Kevin Berryman

Recent concerns about meditation-related adverse effects (MRAEs) have led to calls for more rigorous informed consent in mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs). This paper examines whether consent procedures are warranted, and under what circumstances, and of what kind, across the diverse settings in which mindfulness is delivered. Drawing on bioethics and the informed consent literature, we argue that although MBIs may involve some risks, the evidence justifying the case for written, formalized informed consent is weak. In clinical medicine and psychotherapeutic practice, consent practices vary according to risk, permanence, invasiveness and patient control, often relying on informal processes where risk is minimal. We propose a dose-sensitive model of informed consent that functions on a sliding scale, calibrating the intensity of mindfulness practices to the probability of risk, potential harm, and severity of adverse events. Our proportional approach avoids the harms of over-disclosure—including inefficiency, nocebo effects, and autonomy infringement—while still respecting individuals’ rights and mitigating risk. A context-sensitive, proportional consent model better aligns with ethical norms, individual autonomy, and the empirical evidence on risks of adverse effects from mindfulness practices.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become increasingly sophisticated in engaging with complex philosophical concepts, a fundamental challenge emerges between technological accessibility of profound nondualist instructions and explanations on one hand and contemplative transformation in nondualist inquiry on the other. Developing nondualist understanding presents unique epistemological challenges due to its trans-discursive nature—requiring non-conceptual recognition that transcends ordinary subject-object cognition. Dialogues with large language models quickly reveal that contemporary AI systems demonstrate remarkable sophistication in clarifying nondualist concepts and simulating traditional Zen teaching methods. However, this technological facility raises questions about what might be termed “simulated understanding”—the possibility that nondualist principles are applied in AI discourse without the dissolution of boundaries that contemplative traditions associate with genuine insight. Arguments highlighting AI’s limitations suggest that the ease of technological access may undermine the struggle and existential friction that contemplative traditions consider essential for authentic realization, while arguments for AI’s utility reveal genuine possibilities as a philosophical partner, offering personalized explanations and democratizing access to esoteric domains. This tension between technological facilitation and contemplative transformation cannot be resolved through theoretical analysis alone, requiring systematic empirical investigation to determine how AI might appropriately support nondualistic understanding without compromising its trans-discursive essence. The present discussion reveals broader implications for understanding technology’s role in knowledge transmission and human development, concluding with research directions for systematic examination by philosophers, practitioners, and contemplative scientists.

Buddhism holds a seeming contradiction. On the one hand, all humans are not-self (anattā). Yet on the other, they are responsible for their actions (kamma), which seems to evoke a self who can be responsible. This raises the question of who is morally responsible if there is no self. I argue that because the Buddhist accepts not-self, they are by default moral responsibility skeptics. At first this seems to threaten responsibility in terms of kamma, but the problem dissolves once interdependent causality (paṭiccasamuppāda) is considered, where action and responsibility can be attributed without a self. What the Buddhist has is causal, not moral, responsibility. Yet ethical directionality is preserved through actions that increase or decrease suffering, preventing collapse into moral fatalism. Thus there is no internal tension between not-self and kamma with human responsibility, but there is an external tension with contemporary philosophical accounts of moral selves and responsibility. The Buddhist view is best described as selfless responsibility.

Vows play a central role in Buddhist thought and practice. Monastics are obliged to know and conform to hundreds of vows. Although it is widely recognized that vows are important for guiding practitioners on the path to enlightenment, we argue that they have another overlooked but equally crucial role to play. A second function of the vows, we argue, is to facilitate group harmony and cohesion to ensure the perpetuation of the dhamma and the saṅgha. However, the prominence of vows in the Buddhist tradition seems at odds with another central part of the doctrine. For vows, like other promises, seem to involve representing a persisting self as the individual who undertakes the vow. And to explicitly appeal to a persisting self conflicts with one of the most important philosophical commitments of Buddhism – the no self view. We argue though that once we articulate the details of how vows generate behavior that conforms to them, we can see that no appeal to the self is required to internalize and act on vows.

Vows play a central role in Buddhist thought and practice. Monastics are obliged to know and conform to hundreds of vows. Although it is widely recognized that vows are important for guiding practitioners on the path to enlightenment, we argue that they have another overlooked but equally crucial role to play. A second function of the vows, we argue, is to facilitate group harmony and cohesion to ensure the perpetuation of the dhamma and the saṅgha. However, the prominence of vows in the Buddhist tradition seems at odds with another central part of the doctrine. For vows, like other promises, seem to involve representing a persisting self as the individual who undertakes the vow. And to explicitly appeal to a persisting self conflicts with one of the most important philosophical commitments of Buddhism – the no self view. We argue though that once we articulate the details of how vows generate behavior that conforms to them, we can see that no appeal to the self is required to internalize and act on vows.