Kipros Lofitis

If we have selfish reasons to do as morality says, does that mean that we have moral reasons? What, exactly, does it mean for there to be moral reasons (for us to do things)? In this paper, I do three things. First, I present and clarify the question of the existence of moral reasons – which in the absence of careful elucidation stands rather obscure. Second, I consider two distinct ways that one may be sceptical about the existence of moral reasons. Third, from the two scepticisms, I raise the interesting question of whether radical scepticism about reasons really does address the question of the existence of moral reasons – and argue that it does not. This is an interesting result which, if true, raises questions that deserve further attention from those interested in the issue of the existence of moral reasons and the question of normativity more generally.

An error theory about moral reasons is the view that ordinary thought is committed to error, and that the alleged error is the thought that moral norms (expressing alleged moral requirements) invariably supply agents with sufficient normative reasons (for action). In this paper, I sketch two distinct ways of arguing for the error theorist's substantive conclusion that moral norms do not invariably supply agents with sufficient normative reasons. I am primarily interested in the somewhat neglected way, which I call the alternative route. A reason for this is because it seems a genuine question whether the alternative route towards the substantive conclusion need be as troubling to the moralist as the standard route. My hunch is that it is not. Though the alternative error theory denies justification from genuinely moral acts, it also does so from acts born out of self-interest or immorality. If the alternative theory is true, the moralist can at least hold on to the claim that if genuinely moral considerations fail to provide agents with reasons for action, nothing else (of the sort) does.