-order motives, patterns of motives, effort as a complex of apparently conflicting subfactors, and the relevance of counterfactual circumstances to character. I appeal to the cases of Oskar Schindler and Huck Finn, among others, to illustrate the complexities of these issues. ;My dissertation is the first systematic analysis of the factors of moral worth. Internal states of persons---motives, intentions, effort, character---matter to us, and an ethical theory is richer with an adequate account of them

This textually well-supported book takes seriously Kant’s corpus as a system, claiming that devoted attention to the whole makes each individual work in turn more intelligible, consistent, and compelling. Wuerth claims that a key to Kant’s system is Kant’s account of the self or soul. For Wuerth, Kant’s self is a simple, noumenal substance that possesses powers by which it effects accidents. This is against the familiar interpretation, associated with Patricia Kitcher, Henry Allison, Robert Pippin, Karl Ameriks, and Béatrice Longuenesse, that Kant in the critical period rejects any and all ontologically significant claims about the self. Wuerth says this..

The gestational surrogate – and her economic and educational vulnerability in particular – is the focus of many of the most persistent worries about paid surrogacy. Those who employ her, and those who broker and organize her services, usually have an advantage over her in resources and information. That asymmetry exposes her to the possibility of exploitation and abuse. Accordingly, some argue for banning paid surrogacy. Others defend legal permission on grounds of surrogate autonomy, but often retain concerns about the surrogate. In response to the dilemma of a ban versus bald permission, we propose a 'soft law' approach: states should require several hours of education of surrogates – education aimed at informing and enhancing surrogate autonomy.

If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may indicate, Kant thinks the emotions play an important role in the moral life. I want to extend the work of Baron, Guyer, Herman, Sherman and Wood in three ways. First, I will set out in a diagram Kant's taxonomy of feelings and emotions. Agreement on such a taxonomy should make it easier to evaluate debates about Kant and the emotions. Second, I will focus on a certain subclass of emotions – reason-caused affects – that have previously received little attention, even from these Kant scholars. Third, these scholars base much of their defence of Kant on his later works – especially the Metaphysics of Morals and the Anthropology – but Kant's fairly rich taxonomy of the emotions, including reason-caused affects, is clearly in place at least as early as the Critique of Judgment . I believe that the Critique of Judgment is an importantly ignored resource for understanding the moral role of the emotions for Kant. The third Critique makes positive, philosophically interesting claims about the emotions and morality. Kant emphasizes certain roles for emotions in this work that he develops to the same extent nowhere else. Nevertheless, the Critique of Judgment goes all but unmentioned by many who write on these issues. In what follows, I will defend as many of my claims as possible using the third Critique

A paradigmatic aspect of a paradigmatic kind of right is that the rights holder is the only one who can alienate it. When individuals waive rights, the normative source of that waiving is normally taken to be the individual herself. This moral feature?immunity?is usually in the background of discussions about rights. We bring it into the foreground here, with specific attention to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Kentucky v. King (2011), concerning search and seizure rights. An entailment of the Court's decision is that, at least in some cases, a right can be removed by the intentional actions of the very party against whom the right supposedly protects the rights holder. We argue that the Court's decision is mistaken. The police officers in the case were not morally permitted, and should not be legally permitted, to intentionally create the very circumstances that result in the removal of an individual's right against forced, warrantless search and seizure

Next SectionSome argue that genetic enhancements and environmental enhancements are not importantly different: environmental enhancements such as private schools and chess lessons are simply the old-school way to have a designer baby. I argue that there is an important distinction between the two practices—a distinction that makes state restrictions on genetic enhancements more justifiable than state restrictions on environmental enhancements. The difference is that parents have no settled expectations about genetic enhancements