Kevin James Turner

This article reconstructs a theory of mind in the Mengzi 孟子. It argues that recent studies in favor of mind-body dualism import Cartesianism through the vocabulary their arguments are couched in. This article exposes this “Cartesian language game” in order to effect a gestalt shift in our understanding of Mengzian philosophy. It then appeals to John Dewey’s conception of mind as both “minding” and “discourse” where mind is a function of attentive engagement predicated on a background of traditional values and meanings. This article then shows how the Mengzi’s concepts of ren 仁 and tian 天 contribute to a theory of mind where the former is defined as xin 心 thus to be understood as “mindful engagement” and the latter implies tradition as shared reservoir of social and cultural meaning. Through the interpretive comparison of the philosophies of the Mengzi and Dewey, we can reconstruct a Mengzian theory of mind.

There is an undeniable relationship between humanity and tian 天 in the philosophy of the Mengzi 孟子 where the latter is generally conceived as the metaphysical or ontological source of the morality and ethics of the former. However, this line of interpretation is misleading because it not only imports foreign notions of transcendence into the thought of the Mengzi but also because it ignores the contribution humans make to tian. At the same time, there have been attempts to read the Mengzi in biological terms, thereby naturalizing human morality. This likewise does not satisfy as an adequate account of human morality because it also reduces it to a natural or biological realm where human culture is an external accessory. However, the relationship between humanity and tian in the Mengzi is one of mutual influence and emergence; therefore, this article analyzes their relationship and argues that tian is to be understood as “tradition” whereby humans in their process of becoming humans contribute to and invigorate it as successive generations carry it on into the future.

Our world is increasingly chaotic. It is important to draw on philosophical resources to help in navigating the coming turbulence. As a philosophical tradition born of troubled times, Confucianism is one such resource. Confucianism is not necessarily pacifist but is characterized by a consciousness for the well-being of others and society. This article looks to the Confucian relational self, social ontology, and the political significance of the family. It is guided by Confucius’ statement that when the way fails in the world one should conceal themselves and his claim that governing is to be found in the family rather than being employed in government. When contextualized within Confucian social philosophy, we are afforded a perspective that shows how the ontological structure of the self-other relationship makes the family a public rather than private institution and informs possible avenues of political action when the way fails in the world.

Daoist thought is well-known for its emphasis on “nothingness” as a mode of optimal living in the world. This optimal living in the world is what the Zhuangzi 莊子 calls “caring for life” (yangsheng 養生). This “caring for life”, exemplified by the butcher’s story, has been understood as an analogy for securing safety in turbulent social times and as a satirical account of ritual. However, what neither of these readings have noticed is how the Zhuangzi’s story of the butcher uses “death” to present a theory on optimal living. This article analyzes death in relation to “negation” (wu 無), “forgetting” (wang 忘), and the body. As a story about “living through dying”, the idea of “caring for life” can be connected to other themes of death and dying in the Zhuangzi that paradoxically lead to greater experience, connection with Dao, and fullness of life. Through an examination of death and dying in relation to methods of cultivation, this article will argue that the Zhuangzi’s idea of “caring for living” should be understood as “living through dying”.

It is commonly accepted that the “self” in Confucian thought is a relational one. What this means, however, is not always clear. In addition, the relationality of the “self” entails certain philosophical problems—such as how one delineates self from other, and how others contribute to the constitution of the self. This article’s investigation of the relational self in Confucian thought focuses on the concept of ren 仁, arguing that it represents a bidimensional social ontology that connects horizontal and vertical dimensions between self and particular and general others. It focuses on the transmitted version of the character for ren, composed of “person and two,” to discuss the horizontal dimension, and on the Guodian excavated version, composed of “body above mind below,” to discuss the vertical dimension. Furthermore, it introduces George H. Mead’s theory of the “generalized other” to elaborate on the vertical dimensionality of the self-other relationship. This will show that self and other are mutually produced and incorporated into a progressive sociocultural complex of selfhood.

As Confucian philosophy and the philosophy of technology continue to cross-fertilize, a new discourse space is being created. This article outlines the technological horizon of the Confucian world and argues that Confucian ritual is a form of disciplinary technology in the Foucauldian sense. It argues that ritual produces Confucian subjects through disciplinary techniques and performative enactments. It argues that ritual discipline not only shapes the body but also produces and is produced by ritual subjectivities. Finally, it argues that ritual discipline must become self-discipline in a project where “self” and “other” are progressively created through their mutual internalization of the ritual technologies that constitute them as relational entities.

This article argues that xing 性 in the Zhuangzi 莊子 should not be understood as “human nature” but as “human condition.” It introduces the problem of interpreting xing as “human nature” by surveying relevant English-language literature before detailing the interpretive paradigm of Chinese accounts, showing how the latter’s appropriation of the language of substance ontology hinders an accurate portrayal of Daoist xing. It argues that xing should be interpreted in connection to the concept of ming 命 understood as contingent, natural, and temporal “external conditions.” It argues that xing are “internal conditions” that function in conjunction with ming as “external conditions” where “habit” ( xi 習) mediates their interaction.

This article argues that a phenomenological notion of “lived body” emerges in the Zhuangzi’s 莊子 critique of the Confucian body of ritual and morality. It also argues that a philosophical account of body cannot be reduced to a Sinological account. This article draws on the phenomenological distinction between “object body” and “lived body,” especially the “three ontological dimensions” of Jean-Paul Sartre to argue that the Zhuangzi criticizes the Confucian body of ritual and morality as being a “body-for-others” and that it maintains a concept of “lived body.” Finally, it argues that through such methods of cultivation as “sitting and forgetting” a liberation of the body is achieved where one is connected to dao 道 and achieves a state of heightened experience.

This article argues that xing 性 in the Zhuangzi 莊子 should not be understood as “human nature” but as “human condition.” It introduces the problem of interpreting xing as “human nature” by surveying relevant English-language literature before detailing the interpretive paradigm of Chinese accounts showing how the latter’s appropriation of the language of substance ontology hinders an accurate portrayal of Daoist xing. It argues that xing should be interpreted in connection to the concept of ming 命understood as contingent, natural, and temporal “external conditions”. It argues that xing are “internal conditions” that function in conjunction with ming as “external conditions” where “habit” (xi 習) mediates their interaction.

This essay argues that the philosophy of the Mengzi is not an idealism or naturalism which makes morality something innate. These interpretations are limited by Cartesian presuppositions of objectivity and subjectivity, which were not a part of the Mengzi’s philosophical repertoire. This essay rehearses the problem of subjectivity and objectivity in Western philosophy. It then argues that no such dichotomy informed the Mengzi; instead, it maintains that minds and their worlds are mutually entailing and constituting. It explores the relationship between the concepts of heart-mind, human nature, and tian, arguing that heart-mind is the emergence of human nature which is the internalized interpretive framework of an external Confucian morality referred to as tian. It argues that humans are situated within historical traditions that provide their world horizons. There is no world beyond the Confucian world and no mind beyond the Confucian mind: the Mengzi is a realism with a Confucian face.

Abstract:Qi has been both understood separately as substance and as field. This essay argues that qi in the Zhuangzi is both substance and field together. This qi field-substance is bidimensional where its vertical axis is that of substance and its horizontal axis that of field. This essay argues that the vertical dimension does not imply a substance dualism but a holism where qi differs in degrees of refinement; it argues that the horizontal dimension is composed of interrelated yinyang forces that constitute an "empty" field. It also argues that at the center of this qi field-substance is the heart-mind and the body and, by drawing on rich resonances between the Zhuangzi and phenomenology, that human beings bring the fields of qi that they are situated in into certain coherences.

ABSTRACT The story of the butcher Pao Ding is one of the best known from the Zhuangzi 莊子. The key concept in this story is yangsheng 養生. This has been understood as involving the preservation of life through various methods of cultivation. However, one insightful perspective has yet to be considered: work. This article sets the stage for understanding yangsheng in terms of work by appealing to Western and Eastern understandings thereof. It then locates the Zhuangzi in contemporary discourse on yangsheng showing that it rejects that concerned with regulating the senses in search of life and accepts that concerned with the activities constitutive of livelihoods. This article then analyzes the relationship between sheng 生 and xing 性 to show that yangsheng is best understood as ‘making a living’ that emerges in the process of individual and collective lives as they unfold in various contexts.