Klaus Günther

Given the rapid advances in AI in predicting and controlling human behavior, the question arises as to whether the responsible use of AI might not best be regulated by law with the aid of AI itself. This question is guided by the expectation that two normative problems associated with legal norms can be definitively resolved with the help of AI: (1) that it might be possible to perfect legal norms through AI to such an extent that they provide a single correct answer for every application, and (2) that they can control the behavior of those subject to them in such a way that there is no longer any deviant behavior. This article situates these two expectations within the historical context of efforts to perfect legal norms and critically discusses the possible consequences for the democratic constitutional state.

The author introduces a normative conception of coherence, derived from a pragmatic interpretation of the application of norms to concrete cases. A distinction is made between the justification of a norm and its application. In the case of moral norms, justification and application can be analysed as two different discursive procedures which give rise to different aspects of the principle of impartiality. Impartial justification requires a procedure by which all interests concerned are taken into account whereas impartial application requires a procedure where all features of a situation are considered. The complete description of a concrete case makes necessary a coherent interpretation of all the valid norms which are prima facie applicable. This requirement of an ideal coherent system of norms is restricted to interpretive “paradigms” in the case of legal norms, because it is necessary to produce singular judgments under the restrictive conditions of scarce time and incomplete knowledge.

Wer verstehen will, wie gesellschaftliche Ordnungen sich herausbilden, verändern, stabilisieren oder zerbrechen, muss ihr normatives Innenleben erschließen. Der Frankfurter Forschungsverbund »Normative Ordnungen« hat eine viel beachtete Methode entwickelt, die die konstitutiven Rechtfertigungen nationaler wie transnationaler Ordnungen untersucht: ihre narrative Struktur, ihre moralische, religiöse, konventionelle, politische, rechtliche Natur – oder eine Kombination davon, so spannungsreich sie auch sein mag. Auf welchen Wegen, in welchen Verfahren und Konflikten entstehen solche Rechtfertigungen? Wann schwindet ihre Kraft? Der Band präsentiert in interdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit eine Antwort auf diese Fragen.

Coercion and trust seem to be mutually exclusive. Someone who can trust another person does not need coercive threats unless there are reasons to be suspicious and no longer trust them. On the other hand, a person who believes that she is trusted will be irritated and doubt the relationship of trust as soon as she is met with coercive threats. At second glance, however, it seems questionable whether this disjunction applies in the sense of strict exclusivity. After a conceptual clarification of the concept of coercion, Niklas Luhmann’s analysis of the concept of trust is used to show that coercion is destructive for relationships of trust when it is applied directly, but can become a condition that enables and stabilizes trust if the possibility of coercion remains latent and in the background. Of course, this presupposes that the coercion is institutionalized, i. e. delegated to a third party who applies the coercion in a predictable and not arbitrary manner. This means that in addition to the horizontal trust between the partners in a trust relationship, there is also vertical trust towards a third party required.

Wie kommt es, dass sich Menschen an normative Ordnungen halten, und aus welchen Normen bestehen diese? Die Frage nach deren bindender Kraft beleuchten die philosophischen Beiträge dieses Bandes. Ergänzend wird aus historischer Sicht untersucht, wie sich unterschiedliche Rechtfertigungsweisen von Ordnungen entwickelt haben. Der Konstruktion neuer internationaler Rechtsordnungen gehen die rechtswissenschaftlichen Beiträge nach. Aus politikwissenschaftlicher Perspektive wird schließlich gezeigt, auf welchen Prinzipien die institutionelle Gestaltung unserer politischen Welt beruht beziehungsweise beruhen sollte.

The article first sketches a panorama of contrasting crisis-like processes that currently characterize the general understanding of freedom, such as the increase in restrictions on freedom against the background of man-made environmental changes, the strengthening of the freedom to dispose of one’s own life in the discussion on assisted suicide, the development of more complex views of the biological nature of human beings and their freedom, the disavowal of the connection between freedom and responsibility, and the increasing use of new communication media and algorithmic technologies of observation, analysis, and modification of human behavior. Under this impression, new contours of a complex and conflictual order of freedom are drawn. They become apparent in at least three determinations of the relationship of freedom: in the relationship of freedom to human nature, in the relationship to others and to society, and in the relationship to extra-human nature. In all three relationships, the semantics of disposal and domination seem to have a highly destructive effect on a crisis-like moment and carry the risk of contributing to a long-term loss of freedom.

La théorie de l'argumentation montre que le raisonnement pratique s'exerce selon deux modalités : la justification de la validité d'une norme générale et la justification de la pertinence de l'application d'une norme générale au cas d'espèce. Le jugement d'application est le produit d'une argumentation commandée par une exigence d'impartialité. Cette exigence se traduit dans le principe procédural selon lequel on ne peut établir qu'une norme peut légitimement s'appliquer dans une situation que si ont été prises en considération toutes les caractéristiques de la situation qui sont relevantes en regard d'une interprétation cohérente de toutes les normes applicables. Un tel critère de validité s'impose tant au jugement moral en situation qu'au jugement juridique

The author introduces a normative conception of coherence, derived from a pragmatic interpretation of the application of norms to concrete cases. A distinction is made between the justification of a norm and its application. In the case of moral norms, justification and application can be analysed as two different discursive procedures which give rise to different aspects of the principle of impartiality. Impartial justification requires a procedure by which all interests concerned are taken into account whereas impartial application requires a procedure where all features of a situation are considered. The complete description of a concrete case makes necessary a coherent interpretation of all the valid norms which are prima facie applicable. This requirement of an ideal coherent system of norms is restricted to interpretive “paradigms” in the case of legal norms, because it is necessary to produce singular judgments under the restrictive conditions of scarce time and incomplete knowledge.