Kerri Woods

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Human Rights is an outstanding resource covering key questions, problems, and debates in scholarship on the nature, justification, authority and relevance of human rights. The volume comprises 35 chapters by leading scholars from a range of philosophical orientations and traditions. The Handbook is divided into five sections:　 Approaching the Philosophy of Human Rights Grounds of Human Rights Critical Perspectives Contemporary Human Rights Issues Human Rights of Groups The volume is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy who are interested in understanding human rights. It is also a valuable resource for those in related fields including law, political science, sociology, and the humanities.

In recent public and activist debates, threats to the sustainability of the global ecosystem, such as climate change, have increasingly been posed in terms that link the impact on human well-being to questions of rights. Environmental human rights are emerging in national and international legal practice and have been invoked by environmental political theorists seeking to explicate and justify obligations to protect and sustain the environment and to secure justice for both contemporary communities and future generations. This chapter addresses three key questions in order to unpack the concept of environmental human rights: Why adopt a human rights approach? How have environmental human rights been conceived? and What does an account of environmental human rights entail for rights holders and duty bearers?

Allies of those experiencing injustice or oppression face a dilemma: to be neutral in the face of calls to solidarity risks siding with oppressors, yet to speak or act on behalf of others risks compounding the injustice. We argue that adhering to a normative demand for deference (NDD) to those with lived experience offers would-be allies a way of navigating this dilemma. While theorists of solidarity have generally focused on epistemic benefits of the NDD, we identify a second important and neglected good in bearing witness. However, how the NDD can be adhered to in practice also raises challenges. While the literature focuses on a gold standard model of direct engagement, we defend a valuable role for a second-order form of engagement through reading, films, and similar media. This second-order form of engagement may be particularly salient for global and transnational solidarity, an important element of contemporary global politics.

Allies of those experiencing injustice or oppression face a dilemma: to be neutral in the face of calls to solidarity risks siding with oppressors, yet to speak or act on behalf of others risks compounding the injustice. We identify what we call ‘a normative demand for deference’ (NDD) to those with lived experience as a response to this dilemma. Yet, while the NDD is prevalent, albeit sometimes implicitly so, in contemporary solidarity theory and activist practice, it remains under-theorised. In this article, we analyse the potential benefits of adhering to the NDD, highlighting both a commonly accepted epistemic benefit, and a neglected but important good in bearing witness. Yet adhering to the NDD also raises real challenges. While the literature focuses on a gold standard model of direct engagement, we defend a valuable role for a second-order form of engagement through reading, films, and similar media, which, we argue, is particularly salient for global and transnational solidarity, an important element of contemporary global politics.

This article reassess Rorty’s contribution to human rights theory. It addresses two key questions: (1) Does Rorty sustain his claim that there are no morally relevant transcultural facts? (2) Does Rorty’s proposed sentimental education offer an adequate response to contemporary human rights challenges? Although both questions are answered in the negative, it is argued here that Rorty’s focus on suffering, sympathy, and security, offer valuable resources to human rights theorists. The article concludes by considering the idea of a dual approach to human rights, combining Rorty’s emphasis on sentiment with an analysis of patterns of responsibility for the underfulfilment of human rights.

This article draws out two implications for cosmopolitan or global friendship from an examination of a recent work on civic friendship in the domestic sphere: Insofar as it is the case that civic friendship, as defined by Schwarzenbach is necessary for justice in the state, it is also the case that the absence of global justice can be partially explained by the absence of what might be called cosmopolitan friendship. If we consider the practicalities of civic friendship, we find that cosmopolitan friendship is an even more difficult and demanding project than we might have imagined.

This article draws out two implications for cosmopolitan or global friendship from an examination of a recent work on civic friendship in the domestic sphere: (1) Insofar as it is the case that civic friendship, as defined by Schwarzenbach (On civic friendship: Including women in the state. Columbia University Press, New York, 2009) is necessary for justice in the state, it is also the case that the absence of global justice can be partially explained by the absence of what might be called cosmopolitan friendship. (2) If we consider the practicalities of civic friendship, we find that cosmopolitan friendship is an even more difficult and demanding project than we might have imagined