Kevin Smith

In opposition to the premises of Against Homeopathy – a Utilitarian Perspective, all four respondents base their objections on the central claims that homeopathy is in fact scientifically plausible and is supported by empirical evidence. Despite ethical aspects forming the main thrust of Against Homeopathy, the respondents’ focus on scientific aspects represents sound strategy, since the ethical case against homeopathy would be weakened concomitant with the extent to which any plausibility for homeopathy could be demonstrated. The trouble here is that the respondents are attempting to perpetuate a sterile debate. The notion that homeopathic preparations could have any biological effects represents a fringe viewpoint, one not entertained by serious scientists nor supported by reason and evidence.In the present article, I shall endeavour to explain why the respondents do not have a valid case. I will deal firstly with their general approach to scientific plausibility and evidence, and then consider some of the specific claims they have made. Finally, I will answer the philosophical arguments some of the respondents have raised

I examine the positive and negative features of homeopathy from an ethical perspective. I consider: (a) several potentially beneficial features of homeopathy, including non-invasiveness, cost-effectiveness, holism, placebo benefits and agent autonomy; and (b) several potentially negative features of homeopathy, including failure to seek effective healthcare, wastage of resources, promulgation of false beliefs and a weakening of commitment to scientific medicine. A utilitarian analysis of the utilities and disutilities leads to the conclusion that homeopathy is ethically unacceptable and ought to be actively rejected by healthcare professionals

I examine the process and outcomes of animal genetic manipulation (‘transgenesis’) with reference to its morally salient features. I consider several objections to transgenesis. I examine and reject the alleged intrinsic wrongness of ‘deliberate genetic sequence alteration’, as I do the notion that transgenesis may lead to human genetic manipulation. I examine the alleged wrongness of killing inherent in transgenesis, and suggest that the concept of ‘replaceability’ successfully justifies such killing, although not for entities deemed to possess ‘personhood’. I examine ‘significant suffering’ associated with transgenesis and propose the radical conclusion that, although it would be wrong to prohibit animal genetic manipulation per se, utilitarians ought to support a ‘default prohibition’ on transgenic experiments that entail significant suffering.