Killian McGrath

The problem of consciousness remains the most intractable question in the philosophy of mind. Scientific approaches to consciousness, in their effort to provide a systematic account, impose determinate structures. This methodological necessity encounters a dilemma: it seeks to define what is never self‐identical. This paper considers Conscious Agent Theory (CAT) within this broader challenge, assessing its attempt to model consciousness while rejecting materialist reductionism. In rendering consciousness as a structured agent, CAT fortifies the problem by generating a fundamental tension between self‐transcendence and reification. Engaging with phenomenology and existentialist thought, the paper explores how being‐for‐itself resists reduction. The challenge from embodiment reveals that CAT risks erasing the transcendence distinguishing consciousness from the world it discloses, or reinstating dualism. CAT's tendency towards reification entails a Cartesian inheritance, placing it in opposition to phenomenological accounts of consciousness as relational, and self‐transcending. This dialectical tension invites further discussion between scientific perspectives and phenomenology.

There is a significant convergence between some contemporary panpsychist theories and idealism. Traditional phenomenal, macro idealism has been widely criticised for its implausible account of physical facts. This paper examines three idealism friendly contemporary panpsychist philosophies and suggests that with some revisions a plausible realist and physical idealism can be articulated. Taking from information-theoretic models of consciousness and metaphysical arguments for the ontological primacy of mind, it is suggested via a Schelling inspired perspective that aspects of consciousness??? intrinsic nature provide a promising approach to the decomposition problem which is currently a significant challenge to pan/cosmopsychist theories.