Klaudyna Horniczak

In the academic debate on gender categorization in elite sport, three main positions are typically distinguished: Anatomists, Identifiers, and Abolitionists. In brief, Anatomists argue that gender categories in professional sport are necessary and should be based on sex assigned at birth. Identifiers maintain that categorization should follow an athlete’s self-identified gender. Abolitionists, by contrast, advocate for eliminating gender divisions in sport altogether. In this paper, the authors introduce a fourth position: the Constructivist. They argue that gender categories in elite sport should be preserved, but grounded in an understanding of gender as a social kind. This position is based on the conviction that fairness is a fundamental value in sport and that, at least in our society, an athlete’s social gender significantly influences their opportunities in competition. The main aim of the paper is to present and defend an argument for the superiority of the Constructivist approach over competing conceptions, namely the Unfair Psychological Advantage argument. This argument holds that the Constructivist account provides the best available proxy for identifying unfair psychological advantages that men may hold over women.

This paper explores evolving gender identity definitions in both social and legal contexts. Traditionally, gender was defined based on visible anatomical features. However, contemporary perceptions acknowledge the significance of gender identity, which may not align with sex assigned at birth. Many legal systems, including the Polish one, still rely on binary gender classifications based on anatomy, while the legal concept of gender identity remains underdefined. The ambiguity regarding legal gender identity calls for a solution that draws from extensive non-legal literature on the topic, to offer a more informed legal understanding. The redefined legal concept of gender should fulfil three key criteria: it should be clear, align with current scientific knowledge, and advance trans rights as well as gender equality. In the paper, three non-legal approaches to defining gender identity – materialist, externalist, and internalist – will be examined; and their potential application in the legal context based on the above-mentioned criteria will be assessed.

It is rather uncontroversial that gender should have no influence on treating others as equal epistemic agents. However, is this view reflected in practice? This paper aims to test whether the gender of the testifier and the accused of assault is related to the perception of a testimony’s reliability and the guilt of the potential perpetrator. Two experiments were conducted: the subjects (n = 361, 47% females, 53% males) assessed the reliability of the testifier in four scenarios of assault accusation, in which the only difference was the gender of the people presented. During the study, we have observed dependencies of gender and ascription of reliability, but only marginal differences in guilt attribution. The results of our research may constitute an argument for the existence of different epistemic status endowed on people depending on their gender and existing gender stereotypes. Our results suggest that gender bias may be situated at a deeper level than the linguistically triggered representation.