Kim Bada

In this paper, I argue that the gap between interpersonal permissivism and intrapersonal permissivism is marginal, and there are ways to convert a (potential) interpersonal permissive case into a (potential) intrapersonal permissive case. My first argument for convertibility is that we can convert a reasonable peer disagreement-based interpersonal permissive case into an intrapersonal permissive case. My second argument for convertibility shows that theoretical virtues can be just as incommensurable in intrapersonal settings as in interpersonal ones by appealing to an epistemological analog of the small improvement argument in rational choice theory. Thus, the two arguments indicate that the arguments for interpersonal permissivism also support intrapersonal permissivism.

This paper presents a summary and discussion of an assignment that asked students about the impact of Large Language Models on their college education. Our analysis summarizes students’ perception of GPT-3, categorizes their proposals for modifying college courses, and identifies their stated values about their college education. Furthermore, this analysis provides a baseline for tracking students’ attitudes toward LLMs and contributes to the conversation on student perceptions of the relationship between writing and philosophy.

In this paper, I explore how the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification impacts our understanding of the relation between propositional and doxastic justification. The ideal rationality-based account sits uncomfortably with the widely accepted claim that propositional justification is necessary for doxastic justification. In particular, the combination of the necessity claim and the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification entails that some plausible doxastic attitudes are doxastically unjustified and thereby severs epistemic justification from connections with epistemic responsibility and the competent formation of beliefs. Thus, those who endorse both the necessity claim and the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification will be forced to give up either their account of propositional justification or the necessity claim. I argue that there is good reason to give up the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification instead of the necessity claim. This result indicates that an adequate account of propositional justification should be sensitive to the agent’s cognitive capacities. If propositional justification should be understood in this way, then the widely accepted explanation of doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification is not promising either. This is because an agent’s cognitive capacities and limitations play a prominent role in understanding propositional justification. Instead, I argue that, at the explanatory level, propositional justification relies on doxastic justification.