Kelsey Boor

This paper discusses the debate regarding the terms makarios (“blessed”) and eudaimon (“happy”) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In it, I identify two scholarly conclusions regarding these terms: (1) the distinction thesis: that the words mean different things in the text, and (2) the interchangeability thesis: that the words do not mean different things in the text, and may be substituted for one another. I argue that the theories should both be used as heuristic tools of analysis, rather than only one of them being used as a universal rule to be applied to the text. Additionally, I argue that a third heuristic device is needed: I forward that while makarios and eudaimon are sometimes interchangeable (contra the distinction thesis) they are not synonymous (contra the interchangeability thesis). Rather, in some cases, both terms can be translated as “happy,” but they are being used by Aristotle in reference to subjects with distinct natures. In these instances, eudaimonia can sometimes be interpreted as a properly human term, which we cannot apply to the gods. Or, if it is applied to the gods, it must be applied in a distinct, qualified way. Meanwhile, makarios can sometimes be interpreted as a properly divine term, used in reference to the gods or to a god-like status achieved by a human being who has superseded normal human achievement or capacity.