Kelsey Maglio

In this article, we explain how Kant upends the terms of the debate concerning the relationship between God’s existence and an objective morality by looking at his moral-teleological argument for God’s existence in the third Critique. We explain Kant’s rejection of external sources of moral normativity and his method of grounding moral authority in the normativity of practical reason. We then turn to Kant’s argument justifying a practical belief in God as the moral author of nature. Kant’s claims about how we must conceptualize organisms teleologically and, as a result, how reason seeks an unconditioned end of nature, brings together our moral purpose with a conception of nature as an organized whole. Since our teleological concepts of organisms seem to require that human beings serve as the final, unconditioned end of nature, but morality and nature might be incompatible and divergent, we must also believe in a moral author of nature. This belief guards against demoralization and creates a unified view of the human moral agent and the world she inhabits, which Kant thinks of as indispensable for our practical lives. Kant notoriously blurs the lines between theology and ethics in nonstandard ways. Although he rejects many traditional approaches to grounding ethics in a conception of divine commands or eternal law, he still devotes a considerable amount of time to dis-cussing the role of religion as a bulwark of the moral life. The goal of this paper is to defend Kant’s relevance to a discussion of the relationship between an objective ethics and the existence of God; his contribution deserves our notice precisely for the ways in which it promises to shift the terms of the contemporary debate and complicate possible answers to the question of whether there can be an objective morality without God.