Kerstin Reibold

This article introduces knowledge-specific epistemic injustice as a third kind of epistemic injustice beside group-based or content-specific epistemic injustice. Knowledge-specific epistemic injustice is caused by a prejudice towards specific forms of knowledge, for example, practical, embodied, or experiential knowledge. The article shows that discounting these forms of knowledge silences knowers in a similar way as prejudice towards certain groups and their capacity as knowers. Thus, in order to achieve full epistemic justice and to overcome unjust power structures upheld by and based on unfairly distributed epistemic resources, all forms of epistemic injustice must be addressed.

This article argues that widespread racism and narratives about who constitutes the cultural ‘other’ undermine efforts to establish social trust through cultural integration. The article criticizes liberal nationalist models of trust and cultural integration which assume that the main factor that drives rising distrust in diverse societies is objective cultural distance. It holds that this narrative about the liberal’s dilemma unwittingly reproduces, or at least does not challenge, the very notion on which cultural racism is founded. The article discusses four ways in which this is problematic: First, it will lead to an incorrect model of how trust, diversity, and cultural integration are connected. Second, the neglect of racism deprives us of an important analytic tool for differentiating between justified and unjustified integration demands and thus makes it more likely that unjust burdens are imposed on immigrants. Third, a too strong or exclusive focus on cultural integration might undermine equality of opportunity by blaming distrust and lack of positive cooperation on cultural differences instead of racist prejudice. Fourth, it detracts from how power inequalities are bound up with racist narratives and boundary-making that leads to mistrust. Addressing racism in the integration context thereby is as much a matter of justice as it is about developing a model that can successfully address the liberal’s dilemma.

This chapter critically discusses John Simmons’ theory of territorial rights. It then argues that while highly coherent and elegant, Simmons’ theory neglects the harms of cultural loss and loss of collective self-determination which colonialism and climate change cause. It outlines the Lockean elements of his theory and their implications for Simmons’ stance on restitution of land rights after historic injustice as well as redistribution of land in the face of a growing population and/ or a shrinking land base. While the theory has radical consequences both with regard to secessionist claims by groups that do not consent to a state’s authority and with regard to the redistribution of land in the light of past injustices and climate change, it remains staunchly individualist and thus has problems accommodating more collective functions of land.

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have become a widely used tool to reconcile societies in the aftermath of widespread injustice or social and political conflict in a state. This article focuses on TRCs that take place in non-transitional societies in which the political and social structures, institutions, and power relations have largely remained in place since the time of injustice. Furthermore, it will focus on one particular injustice that TRCs try to address through the practice of truth-telling, namely the eradication of epistemic injustice. The article takes the Canadian and Norwegian TRCs as two examples to show that under conditions of enduring injustice, willful ignorance of the majority, and power inequality, TRCs might create a double bind for victims which makes them choose between epistemic exploitation and continued injustices based on the majority's ignorance. The article argues that the set-up and accompanying measures of TRCs are of the utmost importance if TRCs in non-transitional societies are to overcome epistemic injustice, instead of creating new relations of exploitation.

Serene Khaders Decolonizing Universalism präsentiert eine erhellende Theorie darüber, wie ein antiimperialer, transnationaler Feminismus heute verstanden werden sollte. Im Mittelpunkt ihrer Theorie steht eine Definition von Feminismus als Widerstand gegen sexistische Unterdrückung, welche sie als systematische Benachteiligung, die Frauen wegen ihres Frau-Seins erfahren, versteht. Allerdings begründet Khader nur sehr kursorisch, warum diese Definition von Unterdrückung am besten für einen antiimperialen, transnationalen Feminismus geeignet ist. Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass Khader nicht nur eine ausführlichere Begründung schuldig bleibt, sondern dass ihr Konzept von Unterdrückung mit einigen der Ziele ihrer Theorie sowie mit den Begründungsformen, die sie für universale Werte vorschlägt, in direktem Konflikt steht. Zunächst wendet sich Abschnitt 2 der Frage zu, wie Khader Unterdrückung genau versteht. Abschnitt 3 argumentiert, dass ihr Konzept von Unterdrückung mit einigen Zielen ihrer Theorie, insbesondere dem Antiimperialismus, in Konflikt steht. Abschnitt 4 schlägt vor, dass ein Konzept von Unterdrückung als Entzug von Autonomie besser zu den antiimperialistischen Zielen von Khaders Theorie passt und dazu geeignet ist, die Offenheit bezüglich des Inhalts grundlegender Menschenrechte zu adressieren.

The article proposes that climate change makes enduring colonial injustices and structures visible. It focuses on the imposition and dominance of colonial concepts of land and self-determination on Indigenous peoples in settler states. It argues that if the dominance of these colonial frameworks remains unaddressed, the progressing climate change will worsen other colonial injustices, too. Specifically, Indigenous self-determination capabilities will be increasingly undermined, and Indigenous peoples will experience the loss of what they understand as relevant land from within their own ontologies of land. The article holds that even if settler states strive to repair colonial injustices, these efforts will be unsuccessful if climate change occurs and decolonization is pursued within the framework of a settler colonial ontology of land. Therefore, the article suggests, decolonization of the ontologies of land and concepts of self-determination is a precondition for a just response to climate change.

This paper argues that land and resource rights are often essential in overcoming colonial inequality and devaluation of indigenous populations and cultures. It thereby criticizes global welfare egalitarians that promote the abolition of national sovereignty over resources in the name of increased equality. The paper discusses two ways in which land and resource rights contribute to decolonization and the eradication of the associated inequality. First, it proposes that land and resource rights have acquired a status-conferring function for colonized peoples so that possession of full personhood and relational equality is partially expressed through the possession of land and resource rights. Second, it suggests that successful internal decolonization depends on access to and control over land and resources, especially for indigenous peoples.

Jeremy Waldron introduced the notion of rights supersession into the philosophical discussion about restitutive justice in cases of historic injustices. He refers to land claims by indigenous peoples as a real-world example and as an application of his theory of rights supersession. He implies that the changes that have taken place in settler states since the first years of colonialism are the kind of changes that lead to a supersession of land rights. The article proposes to unbundle property rights into rights of benefit, control, use, and access and to distinguish between different forms of attachment. This strategy allows for a third option of restitution and supersession, namely partial restitution. Partial restitution grants current land holders those rights that they need to satisfy their attachments and basic distributive justice claims. At the same time, rights that are not needed for either purpose will revert back to indigenous peoples as the original owners. The article argues that the notion of partial restitution allows for far more extensive land rights than a less nuanced application of the supersession thesis.