Kevin O'Reilly

Since the appearance of his earliest works on the subject of the emotions, namely, his article “Emotions and Choice” in 1973 and his book The Passions in 1976, Robert C. Solomon has never ceased to develop the idea that we are in some significant sense and to some significant degree responsible for our emotions. His presentation of this thesis in these two works was, on his own admission, somewhat polemical and stood in need of considerable revision. This present volume, which brings together twelve different articles, beginning with “Emotions and Choice” and concluding with two papers from the year 2001, allows those interested in emotion theory to follow in great detail the contours of the development of the thought of one of the most important figures working in this field.

This study elicits a concern to show forth those elements in the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas that can menaingfully engage with those trends in contemporary hermeneutical philosophy and theology that highlight the conditioned nature of human understanding. The main point of reference in this regard os the hermeneutical philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. At the heart of this hermeneutical enterprise is Thomas's construal of the relationship between intellect and will, a relationship that can be described as one of dynamic reciprocity. A dynamic interaction between intellect and will obtains in both their natural and graced operations. Hence, the title of this book, The Hermeneutics of Knowing and Willing in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Some might be concerned that the notion of hermeneutics will import the spectre of relativism into Thomas's thought. By guiding the reader through Thomas's doctrine of man as made to the image of the Trinity, his Trinitarian theology, his Christology, and his treatment of grace, the theological virtues of faith and charity, and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the author shows how Thomas in fact offers us resources for a theological hermeneutics of objectivity. The criteria for this objectivity, so the author argues, are Trinitarian, Christological, Pneumatological, ecclesial, and Scriptural. It is to be hoped that this book will be read not only by those who have a particular interest in Thomas's theology but also by theologians outside of the Thomistic tradition, particularly those interested in hermeneutics.

Since the appearance of his earliest works on the subject of the emotions, namely, his article “Emotions and Choice” in 1973 and his book The Passions in 1976, Robert C. Solomon has never ceased to develop the idea that we are in some significant sense and to some significant degree responsible for our emotions. His presentation of this thesis in these two works was, on his own admission, somewhat polemical and stood in need of considerable revision. This present volume, which brings together twelve different articles, beginning with “Emotions and Choice” and concluding with two papers from the year 2001, allows those interested in emotion theory to follow in great detail the contours of the development of the thought of one of the most important figures working in this field.

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, while Aristotle’s treatment of practical wisdom cannot be divorced from his account of theoretical wisdom, there has nevertheless been a tendency in Western thought to separate what he terms the theoretical and practical modes of concern and to afford a certain priority to the theoretical mode. This article argues that one thinker in the tradition with which Heidegger engaged, namely Thomas Aquinas, constitutes an exception to this analysis. Thomas’s treatment of prudence (prudentia), rooted in Aristotle’s discussion of phronēsis, furnishes an initial point of contact with Heidegger. Turning to Thomas’s account of the precepts of the natural law, I show that implicit therein is an understanding of care that corresponds to Heidegger’s notion of Sorge, albeit an understanding that is imbued with a strikingly different character—namely, a theistic one. Central to this argument is the claim that Thomas escapes Heidegger’s dismissal of ontotheology thanks to his analogical construal of being.