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Communication and shared informationPhilosophical Studies 169 (3): 489-508. 2014.Strawson style counterexamples to Grice’s account of communication show that a communicative intention has to be overt. Saying what overtness consists in has proven to be difficult for Gricean accounts. In this paper, I show that a common explanation of overtness, one that construes it in terms of a network of shared beliefs or knowledge, is mistaken. I offer an alternative, collectivist, model of communication. This model takes the utterer’s communicative intention to be a we-intention, a kind …Read more
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Words on PsycholinguisticsJournal of Philosophy 113 (12): 593-616. 2016.David Kaplan’s analysis of the factors that determine what words someone has used in a given utterance requires that a speaker can only use a word through producing an utterance performed with a particular, related intention directed at speaking that word. This account, or any that requires a speaker to have an intention to utter a specific word, proves inconsistent with models of speech planning in psycholinguistics as informed by data on slips-of-the-tongue. Kaplan explicitly aims to formulate…Read more
APA Central Division
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Collective Intentionality |