Kevin Patton

The Belmont Report has a place of great importance in American biomedical research ethics. This paper argues that a similar kind of report, and the legal infrastructure that birthed it, is needed in the United States if we are to preempt a great many of the potential issues that are on the horizon with artificial intelligence (AI). What makes the Belmont Report so important is not just that it established a new basis for how medical professionals ought to treat their patients and experiment participants; it did so with the force of law. Establishing an equivalent legal framework for AI is going to take tremendous buy-in from a variety of private and public actors in the United States. The model afforded by the Belmont Report is well suited to generate such buy-in. While this may seem like a daunting task given various polarizing issues at play in society today, the context that produced the Belmont Report was quite fractious itself. It is the position of this paper that a similarly styled approach to AI regulation can succeed in proactively limiting the harms of AI’s use (and abuse).

This dissertation answers the three value problems in epistemology. These three problems require an answer as to how knowledge is more valuable 1) than mere true belief, 2) any of the proper subsets of knowledge, and 3) in kind than that which falls short of knowledge. The methodology used to provide an answer to these problems relies on the arguments put forth in a rarely discussed paper from Ward Jones. In short, the Jonesian approach can be summed up as the view that epistemic axiology and analysis ought to be kept separate. The Jonesian framework instead looks outside of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge to find properties of knowledge which, though contingent, can explain the distinctive value of knowledge. Thisframework, though remarkably robust, requires going against what I consider to be the orthodox approach to the problems. This orthodox approach relies on two axiological assumptions. The first is that every component of an analysis on knowledge must provide independent value to knowledge. The second assumption is that the value of knowledge cannot be derived from factors excluded from an analysis of knowledge. Once these assumptions are appropriately discarded, the Jonesian view has a straightforward answer to the first problem. Answering the second requires assessing Jonathan Kvanvig’s claim that a satisfied Gettier condition contributes no independent value. While I agree with Kvanvig regarding a satisfied Gettier condition, I will argue that an unsatisfied Gettier condition is not likewise neutral; it contributes disvalue. With that distinction in place, a solution to the second problem follows immediately. The third value problem, however, is a different kind of problem altogether. Answering it requires not only the Jonesian framework, but also a novel account of how we determine final value. Once this account is offered, a Jonesian answer to the tertiary problem follows immediately. This dissertation closes by applying the Jonesian framework to an argument that claims there can be no modal conditions on knowledge due to such conditions failing to help answer the value problems. This claim will be found wanting.