Kevin Kinghorn

How can a loving God also be a God of wrath? God's wrath stands out in the minds of many as the single most puzzling aspect of God's character. Often Christians who would like to reconcile divine love with divine wrath―while remaining faithful to the Bible―can't figure out how to do so. Kevin Kinghorn and Stephen Travis offer a way forward. Using a philosophically informed line of argument and a careful study of the relevant biblical texts, Kinghorn and Travis show how these two aspects of God's character can be reconciled. Often God's wrath is viewed as an expression of holiness or justice, with the implicit assumption that God's just response to people is incompatible with a loving response. The authors instead view God's love as a strictly essential divine attribute, with justice as a derivative of love. But What About God's Wrath? will appeal to Christians eager to engage this puzzle more deeply, more philosophically, and more biblically, beyond pat answers and devotional platitudes.

This book provides an ethical framework for understanding the good and how we can experience it in increasing measure. In Part 1, Kevin Kinghorn offers a formal analysis of the meaning of the term "good," the nature of goodness, and why we are motivated to pursue it. Setting this analysis within a larger ethical framework, Kinghorn proposes a way of understanding where noninstrumental value lies, the source of normativity, and the relationship between the good and the right. Kinghorn defends a welfarist conception of the good along with the view that mental states alone directly affect a person's well-being. He endorses a Humean account of motivation―in which desires alone motivate us, not moral beliefs―to explain the source of the normative pressure we feel to do the good and the right. Turning to the place of objectivity within ethics, he concludes that the concept of "objective wrongness" is a misguided one, although a robust account of "objective goodness" is still possible. In Part 2, Kinghorn shifts to a substantive, Christian account of what the good life consists in as well as how we can achieve it. Hume's emphasis of desire over reason is not challenged but rather endorsed as a way of understanding both the human capacity for choice and the means by which God prompts us to pursue relationships of benevolence, in which our ultimate flourishing consists.

Our everyday conversations reveal the widespread assumption that positive and negative treatment of others can be justified on the grounds that “they deserve it.” But what is it exactly to 'deserve' something? This book offers an exploration into how we came to have this concept, along with an explanation why people feel so strongly that redress is needed when outcomes are undeserved. The book probes for that core concern which is common to the range of everyday desert claims people make. What emerges is an alternative model of desert, which moves us beyond seeing desert as a 3-place relation, and which therefore represents a fundamental challenge to the received wisdom on the structure of desert claims. In the end, our plea for deserved treatment ends up being linked to the universal human concern for a shared narrative, as we seek healthy relationships within a community.

In unpacking the nature of deception, we'll want to ask what conditions would need to be met in order rightly to conclude that an act of deception has taken place. The literary stories about Sherlock Holmes provide a large pool of examples of misdirection, whereby Holmes is able to stay one step ahead of his adversaries. These examples are used to show the inadequacy of a number of purported definitions of deception. I then settle on one definition that does seem adequate. One odd outcome of the discussion is that Holmes and his nemesis, Moriarty, actually do not engage in a contest of deception with one another.

In his essay, "Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes", Roger White examines the extent to which a multiple-universe hypothesis lessens the ’surprisingness’ that our universe should be life-sustaining. White offers two main conclusions. His first conclusion -- that the existence of our world is not itself evidence for the existence of multiple universes -- is sound. However, his second conclusion is that, on the hypothesis that multiple universes exist, the further hypothesis of an intelligent designer does not lesson the surprisingness that our universe should be life-permitting. This second conclusion, which would undercut most design arguments, is shown to rest on a mistake

Christian theologians have historically described a 'saving faith in God' as containing a fundamental element of 'belief'. However, philosophers present strong arguments exist that we are not capable of freely deciding which beliefs we will hold. Rather, we simply find ourselves believing things as the evidence before us seems to dictate. So, if belief is indeed involuntary, and if certain beliefs are requisite for Christian faith, then how can the matter of one's salvation rest on whether one has freely put one's faith in God? After unpacking this objection to the Christian affirmation that faith is a voluntary matter for which God will hold all people morally accountable, this study in philosophical theology explores how the Christian theist might respond to this objection. Kinghorn uses experimental studies within the psychological literature on self-deception to make sense of the Christian idea of 'spiritual blindness'; and he argues that whether or not a person willfully contributes to self-deception will hinge on decisions s/he makes either to embrace or avoid the truth as s/he sees it. Kinghorn then attempts to show that decisions of this type - more specifically, decisions to embrace or avoid the truth about God, wherever the truth lies - are ultimately more fundamental to the kind of relationship with God commended by the Christian religion than is the question of what a person believes. Kinghorn's conclusion is that the Christian theist can indeed rebut the pending objection about the involuntariness of faith, but only by providing a sharper distinction between faith and belief than is generally found within the Christian tradition.

The movies of Alfred Hitchcock provide continuous plot twists and surprising revelations. But what exactly makes an event improbable? Examples from Hitchcock movies are used to demonstrate how we might talk about different kinds of probability. A larger discussion of evidential probability then follows in which the movie Rear Window is used to illustrate methods of induction. More specifically, the reasoning process of Jimmy Stewart's character involves him asking the very questions that Bayes Theorem calls us to ask, as we evaluate evidential probability.

In a scene from C. S. Lewis's The Magician's Nephew, a handful of humans watch as Aslan sings the new world of Narnia into existence. Everyone is amazed to find they can understand the animals speaking--except Uncle Andrew, who only hears barkings, howlings, and the like. But why is this so? Lewis gives hints throughout the book that Uncle Andrew does not possess the kinds of characteristics that later philosophers would identify as epistemic virtues. In this article I introduce Lorraine Code's four central virtues of a responsible seeker of knowledge, showing how Uncle Andrew possessed none of them and how this seemingly prevented him from seeing and hearing what was plain to others.

In settling the question whether The Hulk is the same person as Bruce Banner, we need to ask what grounds our personal identity in the first place. What makes it the case that you are the 'same person' today that you were 10 years ago? Physical, mental, and causal accounts of identity are shown to be lacking. In the end, continuity of personal identify must be found in the relationships one has with others--and how others view us. In this instance ontology actually does seem to depend on epistemology.