Kevin Scott Jobe

This paper develops an account of the reciprocity of Nature in Spinoza as a central yet underappreciated dimension of Spinoza’s relational metaphysics. Building on Ziporyn’s interpretation of Spinoza, the paper argues that any understanding of infinity and necessity is incomplete without Spinoza’s relational account of the reciprocity of God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). Through a close analysis of the Ethics, the Principles and Letter 32, the paper shows that for Spinoza all finite things are reciprocally determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way through the infinite, eternal and equal force [vis] of Nature by which each thing perseveres in existing. This reciprocal and omnipresent structure of the whole of Nature constitutes the engaged, phenomenological experience of Individuality: God or Nature does not respond purposively or personally, yet every movement and thought is necessarily met by reciprocal determinations within the immediacy of Nature itself. The paper concludes that Ziporyn’s account is strengthened by a relational metaphysics grounded not in intellectual contemplation of infinite Substance but rather in the active and embodied immersion in the infinite encounters of Nature’s reciprocity.

This paper develops a Spinozist social theory of anti-migrant affect by interpreting contemporary hostility toward immigration through the concept of invidia (envy). Drawing on recent empirical research on ‘superiority-seeking’, whereby individuals derive status utility from excluding others, the paper interprets invidia as an affective hatred of equality. For Spinoza, envy is caused not by actual material loss but from the imagination that misconceives shared goods as exclusive possessions. This social theory of invidia inverts readings that locate envy in migrants themselves, instead arguing that, in Spinoza’s Political Treatise, the democratic multitude harbours invidia against migrants when they are perceived as potential rivals of equal status. This helps explain why extending rights to migrants can provoke hostility even in the absence of real material or economic loss. Finally, the paper explores whether a non-rivalrous conception of political membership can mitigate these dynamics while still satisfying Spinoza’s account of the human striving for recognition. The paper concludes that overcoming anti-migrant hatred requires re-conceiving citizenship in terms of common ratios of living that may be shared collectively as expressions of the same infinite substance and power of Nature of which we are all a part.

Malevolent Legalities draws upon archival research conducted at the Scalia Papers at the Harvard Law School Historical and Special Collections to examine the influence of Justice Antonin Scalia’s judicial philosophy of “textualist-originalism” on the US Supreme Court’s antidiscrimination jurisprudence. The book focuses on six US Supreme Court cases, organized into two parts. The main argument of the book, grounded in archival and legal materials, is that textualist-originalism makes it lawful for discrimination to be performed through the text, and explicitly seeks to prevent progress by enacting a regime of “static law.” In Shelby County v. Holder (2013), Justice Ginsburg remarked that discrimination today behaves like the Hydra, the many-headed serpent in Ancient Greek mythology which regenerates each time its head is severed. The analysis of archival and legal materials is therefore prefaced by the development of a unique methodology for studying discrimination called discriminatology, understood as a framework for analyzing how discrimination persists through time, is performed through the text, and is a product of the manipulation of legal speech. In this way, Malevolent Legalities approaches the study of textualist-originalism as itself a vehicle for discrimination performed mala fide or "in bad faith.”

The aim of this study is to understand the judicial reasoning process of anti-discrimination jurisprudence by utilizing a hybrid computational model. The advancement of hybrid computational legal studies that combine “law-as-code” and “law-as-data” approaches have led to promising techniques for tackling complex legal reasoning tasks as multifactor judicial reasoning standards. Following this hybrid model, this study conducts a statistical and multilayer perceptron (MLP) analysis of the judicial reasoning process of the multifactor Arlington Heights discriminatory purpose test based on an original hand-coded dataset of discrimination cases. The results of the study show that “sequence of events” predominates the other factors for predicting the outcome of discrimination cases, with “statistical impact” and “historical background” showing particularly weak effect on the outcome. Results show that completely removing the factor of disparate statistical impact (Impact) actually improves confidence in predicting discrimination. The conclusion of the study suggests that courts fail to give either disparate statistical impact or historical record of discrimination any meaningful cumulative import in determining discriminatory purpose. I conclude by observing the benefits of hybrid computational legal studies on interrogating more normative values in the law like transparency, fairness, and procedural justice.

In August 2021, a U.S. Federal District Court ruled that §1326 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which criminalizes illegal reentry violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment because it has disparate impact upon and discriminatory intent against Mexican and Latinx individuals. While §1326 has been unsuccessfully challenged in numerous other federal courts, US v. Carrillo-Lopez stands out in its originality of interpretation regarding the discriminatory intent of a federal statute. In this case commentary, the reasoning of the case will be explicated, followed by an analysis of the unique statutory interpretation applied within the context of discriminatory intent doctrine.

Drawing upon Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory, the paper argues that the legal claims of homeless appellants before and during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate our universal vulnerability which stems from the essential, life-sustaining activities flowing from the ontological status of the human body. By recognizing that housing availability has constitutional significance because it provides for life-sustaining activities such as sleeping, eating and lying down, I argue that the legal rationale reviewed in the paper underscores the empirical, ontological reality of the body as the basis for a jurisprudence of universal vulnerability. By tracing the constitutional basis of this jurisprudence from Right to Travel to Eighth Amendment grounds during COVID-19, the paper outlines a distinct legal paradigm for understanding vulnerability in its universal, constant and essential form – one of the central premises of vulnerability theory.

When we take into consideration all those who fall under the UN-Habitat’s definition of “houseless” or at risk of houselessness, we see that the central issue of homelessness is not the specific problems or failings of the various subpopulations of the houseless, but rather the structural causes of houselessness themselves: social, political, economic, and ecological factors which deprive and dispossess people of their livelihoods, their labor, their security, and their dignity. However, when debates are framed too narrowly as if the central problem revolves around the special characteristics of a problematic subpopulation (i.e., their deficiency in autonomy), such discussions tend to downplay, ignore, or obscure larger structural causes of houselessness and the role of local and regional struggles and public policy initiatives to meet basic human needs, and provide basic, affordable shelter for vulnerable populations. In this chapter, I explore one such debate over the “autonomy” of the homeless and try to show how the debate too narrowly defines and limits our understanding of homelessness and therefore obscures a broader, needs-based conception of houselessness and the structural issues that underpin various states of houselessness around the globe.

This paper traces the contradictions of liberal ‘police’ power from Hegel’s analysis of modern polizei to a Foucauldian analysis of the 2011 judicial ruling on the police eviction of Occupy Wall Street protestors from Zucotti Plaza in New York. In the first section, I develop insights from Hegel and Foucault’s analysis of the contradictions of liberal police, whereby power in liberal government incorporates an ‘internal principle of limitation’ that distinguishes it from the unlimited internal objectives of the European police state, while finding itself constantly violating its own internal normative principles. In the second section, I situate liberal police within Foucault’s history of police and the development of a political economy of the poor. In the third section, I challenge Foucault’s own portrayal of liberal police as ‘self-limiting’ in the 1978-79 lectures, through a detailed examination of ‘police’ in the life and thought of Benjamin Franklin. In the final section, I draw upon this historical background of police to analyse the police power jurisprudence laid out in the 2011 Waller v. City of New York ruling on the police eviction of protestors from Zucotti Plaza. Here, I argue that the ruling allows us to see how the discourse of ‘police power’ claims to uphold a (neo)liberal economic-juridical order, while at the same time functioning as a mechanism of repression and security against the ‘dangerous’ (democratic) element within the polity.

While Foucault claimed that biopower, as a form of political pastorate, did not exist in ancient Greece, he did take the view, following Hegel, that the ancient ‘ethical community’ [sittlichkeit] constituted a kind of ‘political technology of the individual’, an ancient form of ‘police’. In this paper, I trace Foucault’s conception of ‘police’ in his Tanner Lectures to Hegel’s analysis of politeia as the origin of the modern polizei. Through an examination of politeia in ancient political and military literature, I uncover a military–pastoral technology, founded on the relation not between shepherd–flock, but between leader [hegemon] and follower [epistatae]. I suggest two forms that a military–pastoral technology has taken shape, both in the politeia of the Spartans and in the early American Republic. This line of inquiry, I conclude, would not only suggest that a political pastorate existed in ancient Greece, but would also force us to re-consider modern forms of ‘police’ through the lens of a military–pastoral technology.

This chapter introduces the notion of the coloniality of homelessness as a way to make sense of how the anthropological imaginaries of Euro-American sovereignty were mapped onto a political economy of homelessness and nomadic forms of life and labor. By tracing the conceptual mapping of homelessness through the colonial encounters of anthropology and urban ethnography, we can see how constructions of homeless culture are bound up with the racial logics of Eurocentrism that distinguished superior Aryan races from inferior nomadic ones. The coloniality of homelessness, therefore, refers to the way in which the very notions of home and homelessness were constructed through a chronotopology of modernity that divides bodies and populations into a racial logic of modern and pre-modern forms of space, time, life and labor. This insight, I argue, helps make sense of the claim that the very concept of homelessness obscures the issue of housing, which is itself a project of both neoliberalism and colonialism.

In this paper, I argue that the unique contributions of Foucault’s late work to critical social theory can be identified in the ways in which power relations are refined as the material condition of “politics” as distinguished from that of law, where “politics”: includes both competitive and goal-oriented strategic actions and interactions, excludes the coercive technologies of law embodied in State institutions, presupposes “incomplete” reciprocity between actors engaged in directing others, always entails modes of revealing truth and acting upon the self. By contextualising the break between pastoral power and direction in the 1979–1980 lectures, I show how for the late Foucault, power relations constitute the material condition of “politics” precisely because, unlike relations of control or coercion, their aims and objectives remain open to the possibility of building new relationships and potentially more “political” forms of social action. I conclude by situating this major distinction within Foucault’s unfulfilled project to study the “military dimension” of society, and the relevance and urgency of this project for contemporary struggles against new forms of militarism and austerity.