•  1471
    Defending the bounds of cognition
    In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. 2010.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark
  •  1105
    Defending non-derived content
    Philosophical Psychology 18 (6): 661-669. 2005.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
  •  688
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently a…Read more
  •  666
    The Enactivist Revolution
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2): 19-42. 2014.
    Among the many ideas that go by the name of “enactivism” there is the idea that by “cognition” we should understand what is more commonly taken to be behavior. For clarity, label such forms of enactivism “enactivismb.” This terminology requires some care in evaluating enactivistb claims. There is a genuine risk of enactivist and non-enactivist cognitive scientists talking past one another. So, for example, when enactivistsb write that “cognition does not require representations” they are not…Read more
  •  662
    Why the mind is still in the head
    with Fred Adams
    In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, th…Read more
  •  646
    Defending the bounds of cognition
    with Fred Adams
    In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. pp. 67--80. 2010.
    This chapter discusses the flaws of Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark’s hypothesis assumes that the nature of the processes internal to an object has nothing to do with whether that object carries out cognitive processing. The only condition required is that the object is coupled with a cognitive agent and interacts with it in a certain way. In making this tenuous connection, Clark commits the most common mistake extended mind theorists make; alleging that an object becomes cognitive once …Read more
  •  596
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently a…Read more
  •  440
    Challenges to active externalism
    In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
  •  396
    To date, almost every historical examination of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts’s, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity” has focused its attention on one dimension of their paper, namely, the attempt to relate neuronal action potentials to formulae in (an extension of) Boolean logic.[1] The implicit justification for this focus begins with the observation that this constitutes the most substantial conceptual innovation of the paper. Earlier work in theoretical neurophy…Read more
  •  378
    The Bounds of Cognition
    with Frederick Adams
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2008.
    A critique of the hypothesis of extended cognition.
  •  300
    The (multiple) realization of psychological and other properties in the sciences
    with Carl Gillett
    Mind and Language 24 (2): 181-208. 2009.
    Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominen…Read more
  •  277
    Understanding The Embodiment of Perception
    Journal of Philosophy 104 (1): 5-25. 2007.
    Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Noë’s theory of en- active perception provides one proposal. Noë suggests a radical constitutive hypothesis according to which (COH) Perceptual ex…Read more
  •  213
    Causal theories of mental content
    with Fred Adams
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010.
    Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs cause the menta…Read more
  •  208
    ABSRACT: An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the spec…Read more
  •  208
    Understanding the embodiment of perception
    APA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3): 5-25. 2006.
    Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Nos (2004) theory of enactive perception provides one proposal. Where it is commonly thought that
  •  207
    One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challeng…Read more
  •  197
    The value of cognitivism in thinking about extended cognition
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4): 579-603. 2010.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
  •  168
    Computation in cognitive science: it is not all about Turing-equivalent computation
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3): 227-236. 2010.
    It is sometimes suggested that the history of computation in cognitive science is one in which the formal apparatus of Turing-equivalent computation, or effective computability, was exported from mathematical logic to ever wider areas of cognitive science and its environs. This paper, however, indicates some respects in which this suggestion is inaccurate. Computability theory has not been focused exclusively on Turing-equivalent computation. Many essential features of Turing-equivalent computat…Read more
  •  164
    This paper argues that the biochemistry of memory consolidation provides valuable model systems for exploring the multiple realization of psychological states
  •  122
    The autonomy of psychology in the age of neuroscience
    with Carl Gillett
    In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences, Oxford University Press. pp. 202--223. 2011.
    Sometimes neuroscientists discover distinct realizations for a single psychological property. In considering such cases, some philosophers have maintained that scientists will abandon the single multiply realized psychological property in favor of one or more uniquely realized psychological properties. In this paper, we build on the Dimensioned theory of realization and a companion theory of multiple realization to argue that this is not the case. Whether scientists postulate unique realizati…Read more
  •  110
      Terry Horgan and John Tienson have suggested that connectionism might provide a framework within which to articulate a theory of cognition according to which there are mental representations without rules (RWR) (Horgan and Tienson 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992). In essence, RWR states that cognition involves representations in a language of thought, but that these representations are not manipulated by the sort of rules that have traditionally been posited. In the development of RWR, Horgan and Tiens…Read more
  •  107
    Consciousness: Don't Give Up on the Brain: Kenneth Aizawa
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 263-284. 2010.
    In the extended mind literature, one sometimes finds the claim that there is no neural correlate of consciousness. Instead, there is a biological or ecological correlate of consciousness. Consciousness, it is claimed, supervenes on an entire organism in action. Alva Noë is one of the leading proponents of such a view. This paper resists Noë's view. First, it challenges the evidence he offers from neuroplasticity. Second, it presses a problem with paralysis. Third, it draws attention to a challen…Read more
  •  95
    Cognition and behavior
    Synthese 194 (11): 4269-4288. 2017.
    An important question in the debate over embodied, enactive, and extended cognition has been what has been meant by “cognition”. What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied, enactive, or extended? Rather than undertake a frontal assault on this question, however, this paper will take a different approach. In particular, we may ask how cognition is supposed to be related to behavior. First, we could ask whether cognition is supposed to be behavior. Second, we could ask whether we shoul…Read more
  •  94
    'X' means X: Semantics Fodor-style (review)
    Minds and Machines 2 (2): 175-83. 1992.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and giv…Read more
  •  92
    'X' means X: Fodor/warfield semantics (review)
    Minds and Machines 4 (2): 215-31. 1994.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield proposes a…Read more
  •  89
    Fodorian semantics, pathologies, and "Block's problem"
    with Fred Adams
    Minds and Machines 3 (1): 97-104. 1993.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathol…Read more
  •  88
    Multiple realization by compensatory differences
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1): 69-86. 2013.
    One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is t…Read more