Kim Jun Young

This paper critically examines Sara Rachel Chant’s attempt to extend the category of collective action to include unintentional collective actions and, on that basis, to provide a unified account of individual and collective action. While Chant’s proposal is motivated by a plausible criticism of classical theories that focus narrowly on small-scale, fully cooperative cases, we argue that her account cannot achieve both of its central aims simultaneously. We introduce a novel case, The Wicked and The Innocent, in which one agent intentionally uses another agent as a means. According to Chant’s criteria, this case qualifies as a collective action. We argue that such cases generate a dilemma for Chant’s view: either they undermine her account as counterexamples, or they force a disanalogy between individual and collective action. We conclude that the category of collective action cannot be broadened in the way Chant proposes.

칸트는 왼손과 오른손처럼 서로 완전히 유사하고 동등하지만 합동되지 않는, 소위 ‘비합동 대응체’를 철학적으로 활용한 최초의 사상가이다. 그는 1760년대부터 1780년대에 이르기까지 이 예시를 반복적으로 사용했으며, 이에 따라 일부 연구자들, 특히 질 뷰로커(Jill Buroker)는 칸트의 비판철학 발전에서 이 개념이 핵심적 역할을 했다고 주장하였다. 그러나 이러한 해석에는 치명적 약점이 있는데, 『순수이성비판』에는 비합동 대응체가 등장하지 않는다는 점이다. 뷰로커는 이에 대응하여, 『순수이성비판』의 「반성개념들의 모호성에 대하여」에서 제시된 두 물방울의 예시와 이를 통한 논증이 사실상 압축된 비합동 대응체 논증이라고 주장한다. 본 논문은 이러한 뷰로커의 주장을 반박한다. 두 물방울은 라이프니츠의 식별불가능자 동일성 원칙에 대한 반례를 제공하지만, 비합동 대응체는 그럴 수 없다. 따라서 「반성개념」에서 두 물방울은 비합동 대응체로 대체될 수 없다. 이를 통해 본 논문은 첫째, 칸트가 비합동 대응체와 두 물방울을 라이프니츠 철학의 정확히 어떤 원칙들에 대한 반례로 사용하고 있는지를 밝힘으로써 양자의 철학적 차이를 선명히 드러낸다. 둘째, 비합동 대응체 논의가 칸트 철학에서 ‘직관을 통해서만 파악 가능한 내적 규정’이라는 측면을 함축한다는 사실을 부각시킨다.

Leibniz's famous proposition that God has created the best of all possible worlds holds a significant place in his philosophical system. However, the precise manner in which God determines which world is the best remains somewhat ambiguous. Leibniz suggests that a form of "Divine mathematics" is employed to construct and evaluate possible worlds. In this paper, I uncover the underlying mechanics of Divine mathematics by formally reconstructing it. I argue that Divine mathematics is a one-player combinatorial game, in which God's goal is to find the best combination among many possibilities. Drawing on the combinatorial theory, I provide new solutions to some puzzles of compossibility.

In this article, I examine Leibniz’s criticism of Spinoza’s notion of priority by nature based on the first proposition in Spinoza’s Ethics. Leibniz provides two counterexamples: first, the number 10’s being 6+3+1 is prior by nature to its being 6+4; second, a triangle’s property that two internal angles are equal to the exterior angle of the third is prior by nature to its property that the three internal angles equal two right angles. Leibniz argues that Spinoza’s notion cannot capture these priority relations. Although this text has received some scholarly attention, Leibniz’s objection in this text has not been fully explained yet. I argue that evaluating Leibniz’s objection relies on how to understand Spinoza’s notion of conception: first, whether conception is co-extensive with inherence and causation; second, whether conception is mental.

How are pictures to be individuated from other kinds of representations, such as linguistic representations? The traditional view is that a picture represents what it represents because it resembles it. Thus, the so-called “resemblance” theory has been the dominant view in understanding pictorial representation. More recently, however, the basis of this view has been brought into question; several philosophers have tried to provide the right theory of pictorial (or iconic) representations. Flint Schier is one of them. He tries to explain pictorial representations in terms of what he calls “natural generativity” in his book, Deeper Into Pictures. In this paper, I will raise a new problem that has never been debated before. Specifically, I will argue that Flint Schier’s individuation of iconic systems is problematic. I will show a counterexample to his method of individuation and argue that he cannot avoid the problem without abandoning one of the core claims of his theory.