Kevin M. Graham

Every theory of justice presupposes a theory of agency which specifies the nature, capacities, and needs of the agents to whom it applies. Likewise, every theory of agency can serve as the basis for a theory of justice which specifies the social conditions in which persons can develop and exercise their capacities for agency. Contemporary liberal, communitarian, and feminist theories of justice all share an abstract understanding of agency as involving the capacity to pursue a conception of the good and the capacity to fit that pursuit into a moral vision. Liberalism, communitarianism, and feminism do not differ primarily over what agency amounts to or whether agency is morally valuable, but over what social conditions persons require in order to develop and exercise their capacities for agency. ;I develop analytic models of a liberal and a communitarian theory of social justice, and I derive from each of these an analytic model of the theory of agency on which it tacitly depends. I show that neither the liberal nor the communitarian theory of agency can accommodate the needs of subordinate social groups such as African-Americans, women, and lesbians for a society in which denigrating racist, sexist, and homophobic cultural images are absent and in which the different needs for agency of members of different social groups can be addressed. ;I also develop a feminist dialogical theory of justice which leaves the demands of justice open to determination by an open, ongoing, egalitarian social dialogue about the social conditions required for agency. I then derive from it a theory of agency which is, I argue, better able to meet the differing needs for agency of members of different social groups, to uncover hidden forms of injustice, and to address changes in prevailing forms of domination and oppression over time

In this article, we explore two related questions. First, under what conditions, if any, can a Black person trust a white person to be a reliable ally in the context of a society founded on racial slavery? Second, under what conditions, if any, can a Black person trust a white person to be a reliable ally in the context of a white supremacist society? We follow Karen Jones and Nancy Nyquist Potter in arguing that allies must not only be competent, conscientious, and accurately self-assess their epistemic capacities, but they must also signal their trustworthiness in advance to those who would trust them. Furthermore, we argue based on our readings of the slave narratives of Mary Prince, Harriet Jacobs, and Frederick Douglass that allies must display social awareness of the social context that they share with those who would trust them and the power dynamics involved in that social context.

Kevin M. Graham argues that political philosophy cannot fully understand race-related injustice without shifting its focus away from distributive inequities between whites and nonwhites and toward white supremacy, the unfair power relationships that allow whites to dominate and oppress nonwhites. Graham's analysis of the racial politics of police violence and public education in Omaha, Nebraska, vividly illustrates why the pursuit of racial justice in the United States must move beyond redistribution

This paper analyzes the political and legal context in which the 1999 Omaha (Nebraska) Public Schools bond issue was proposed and approved, and the conception of social justice that underpins it. I argue that the 1999 bond issue marks a shift from an ideal of social justice centered on integration toward another ideal of justice centered on fair distribution of resources. I indicate some of the limits of this distributive conception of justice from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. I argue that distributive justice must be carried out in a context of participatory democracy in order to achieve social justice in public education in present-day Omaha.

This review essay considers three prominent recent works in the philosophy of race: Mills's The Racial Contract, Outlaw's On Race and Philosophy, and McGary's Race and Social Justice. Each of these books has played an important role in convincing social and political philosophers to take race more seriously as a category for theoretical analysis rather than simply as a subject related to certain applied moral and political problems such as affirmative action. Each of these works also wrestles with the question of whether the dominant theoretical traditions in modern Western political philosophy, and particularly liberalism, are capable of addressing the wide range of forms of social injustice that are linked to racism. The author indicates a number of differences between the books' approaches and argues that the conclusions at which they arrive are subject to different shortcomings. The author also shows that all three books raise sharp challenges to the liberal tradition at the same time that they remain ambivalent about the risks of departing altogether from that tradition. Key Words: justice • liberalism • modernity • race

Some labor historians and social historians of race are tempted to try to explain Chinese American racial oppression in the US purely by appeal to economic factors, especially the role that Chinese American men played in the US labor market. In this essay, I argue that such reduction is not possible. I briefly describe the history of Chinese immigration to the US, focusing on key changes in US law governing immigration and citizenship as they affected the Chinese. I then refute two economic reductionist views of Chinese American racial oppression. I conclude by suggesting a third, alternative understanding of this oppression that appeals to economic factors among others.

Charles Mills’s philosophical work provides a standpoint from which white philosophers can engage philosophical questions about race by demonstrating that the concept of race is relevant to the study of Western political philosophy, by developing the critical concept of white supremacy, and by critiquing the failure of liberal political philosophy to address the history of race-based chattel slavery in the US and the British empire. Nonetheless, the social contractarian methodology of Mills’s philosophical work is flawed because of its individualistic social ontology, its reliance on structured ignorance rather than situated knowledge to attain objective knowledge about society, and its inability to fulfill its promise to generate a generalized account of race-related injustice that applies to all societies at all times.

Epistemic injustice is defined by Miranda Fricker as injustice done to people specifically in their capacities as knowers. Fricker argues that this injustice can be either testimonial or hermeneutical in character. A hearer commits testimonial injustice against a speaker by assigning unfairly little credibility to the speaker’s testimony. Hermeneutical injustice exists in a society when the society lacks the concepts necessary for members of a group to understand their social experiences. We argue that epistemic injustice is necessary to permit the functioning of race-based chattel slavery and that this necessity is illustrated in slave narratives. The testimonies of slave narratives like those of Frederick Douglass, Olaudah Equiano, Harriet Jacobs, and Mary Prince identify and transform a culture of race-based epistemic hermeneutic and testimonial injustice. Through telling their stories, these agents establish their capacity as knowers and thus resist the epistemic injustice that undergirds the oppressive system of race-based chattel slavery. The authors of slave narratives not only identify race-based epistemic injustice, but actively fight against it.

If political dialogue is to identify and redress existing forms of injustice, participants in the dialogue must be able to appeal to the concept of objectivity in order to exchange claims, attitudes, and background beliefs which distort or conceal various forms of injustice. The conceptions of objectivity traditionally employed in liberal democratic political philosophy are not well-suited to play this role because they are insufficiently sensitive to the social and ideological pluralism of modern societies. Some liberal political philosophers have recently offered more context-sensitive and pluralistic conceptions of objectivity, requiring participants in political dialogue to frame their demands for justice in terms of a conception of justice acceptable to all participants in the dialogue. I argue that this conception of objectivity constitutes an improvement over traditional liberal conceptions. However, it is ultimately unacceptable because it does not take adequate account of the limited and distorted knowledge that members of dominant social groups tend to possess about the oppression experienced by members of subordinate and marginalized groups. As a result, this conception of objectivity wrongly deems the demands for justice voiced by members of subordinate and marginalized groups to be subjective simply because they seem unreasonable from the limited and distorting standpoint of dominant social groups.