Klaus Brinkmann

By conventional standards, the papers in this volume fall roughly into the two broad categories of moral theory and applied ethics. However, a closer look will reveal that there is nothing conventional about them. Not only do some of the applied ethics papers challenge widely acknowledged positions in bioethics or suggest a new framework for the reconciliation of nature and culture in environmental ethics, the papers in moral theory show a remarkable preparedness to rethink traditional boundaries, positions, and methodological approaches altogether. Contributors include Stephen Darwall, Matti Häyry, Virginia Held, Alasdair MacIntyre, Ricardo Maliandi, Holmes Rolston III, Gunnar Skirbekk, and Hung-Yul So. Author abstracts are provided for each paper and a complete name index is provided.

This book contains material from some 15 years of scholarly work on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its reception by his immediate successors. While large parts of the book rely on previously published articles, Ameriks has worked these earlier publications into a monographic study by integrating them into an overall argument now prefaced by a detailed introduction to the book’s main thesis and rounded out by a conclusion that provides a “final perspective” on the study as a whole. The central thesis of the book may be summarized as follows. The reception of Kant’s philosophy by his contemporaries and immediate successors, and above all by Fichte and Hegel, was decisively influenced by the way in which Reinhold transformed the Kantian enterprise into a foundationalist system in which all propositions were to be derived from a first grounding principle. This is significant because in the process Reinhold “managed to distort the basic meaning of Kant’s original doctrine”. As a result, German idealism after Kant can by no means be said to be the continuation and completion of Kant’s Copernican revolution. Rather, Kant’s position constitutes an “alternative to this ambitious foundational project”. The post-Kantian development thus breaks with Kant’s much more modest view of what a system of philosophy can and should be. A crucial role in this process of misinterpretation of Kant’s intentions falls to Reinhold’s recasting of what Ameriks calls Kant’s “long argument to idealism” into Reinhold’s “short argument”, that is, the exclusive reliance by Reinhold on the argument from representation according to which the thing-in-itself is “unrepresentable” and hence dispensable. The Reinhold of the “Elementary Philosophy” of 1789–91 thus believed to possess a shortcut to idealism which made Kant’s complicated justification of the complementarity thesis redundant. It also established the immanence of representational consciousness as the exclusive ground of all claims to knowledge and thus prepared the way for the closed, “absolutist” systems that became the hallmark of post-Kantian idealism. Ameriks unfolds this argument in four parts dealing first with Kant’s more modest claims concerning system and knowledge as a backdrop for the subsequent discussion, the motivation for and the content of Reinhold’s revision of Kant’s philosophy, Fichte’s practical foundationalism as inspired by Reinhold, and Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy. The book covers other topics as well such as an illuminating discussion of the notion of apperception in Kant and Fichte as compared to contemporary interpretations of the apperception theory. The introduction also argues for a compatibilist alternative to Kant’s theory of freedom which would minimize Kant’s metaphysical commitment to the existence of an absolute spontaneity and thus make Kant’s position an even more modest one.

Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic constitutes the foundation of the system of philosophy presented in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Together with his Science of Logic, it contains the most explicit formulation of his enduringly influential dialectical method and of the categorical system underlying his thought. It offers a more compact presentation of his dialectical method than is found elsewhere, and also incorporates changes that he would have made to the second edition of the Science of Logic if he had lived to do so. This volume presents it in a new translation with a helpful introduction and notes. It will be a valuable reference work for scholars and students of Hegel and German idealism, as well as for those who are interested in the post-Hegelian character of contemporary philosophy.

The role of history in Hegel’s system is puzzling. On one hand, Hegel argues that truth is necessarily the outcome of development, and to that extent historical. On the other hand, however, this development is said to be a mere “play” of the Idea with itself. Moreover, Hegel’s claim in Enc. §14 that the historical development of spirit follows its systematic development not only implies that the systematic structure of the Idea precedes its historical unfolding but also makes history deterministic. This article argues that if we want to preserve the primacy of the system over its history while at the same time avoiding determinism, we need to amend Hegel’s position in light of the Aristotelian distinction, ignored by Hegel, between hypothetical and absolute necessity.

By conventional standards, the papers collected in this first volume of invited contributions to the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy fall roughly into the two broad categories of moral theory and applied ethics. However, a closer look will reveal that there is nothing conventional about them. Not only do some of the applied ethics papers challenge some widely acknowledged positions in bioethics or suggest a new framework for the reconciliation of nature and culture in environmental ethics, the papers in moral theory broadly conceived show a remarkable preparedness to rethink traditional boundaries, positions, and methodological approaches altogether. Thus the traditional boundaries between normative ethics and metaethics come under pressure once it is realized that, for instance, normative disagreements concerning different conceptions of the good life presuppose an agreement to the effect that the good life is indeed something we ought to strive for. Based on observations like these, it is possible to develop a powerful argument for the reintegration of normative ethics with metaethics. Again, the divisions within moral theory become less important, not to say irrelevant, when the established normative positions seem to lose their universalistic standing in a confrontation with culturally based ethical pluralism. One may then even go so far as to speak of the “demise of moral theory” due to its inability to defend an unambiguous notion of morality.

This book attempts to reconstruct the deep current of part of the spiritual history of modernity which in the Western world has led to the fundamental reorientation of our being-in-the-world known under the title of secularization. In addition, the book tries to understand the nature of the intellectual response to this process of secularization as it was mounted by various Catholic movements. The process of secularization finally issued not only in the loss of the religious dimension of transcendence, but also in what the author calls the "disappearance of the future as an historical standard of judgment". In the book's final chapter, the author argues that the Heideggerian concept of temporality is apt to contribute to a new opening up of the dimension of futurity insofar as Heidegger's interpretation of time as "ek-static" leads to a re-evaluation of the past as dependent in its meaning on the advent of the future--a notion that has become all but extinct in the process of secularization. It is as though Heidegger offered a secular alternative to both the religious tradition of transcendence with its eschatological connotations and the loss of a teleological orientation of history in the wake of the scientific interpretation of the world.

The concept of the self is embedded in a web of relationships of other concepts and phenomena such as consciousness, self-consciousness, personal identity and the mind–body problem. The article follows the ontological and epistemological roles of the concept of selfconsciousness and the structural co-implication of consciousness and self-consciousness from Descartes and Locke to Kant and Sartre while delineating its subject matter from related inquiries into the relationship between the mind and the body, personal identity, and the question whether consciousness is an irreducible reality sui generis or essentially a neurobiological entity. Over the course of its history, the modern self turns out to become an ever more elusive phenomenon, while its roles as a bearer of individual responsibility and as a subject of reflective endorsement of the truth become ever more pronounced.