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47The CDF collaboration and argumentation theory: The role of process in objective knowledgePerspectives on Science 16 (1): 1-25. 2008.: For philosophers of science interested in elucidating the social character of science, an important question concerns the manner in which and degree to which the objectivity of scientific knowledge is socially constituted. We address this broad question by focusing specifically on philosophical theories of evidence. To get at the social character of evidence, we take an interdisciplinary approach informed by categories from argumentation studies. We then test these categories by exploring thei…Read more
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41“Agreement” in the IPCC Confidence measureStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57 126-134. 2017.
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58
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17Allan Franklin. Shifting Standards: Experiments in Particle Physics in the Twentieth Century. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013. Pp. 360. $50.00 (review)Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1): 158-162. 2016.
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59How uncertainty can save measurement from circularity and holismStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85 155-165. 2021.
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28Natural Laws in Scientific Practice (review)Review of Metaphysics 56 (2): 435-436. 2002.One might view the literature on laws of nature as dividing into two camps: the “metaphysical” advocates of laws as objective realities beyond any actual regularities, and the “antimetaphysical” skeptics. Hard-liners in both camps will find much to disagree with in Marc Lange’s Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. I mean that as a compliment to Lange’s work.
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10Hans Radder , The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press , 336 pp., $29.95 (review)Philosophy of Science 72 (3): 525-528. 2005.
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95Securing the Empirical Value of Measurement ResultsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (1): 87-113. 2020.Reports of quantitative experimental results often distinguish between the statistical uncertainty and the systematic uncertainty that characterize measurement outcomes. This article discusses the practice of estimating systematic uncertainty in high-energy physics. The estimation of systematic uncertainty in HEP should be understood as a minimal form of quantitative robustness analysis. The secure evidence framework is used to explain the epistemic significance of robustness analysis. However, …Read more
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12Comments on William Harper’s “ISaac Newton’s Scientific Method”Modern Schoolman 87 (3-4): 303-313. 2010.
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Over the Top: Experiment and the Testing of Hypotheses in the Search for the Top QuarkDissertation, The Johns Hopkins University. 1998.This study presents a historical account of experiments, performed by the Collider Detector at Fermilab collaboration, which led to the discovery of the top quark, and a discussion of philosophical issues raised by that episode. ;The historical discussion is based on published and unpublished documents and oral history interviews, and is presented in two parts: First, the formation of the collaboration and construction of the detector are described. The activities of the collaborators during the…Read more
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41This paper analyzes Deborah Mayo's error-statistical (ES) account of scientific evidence in order to clarify the kinds of "material postulates" it requires and to explain how those assumptions function. A secondary aim is to explain and illustrate the importance of the security of an inference. After finding that, on the most straightforward reading of the ES account, it does not succeed in its stated aims, two remedies are considered: either relativize evidence claims or introduce stronger assu…Read more
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62: Evidence claims depend on fallible assumptions. This paper discusses inferential robustness as a strategy for justifying evidence claims in spite of this fallibility. I argue that robustness can be understood as a means of establishing the partial security of evidence claims. An evidence claim is secure relative to an epistemic situation if it remains true in all scenarios that are epistemically possible relative to that epistemic situation.
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7Steven French and Décio Krause, Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. xv+422. ISBN 0-19-927824-5. £55.00 (review)British Journal for the History of Science 42 (1): 145. 2009.
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48Novelty, severity, and history in the testing of hypotheses: The case of the top quarkPhilosophy of Science 63 (3): 255. 1996.It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of "use novelty" introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philosophically, in terms of the need to conduct a seve…Read more
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16Evidence and Method: Scientific Strategies of Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell (review)Isis 105 (3): 672-673. 2014.
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6Allan Franklin, No Easy Answers: Science and the Pursuit of Knowledge. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Pp. xii+258. $29.95 (review)British Journal for the History of Science 40 (3): 455. 2007.
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46The Evidence for the Top Quark: Objectivity and Bias in Collaborative ExperimentationCambridge University Press. 2004.The Evidence for the Top Quark offers both a historical and philosophical perspective on an important recent discovery in particle physics: evidence for the elementary particle known as the top quark. Drawing on published reports, oral histories, and internal documents from the large collaboration that performed the experiment, Kent Staley explores in detail the controversies and politics that surrounded this major scientific result. At the same time the book seeks to defend an objective theory …Read more
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69Pragmatic warrant for frequentist statistical practice: the case of high energy physicsSynthese 194 (2). 2017.Amidst long-running debates within the field, high energy physics has adopted a statistical methodology that primarily employs standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation, but incorporates Bayesian methods for limited purposes. The discovery of the Higgs boson has drawn increased attention to the statistical methods employed within HEP. Here I argue that the warrant for the practice in HEP of relying primarily on frequentist methods can best be…Read more
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154Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquirySynthese 182 (3): 475-492. 2011.While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates—the internalist-externalist debate—from the perspective…Read more
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118Dirac's “Fine-Tuning Problem”: A Constructive Use of Anachronism?Perspectives on Science 20 (4): 476-503. 2012.
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394What experiment did we just do? Counterfactual error statistics and uncertainties about the reference classPhilosophy of Science 69 (2): 279-299. 2002.Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method by which it may be addressed, with an example from …Read more
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88Strategies for securing evidence through model criticismEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1): 21-43. 2012.Some accounts of evidence regard it as an objective relationship holding between data and hypotheses, perhaps mediated by a testing procedure. Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence is an example of such an approach. Such a view leaves open the question of when an epistemic agent is justified in drawing an inference from such data to a hypothesis. Using Mayo’s account as an illustration, I propose a framework for addressing the justification question via a relativized notion, which I design…Read more
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12Novelty, Severity, and History in the Testing of Hypotheses: The Case of the Top QuarkPhilosophy of Science 63 (5). 1996.It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of "use novelty" introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philosophically, in terms of the need to conduct a seve…Read more
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204Evidential collaborations: Epistemic and pragmatic considerations in "group belief"Social Epistemology 21 (3). 2007.This paper examines the role of evidential considerations in relation to pragmatic concerns in statements of group belief, focusing on scientific collaborations that are constituted in part by the aim of evaluating the evidence for scientific claims (evidential collaborations). Drawing upon a case study in high energy particle physics, I seek to show how pragmatic factors that enter into the decision to issue a group statement contribute positively to the epistemic functioning of such groups, co…Read more
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24An Introduction to the Philosophy of ScienceCambridge University Press. 2014.This book guides readers by gradual steps through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent W. Staley shows how seemingly abstract philosophical issues are relevant to important aspects of scientific practice. Structured in two parts, the book first tackles the central concepts of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of induction, falsificationism, and underdetermination, and important figures and movements,…Read more
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19The recent discovery of a Higgs boson prompted increased attention of statisticians and philosophers of science to the statistical methodology of High Energy Physics. Amidst long-standing debates within the field, HEP has adopted a mixed statistical methodology drawing upon both frequentist and Bayesian methods, but with standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation playing a primary role. Physicists within HEP typically deny that their methodolo…Read more
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761Robust evidence and secure evidence claimsPhilosophy of Science 71 (4): 467-488. 2004.Many philosophers have claimed that evidence for a theory is better when multiple independent tests yield the same result, i.e., when experimental results are robust. Little has been said about the grounds on which such a claim rests, however. The present essay presents an analysis of the evidential value of robustness that rests on the fallibility of assumptions about the reliability of testing procedures and a distinction between the strength of evidence and the security of an evidence claim. …Read more
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18Kent Staley Reviewed work: Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics by Peter Galison (review)Philosophy of Science 67 (2): 339-341. 2000.
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80Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background BeliefsEpisteme 7 (3): 232-247. 2010.Some prominent accounts of scientific evidence treat evidence as an unrelativized concept. But whether belief in a hypothesis is justified seems relative to the epistemic situation of the believer. The issue becomes yet more complicated in the context of group epistemic agents, for then one confronts the problem of relativizing to an epistemic situation that may include conflicting beliefs. As a step toward resolution of these difficulties, an ideal of justification is here proposed that incorpo…Read more
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