Klaus Corcilius

This is a discussion of the main argument of Anna Marmodoro’s _Aristotle on Perceiving Objects_. Each of the book’s three larger thematic sections is briefly summarized and discussed: Aristotle’s metaphysics of powers, his theory of modally specific perception, and his theory of more complex perceptual content. It is argued that while Marmodoro’s argument for the thesis that Aristotle is a proponent of an ontology of pure causal powers is unsuccessful, her account of modally specific perception has the merit of bringing out the explanatory potential of Aristotle’s basic account of change in interesting ways. Finally, an examination of her argument for the thesis that the so–called common sense generates complex perceptual content by actively unifying input from the five senses raises questions concerning the unity and structure of the book’s overall argument.

Does the soul have parts? What kind of parts? And how do all the parts make together a whole? Many ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers discussed these questions, thus providing a mereological analysis of the soul. Their starting point was a simple observation: we tend to describe the soul of human beings by referring to different types of activities (perceiving, imagining, thinking, etc.). Each type of activity seems to be produced by a special part of the soul. But how can a simple, undivided soul have parts? Classical thinkers gave radically different answers to this question. While some claimed that there are indeed parts, thus assigning an internal complexity to the soul, others emphasized that there can only be a plurality of functions that should not be conflated with a plurality of parts. The eleven chapters reconstruct and critically examine these answers. They make clear that the metaphysical structure of the soul was a crucial issue for ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers.