Kian Mintz-Woo

Collective climate action hinges on the distribution of benefits and burdens of climate change mitigation. Yet assumptions relevant to distributional justice are frequently made only implicitly in climate change mitigation scenarios. Here, we introduce the patterns of the distributional justice framework that operationalize philosophical justice theories as quantitative requirements for scenario trajectories. We then apply this framework to the IPCC AR6 scenario database to assess the distributional implications of global climate change mitigation scenarios across world regions. Focusing on scenario variables related to energy and meat consumption, we found a diversity of patterns of justice across scenario characteristics. The prioritarian perspective, which prioritizes improvements to those currently worse off, emerged as the most dominant pattern of justice. By contrast, futures with limited or reduced energy and meat consumption were the least represented in the database. Our research further indicates that most scenarios consistent with patterns of justice do not explicitly aim to model more just futures, suggesting that underlying scenario narratives—most often SSP2—largely determine the distributional outcomes. We therefore propose a stakeholder engagement strategy to make distributional justice assumptions in scenario development ex-ante more diverse and transparent. Overall, this study provides a practical avenue for developing justice-conscious scenarios that may be more likely to motivate collective climate action. [Open access]

Green nudges (GNs) are increasingly popular behavioral interventions aimed at mitigating environmentally mediated harm, particularly in the context of climate change. The justification of GNs traditionally relies on cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which quantifies the total costs and benefits, factoring in probabilities to maximize expected utility. However, the application of CBA faces significant challenges when GNs involve potential catastrophic outcomes associated with climate change and climate nudging. We argue that the qualitative distinction between catastrophic and non-catastrophic outcomes poses a challenge for traditional CBA. While CBA is adept at assessing ordinary costs and benefits, it struggles to accommodate the putative catastrophic outcomes linked to climate change and climate nudging. To address this challenge, this article considers the lexical precautionary principle (LPP) as a viable decision-making framework for climate nudging. Unlike CBA's decision rule, maximize expected utility, LPP maximizes lexical utility, thereby prioritizing the avoidance of catastrophic outcomes.

With respect to climate Loss and Damage, Laura García-Portela adopts both a sufficientarian account of distributional justice and a Polluter Pays Principle whereby historical emissions are the basis for transfers. This paper makes three main claims. First, it argues that the way that García-Portela adopts a Polluter Pays Principle means that her sufficientarianism would be largely otiose for polluters. Second, it argues that her account of harm leaves questions unanswered about how to classify and respond to climate impacts above her threshold. Finally, it argues that, insofar as the basis for transfers are harms defined as falling below a threshold, an alternative account, the “Polluter Pays, Then Receives Principle” has a better practical and theoretical fit.

With respect to climate Loss and Damage, Laura García-Portela adopts both a sufficientarian account of distributional justice and a Polluter Pays Principle whereby historical emissions are the basis for transfers. This paper makes three main claims. First, it argues that the way that García-Portela adopts a Polluter Pays Principle means that her sufficientarianism would be largely otiose for polluters. Second, it argues that her account of harm leaves questions unanswered about how to classify and respond to climate impacts above her threshold. Finally, it argues that, insofar as the basis for transfers are harms defined as falling below a threshold, an alternative account, the “Polluter Pays, Then Receives Principle” has a better practical and theoretical fit. [Open access]

In this work, we conduct a narrative review of pressing equity and justice issues within global modelled scenarios and propose a new research agenda to strengthen their consideration in future model developments and applications. We begin by introducing a typology of equity and justice limitations in climate mitigation scenarios, distinguishing among structural, methodological, and epistemological issues that shape what integrated assessment models (IAMs) can reveal at policy-relevant scales. Reflecting on these concerns, we develop a research agenda that describes new avenues of work and draws together distinct emerging initiatives, ranging from incremental improvements to structural reforms and alternative participatory approaches. Drawing on reflexive insights from integrated assessment practitioners, this agenda prioritizes embedding equity principles directly into scenario design through differentiated effort sharing and finance flows, developing new frameworks that incorporate sufficiency and demand transformations while protecting decent living, and establishing genuine co-production with underrepresented communities beyond mere consultation. Underlying this research agenda is a recognition that modeling communities must engage more critically with the implicit assumptions in scenario and model design and use that have equity and justice implications. Achieving equitable climate futures will require transformative actions that integrate diverse justice concerns, advance sustainable development, and confront systemic inequities across both human and ecological dimensions. Although models will never capture all these aspects, these can be significantly enhanced to support more informed discussion and practical application. Our contribution proposes a way forward to achieving this goal. [Open access]

A just transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy has been associated with a variety of duties, including climate change mitigation and promoting procedural, distributive, and recognitional justice. Several authors have discussed transitional justice tensions between the need for rapid greenhouse gas emissions reductions and other aspects of a just transition, such as fair inclusion of stakeholders. We make the case that such trade-offs are often uncertain, and that this has important moral implications tied to inductive risks. Inductive risks arise when decision-making requires accepting or rejecting an uncertain statement, where the moral harms of errors may be asymmetrical. This line of reasoning suggests that very strong evidence should be required to accept that imposing injustices on marginalized populations is necessary for rapid emissions reductions. [Open access]

This chapter introduces several distinctions relevant to what is called the “discounting problem”, since the issue is how (future) costs and benefits are discounted to make them comparable in present terms. The author defends the claim that there are good reasons to adopt Ramsey-style discounting in the context of climate change: the Ramsey rule is robust, flexible, and well-understood. An important distinction involved in discounting—“descriptivism” and “prescriptivism”—is discussed. It is argued that, even if we adopt prescriptivism, and accept that this means there is need for moral experts in parameter assignments, there is a significant issue. The type of moral expertise required for the discounting problem will not involve knowledge of moral theory—thus making moral philosophy unhelpful in terms of making particular parameter assignments, despite these being substantive moral judgments.

This paper argues that moral philosophers can have a special role in helping members of society come to choose which moral theories to believe. Importantly, the argument does not depend on the idea that moral philosophers (more) reliably have true moral beliefs (or are “Strong Moral Experts”). Instead, the argument is that moral philosophers are well-placed to develop understanding of moral theories by drawing out valid implications (they are “Weak Moral Experts”). By developing valid moral arguments, and by making the relevant implications accessible to society, moral philosophers can help people understand the costs and benefits of various moral theories, allowing them to make more informed choices. This does not imply that everyone will agree; there is room for disagreement about the weight to put on various theoretical costs and benefits. But it does give a metaphilosophical picture of the role of moral philosophers, justify certain kinds of public philosophy, and explain the value that moral philosophers can add to society at the philosophy-public interface. [Open access]

From a traditional environmental ethics perspective, rights of nature are linked to debates about non-anthropocentrism because they give legal force to the idea that nature has intrinsic moral value. However, we claim that the emergence of Indigenous-led rights of nature initiatives shows that intercultural respect is also an important aspect of this issue. Supported by an example involving an Indigenous nation in Peru, we explain how intercultural respect encourages greater engagement between Western and Indigenous philosophies. On this basis, we advance an argument that a river can be a living being with interests of its own. We also explain how intercultural respect is helpful for understanding the relationship between rights of nature and climate change. In general, our contention is that rights of nature should be understood in the context of efforts to counteract the disrespect of marginalized groups commonly found in environmental injustices. [Open access]

We analyze the moral aspects of Carbon Dioxide Removal technologies (CDRs) through what we call ‘transitional justice.’ Experts currently consider CDRs to be essential for mitigating climate change. This raises the question: are CDRs compatible with a just transition? We argue that there is a strong case for adopting CDRs within a just transition, despite some potentially unjust facets of these technologies. We also show that framing CDRs as a moral hazard to climate change mitigation is not conducive to a just transition, and that instead a notional opposition to CDRs constitutes an actual moral hazard to sufficient mitigation. [Open access]

What could philosophical or justice perspectives contribute to climate (and other applied philosophy) policy discussions? This question is important for philosophers on government policy committees. This article identifies two novel concerns about such contexts (which I call ‘contingent selection’ and ‘committee deference’) and systematizes some potential methodologies before arguing for a previously unrecognized methodology that focuses on disciplinary convergence. After supporting this methodology by providing several justifications, the Appendix explains how to apply it when evaluating a carbon budget. This methodology and its application are meant to be of interest to both theorists and practitioners. [Open access]

The three main types of policies for addressing climate change are command and control regulation, carbon taxes (or price instruments), and cap and trade (or quantity instruments). The first question in the ethics of carbon pricing is whether the latter two (price and quantity instruments) are preferable to command and control regulation. The second question is, if so, how should we evaluate the relative merits of price and quantity instruments. I canvass relevant arguments to explain different ways of addressing these important policy questions, suggesting that carbon pricing is preferable to command and control regulation, and that price instruments have the theoretical edge over quantity instruments.

A number of universities have implemented policies to increase the proportion of plant-based items offered by their food services as part of efforts to promote environmental sustainability and health. This article explores student freedom as an ethical issue in this context. Our central claim is that, while freedom is indeed an important ethical concern for university plant-based food initiatives, these efforts can avoid unjustifiably interfering with freedom if certain conditions are met. We suggest four criteria: (1) public messaging surrounding dietary choices should avoid stigmatizing meat-eating, (2) menus should retain some animal-source foods and ensure that plant-based substitutes included nutritionally fortified and whole food options, (3) the aggressiveness of the transition should be calibrated to student support, and (4) plant-based menu items should be appealing on their own terms. [Open access]

Many households worldwide face substantial gaps in decent living standards (DLS), universal and essential material preconditions for achieving well-being and inclusive development. Here, we use subnational Demographic and Health Survey data from 75 low and middle-income countries (1990–2021) to explore the distribution and trends of ten living standards. We estimate that 94.9% of households in our dataset lack the material prerequisites for at least one of the ten standards, and 63.6% for one-third of them. Stark inequalities persist both within and between countries, with regions in sub-Saharan Africa experiencing the most severe deprivations. Despite some improvements, progress remains limited in critical areas such as health care, sanitation, housing, and education. Within countries, rural, agrarian households with low levels of educational attainment are particularly disadvantaged. These granular findings at the subnational level can help direct policy efforts and resources towards those populations most in need. [Open access]

Despite scrap metal collection being a valuable ecological practice, one which exposes collectors to health hazards and poor working conditions, it is frequently devalued and rarely portrayed as a positive environmental contribution. Our article examines views regarding scrap metal collection expressed in response to Charlie Hebdo’s caricature of the (non-Romani) Romanian tennis player Simona Halep as a scrap iron collector. We argue that the reactions to the caricature are evidence of a racially charged negative stereotype of Roma as (illicit) scrap iron recyclers. Second, we argue that what makes this stereotype wrong is not (just) that it is false or demeaning, but that it contravenes duties to reduce material footprints through activities like metal recycling. Drawing on Andrew Dobson’s work, we explore the stereotype’s negative framing of metal collection as a failure of ecological citizenship, and we consider how its racial elements challenge Dobson’s neutral image of ecological citizens. We argue that addressing the stereotype requires a more inclusive and transformative understanding of ecological citizenship, and we end by considering ways in which focusing on the duties of ecological citizenship can boost the struggles against the various forms of ecological injustice and exploitation that Romani communities face. [Open access]

While mitigation and adaptation will help to protect us from climate change, there are harms that are beyond our ability to adapt. Some of these harms, which may have been instigated from historical emissions, plausibly give rise to duties of compensation. This chapter discusses several principles that have been discussed about how to divide climate duties—the polluter pays principle, the beneficiary pays principle, the ability to pay principle, and a new one, the polluter pays, then receives principle. The chapter introduces several challenges to these principles from the literature, before discussing which policies and institutions might be relevant to compensation, whether internationally (e.g. the Green Climate Fund) or intergenerationally (e.g. Broome and Foley’s World Climate Bank). It also describes some recent successful climate cases which require both the Dutch government and a private firm to act in accordance with climate targets to avoid potential rights-violations. Finally, it discusses one of the most important international concepts with respect to compensation: the Loss & Damage pillar of climate policy.

We claim that a moral obligation to take climate leadership by means of unilateral mitigation depends on the existence of a plausible follow-the-leader mechanism whereby unilateral mitigation by some increases the probability of sufficient mitigation by others to avert catastrophic climate impacts. By understanding these mechanisms, we can better articulate the obligation for climate leadership across various sectors, from government to individual actors, in the fight against climate change. [Open access]

Luke Elson defends carbon offsetting on the basis that it is not morally objectionable to shift harms or risks around. As long as emitting and offsetting does not increase the overall harms or risks—and merely shifts them—compared to refraining from emitting, he suggests there is no injustice involved. I respond in several ways, suggesting that the time delay involved in offsetting can increase these risks but, regardless, there is a defensible default which could justify refraining from emitting, even when planning to offset. [Open access]

Despite growing interest in risks of societal collapse due to anthropogenic climate change, there exists no consensus about how collapse should be understood. In this article, we critically examine existing definitions and argue that none adequately address the challenges for conceptualizing collapse that climate change presents. We therefore propose an alternative conception, which regards collapse as a reduction of collective capacity resulting in a pervasive and difficult-to-reverse loss of basic functionality. Our conception is dynamic in that it focuses on the interrelations of constituent subsystems. It also distinguishes collapse from transformations needed to address climate change and provides insight into the relationship between collapse and sustainability. [Open access]

One branch of the responsible innovation literature involves the direction of innovation: if the public or decision-makers can or should direct innovation, how should innovation be directed? This paper explicates a case study where directionality – the plurality of plausible values for innovation – is directly implicated. In this case, a key technology may require a strategy for innovation, but there are contrasting normative reasons to drive that innovation in different ways, reflecting two distinct moral values, ‘effectiveness’ and responsiveness to ‘need’. In this case, carbon dioxide removal, these values may well conflict. Strategically deploying carbon dioxide removal in a cost-effective manner would tend to support siting it in regions where there are significant oil and gas operations. In contrast, strategically deploying carbon dioxide removal in response to need would tend to support siting it in regions where expected demand for the technology is required for development. [Open access]

Solar radiation management (SRM) may help to reduce the negative outcomes of climate change by minimising or reversing global warming. However, many express the worry that SRM may pose a moral hazard, i.e., that information about SRM may lead to a reduction in climate change mitigation efforts. In this paper, we report a large-scale preregistered, money-incentivised, online experiment with a representative US sample (N = 2284). We compare actual behaviour (donations to climate change charities and clicks on climate change petition links) as well as stated preferences (support for a carbon tax and self-reported intentions to reduce emissions) between participants who receive information about SRM with two control groups (a salience control that includes information about climate change generally and a content control that includes information about a different topic). Behavioural choices are made with an earned real-money endowment, and stated preference responses are incentivised via the Bayesian Truth Serum. We fail to find a significant impact of receiving information about SRM and, based on equivalence tests, we provide evidence in favour of the absence of a meaningfully large effect. Our results thus provide evidence for the claim that there is no detectable moral hazard with respect to SRM. [Open access]

Highlights: • Proposes forward-looking approach to studying climate collapse risks. • Suggests diminishing returns on climate adaptation as a collapse mechanism. • Suggests strategies for sustainable adaptation pathways in face of climate change. • Illustrates analysis with examples of small island states and global food security. Abstract: This article proposes a forward-looking approach to studying societal collapse risks related to climate change. Such an approach should indicate how to study emerging collapse risks and suggest strategies for adapting to them. Our approach is based on three postulates that facilitate a forward-looking approach: (1) collapse, if it occurred, would be a lengthy process rather than an abrupt event; (2) significant collapse risks already exist in some places; and (3) diminishing returns on adaptation to intensifying climate impacts are a key driver of collapse risks. The first two postulates suggests that collapse risks can be studied in process, while the third points to strategies for adaptation pathways that avoid unsustainable diminishing returns. Applying diminishing returns to climate change adaptation, rather than sociopolitical complexity or resource extraction, is also a novel theoretical contribution to collapse literature. [Open access]

Climate change and decarbonization raise complex justice questions that researchers and policymakers must address. The distributions of greenhouse gas emissions rights and mitigation efforts have dominated justice discourses within scenario research, an integrative element of the IPCC. However, the space of justice considerations is much larger. At present, there is no consistent approach to comprehensively incorporate and examine justice considerations. Here we propose a conceptual framework grounded in philosophical theory for this purpose. We apply this framework to climate mitigation scenarios literature as proof of concept, enabling a more holistic and multidimensional investigation of justice. We identify areas of future research, including new metrics of service provisioning essential for human well-being. [Can be freely read by clicking the ReadCube link below.]

[Newspaper opinion] If you’re like most people, you’ve been taught that climate action is a sacrifice. Cutting emissions from fossil fuels, you’ve probably been told, is the economy-squeezing price we must pay for a livable planet. But our research explains why we should look at this issue through a different frame. Frames help us think about complex issues. They suggest starting assumptions, problems to be solved and point towards possible solutions. Sacrifice frames begin with the assumption that climate action is a burdensome cost. Given that assumption, it naturally follows that climate action is all about convincing people to make sacrifices. But scholars have criticized sacrifice frames for being bad at motivating action. Tell a person to sacrifice, and they’re likely to give you a list of reasons why they shouldn’t have to do it. We suggest a different approach. Instead of explaining why you should sacrifice for the climate, we explain why climate action isn’t a sacrifice. We also suggest an alternative, more hopeful frame that fits with current science. [Open access]

Ideal carbon tax policy is internationally coordinated, fully internalizes externalities, redistributes revenues to those harmed, and is politically acceptable, generating predictable market signals. Since nonideal circumstances rarely allow all these conditions to be met, moral issues arise. This paper surveys some of the work in moral philosophy responding to several of these issues. First, it discusses the moral drivers for estimates of the social cost of carbon. Second, it explains how national self-interest can block climate action and suggests international policies—carbon border tax adjustments and carbon clubs—that can help address these concerns. Third, it introduces some of the social science literature about the political acceptability of carbon taxes before addressing a couple common public concerns about carbon taxes. Finally, it introduces four carbon revenue usage options, arguing that redistributive and climate compensation measures are most morally justified. [Open access]

In this article, we claim that recent developments in climate science and renewable energy should prompt a reframing of debates surrounding climate change mitigation. Taken together, we argue that these developments suggest (1) global climate collapse in this century is a non-negligible risk, (2) mitigation offers substantial benefits to current generations, and (3) mitigation by some can generate social tipping dynamics that could ultimately make renewables cheaper than fossil fuels. We explain how these claims undermine familiar framings of climate change, wherein mitigation is understood as self-sacrifice that individuals and governments must be morally persuaded or incentivized to undertake. [Open access]

[Book Review] Joseph Heath sometimes plays the role of a gadfly in climate and environmental ethics. He often defends conventional, economics-focused claims which rub many philosophers the wrong way—claims that are at the heart of issues raised in these pages, claims such as that discounting is justifiable, growth is good, or cost-benefit analysis is appropriate in liberal democracies. I think we can all agree that sophisticated defences of conventional positions play an important part in the ecosystem. For philosophers, a gadfly can challenge entrenched conceptions. If we agree that these goals are worthwhile, then this book serves as a useful summary and synthesis of the ways Heath has ably defended conventional claims about climate policy.