Kent Staley

Much of the discussion of the argument from inductive risk (AIR) centers on scientific research that has relevance to policymaking. To emphasize that inductive risk pervades science, this chapter discusses the AIR in the context of high energy physics: specifically, the discovery of the Higgs boson, a scientific finding that is irrelevant to policy. The applicability of the AIR for the case of the Higgs boson is established through a pragmatic approach to scientific inquiry, emphasizing the centrality of practical decision problems to the production of scientific knowledge. This approach, drawing on debates among pragmatists over the interpretation of statistical inference, eschews the classification of value judgments into epistemic and non-epistemic.

We employ a pragmatist model of inquiry to explain how measurement in physics can solve the problem of usefulness. In spite of the fact that a variety of resources, including theory, simulation, heuristics, rules of thumb, and practical considerations contribute to the context of a specific measurement inquiry, the measurement inquiry process partially decontextualizes its results, making them useful for other inquiries. This measurement inquiry process involves a process of transformation of data we call “entheorization,” which happens in conjunction with the evaluation of uncertainty of measurement results. These uncertainty estimates then serve to define the sensitivity of the result to the aims of subsequent inquiries. On this approach, the epistemology of measurement requires treating measurement procedure, uncertainty estimation, and sensitivity to targets of inquiry as equally fundamental to understanding how measurement yields knowledge. To help understand how the abstract elements of our epistemological model of experimental inquiries are applicable to concrete episodes of measurement, we use the example of the W-boson mass measurement at the Large Hadron Collider to illustrate our arguments.

Amidst long-running debates within the field, high energy physics (HEP) has adopted a statistical methodology that primarily employs standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation, but incorporates Bayesian methods for limited purposes. The discovery of the Higgs boson has drawn increased attention to the statistical methods employed within HEP. Here I argue that the warrant for the practice in HEP of relying primarily on frequentist methods can best be understood as pragmatic, in the sense that statistical methods are chosen for their suitability for the practical demands of experimental HEP, rather than reflecting a commitment to a particular epistemic framework. In particular, I argue that understanding the statistical methodology of HEP through the perspective of pragmatism clarifies the role of and rationale for significance testing in the search for new phenomena such as the Higgs boson.

We employ a pragmatic model of inquiry to distinguish the epistemological character of exploratory experimentation. Exploratory experimentation is not constituted by any intrinsic characteristics of an episode of experimentation but depends on the context and aims of the experiment and the ways in which these shape decisions about how the experimental inquiry is to be conducted: its tasks, resources, and aims, as well as the critical assessment of all of these. To demonstrate the usefulness of our pragmatist model, we apply it to the contrast between two kinds of searches for new physics at the Large Hadron Collider. Some searches are exploratory while others target specific Beyond Standard Model hypotheses, but this contrast can be understood only by considering the relations between these searches, their aims, and the way that these aims shape their respective experimental parameters and procedures. Our approach provides a model for establishing the epistemological significance of details of experimental practice.

: For philosophers of science interested in elucidating the social character of science, an important question concerns the manner in which and degree to which the objectivity of scientific knowledge is socially constituted. We address this broad question by focusing specifically on philosophical theories of evidence. To get at the social character of evidence, we take an interdisciplinary approach informed by categories from argumentation studies. We then test these categories by exploring their applicability to a case study from high-energy physics. Our central claim is that normative philosophy of science must move beyond abstract theories of justification, confirmation, or evidence conceived impersonally and incorporate a theoretical perspective that includes dialogical elements, either as adjuncts to impersonal theories of evidence or as intrinsic to the cogency of scientific argumentation.

Reports of quantitative experimental results often distinguish between the statistical uncertainty and the systematic uncertainty that characterize measurement outcomes. This article discusses the practice of estimating systematic uncertainty in high-energy physics. The estimation of systematic uncertainty in HEP should be understood as a minimal form of quantitative robustness analysis. The secure evidence framework is used to explain the epistemic significance of robustness analysis. However, the empirical value of a measurement result depends crucially not only on the resulting systematic uncertainty estimate, but on the learning aims for which that result will be used. Important conceptual and practical questions regarding systematic uncertainty assessment call for further investigation. _1_ Introduction _2_ Systematic Uncertainty: The Very Idea _3_ Systematic Uncertainty in High-Energy Physics _4_ Methodological Debates in High-Energy Physics _5_ The Secure Evidence Framework _6_ Systematic Uncertainty Assessment as Robustness Analysis _7_ Security and Sensitivity _8_ Conclusion Appendix

This study presents a historical account of experiments, performed by the Collider Detector at Fermilab collaboration, which led to the discovery of the top quark, and a discussion of philosophical issues raised by that episode. ;The historical discussion is based on published and unpublished documents and oral history interviews, and is presented in two parts: First, the formation of the collaboration and construction of the detector are described. The activities of the collaborators during the period of detector construction are described in terms of the development of resources for a general experimental programme. Second, the development of the means of analyzing the data for the top quark search is described, particularly aspects of the analysis that were disputed. The hypothesis that collaboration researchers have come to regard the social process of resolving disputes as a matter of methodological importance is suggested. ;The philosophical discussion of the experiment employs the hierarchy of models approach of Patrick Suppes and Deborah Mayo in order to examine the logic of hypothesis testing and draw some conclusions regarding the nature of scientific evidence. In an extension of an argument presented by Peter Achinstein, the account of hypothesis testing given by hypothetico-deductivist philosophers such as Karl Popper and R. B. Braithwaite is examined in light of the reasoning employed in the top search, and is found wanting. The prediction based on the hypothesis being tested in the top search is found to have been inferred inductively from the experimental data. ;Finally, a discussion is presented of tuning on the signal, a form of bias in the testing of hypotheses. The proscription of this form of bias resembles John Worrall's requirement of use novelty, but is shown instead to serve the aim of devising a test of the hypothesis that is severe, in the sense articulated by Deborah Mayo. It is shown that the evaluation of evidence claims, as it depends on severity considerations, sometimes, as in the case of the top search, requires consideration of the procedures used in designing the test, which may involve historical and social facts about the experimenters and their actions

Among the evidence concepts that Peter Achinstein has defended is one (ES-evidence) that he claims is based on the idea of providing an epistemic justification for belief. To the contrary, This chapter argue that his account of evidence lacks a substantive account of epistemic justification. To remedy this, This chapter propose an ideal of justification that this chapter argue is compatible with his account of evidence. This chapter's proposal does not introduce any new notion of evidence, but articulates instead a relativized, non-probabilistic notion (the _securing_ of evidence) that helps make sense of certain strategies by which scientists justify their claims about what evidence they have and their inferences from that evidence. This chapter illustrate this framework by drawing upon a historical episode about which Achinstein himself has written: Heinrich Hertz's cathode ray researches.

I contrast two modes of error-elimination relevant to evaluating evidence in accounts that emphasize frequentist reliability. The contrast corresponds to that between the use of of a reliable inference procedure and the critical scrutiny of a procedure with regard to its reliability, in light of what is and is not known about the setting in which the procedure is used. I propose a notion of security as a category of evidential assessment for the latter. In statistical settings, robustness theory and misspecification testing exemplify two distinct strategies for securing statistical inferences.

While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates—the internalist-externalist debate—from the perspective of objective accounts of scientific evidence. In particular, we focus on Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence because it is a paradigmatically objective theory of evidence that is strongly informed by methodological practice. We contend that from the standpoint of such an objective theory of evidence, justification in science has both externalist and internalist characteristics. In reaching this conclusion, however, we find that the terms of the contemporary debate between internalists and externalists have to be redefined to be applicable to scientific contexts

This paper analyzes Deborah Mayo's error-statistical (ES) account of scientific evidence in order to clarify the kinds of "material postulates" it requires and to explain how those assumptions function. A secondary aim is to explain and illustrate the importance of the security of an inference. After finding that, on the most straightforward reading of the ES account, it does not succeed in its stated aims, two remedies are considered: either relativize evidence claims or introduce stronger assumptions. The choice between these approaches turns on the value attached to two aims of inquiry that are in tension: drawing strong, informative conclusions and reasoning securely.

Evidence claims depend on fallible assumptions. Three strategies for making true evidence claims in spite of this fallibility are strengthening the support for those assumptions, weakening conclusions, and using multiple independent tests to produce robust evidence. Reliability itself, understood in frequentist terms, does not explain the usefulness of all three strategies; robustness, in particular, sometimes functions in a way that is not well-characterized in terms of reliability. I argue that, in addition to reliability, the security of evidence claims is of epistemic value, where an evidence claim is secure relative to an epistemic situation if it remains true in all scenarios that are epistemically possible relative to that epistemic situation.

This paper examines probabilistic versions of the fine-tuning argument for design (FTA), with an emphasis on the interpretation of the probability statements involved in such arguments. Three categories of probability are considered: physical, epistemic, and logical. Of the three possibilities, I argue that only logical probability could possibly support a cogent probabilistic FTA. However, within that framework, the premises of the argument require a level of justification that has not been met, and, it is reasonable to believe, will not be met anytime soon.

This paper examines the role of evidential considerations in relation to pragmatic concerns in statements of group belief, focusing on scientific collaborations that are constituted in part by the aim of evaluating the evidence for scientific claims (evidential collaborations). Drawing upon a case study in high energy particle physics, I seek to show how pragmatic factors that enter into the decision to issue a group statement contribute positively to the epistemic functioning of such groups, contrary to the implications of much of the existing discussion of group belief. I conclude by suggesting that applying social epistemological considerations to scientific collaborations could be practically beneficial, but only if an appropriately broad range of epistemic values is considered.