Koji Tachibana

This is the first volume to explore the modern reception and contemporary relevance of Aristotle and his philosophy in Japan, making it a valuable contribution to both global Aristotelian studies and studies of Japanese philosophical traditions. The study of Aristotle's philosophy in Japan is already over a hundred years old, yet the fruits of these efforts have mostly been published in Japanese and thus circulated almost entirely within Japan. Japanese scholarship, however, has not been conducted in isolation, but rather has developed by keeping up with crucial contemporary trends in international scholarship. Aristotelian studies in Japan have therefore been neither particularly Japanese nor Far East Asian at first glance, which is one reason why they have not received much attention in Japanese philosophical literature. This volume addresses this gap, exploring the long historical struggle of Japanese people to read, understand and adopt Aristotle's philosophy in a philosophical tradition different from the West. It also examines the applicability of Aristotle's philosophy to contemporary issues and demonstrates the extent to which his philosophy remains relevant today, whether in the East or West. Aristotle in Japan: Reception, Interpretation and Application is of interest to students and scholars of Aristotelian philosophy, as well as those working on Japanese philosophy and classical reception.

The historical trajectory of the Japanese concept of virtue, “toku (徳)”, has been relatively neglected by scholars. Dividing Japanese history into five periods, I examine this concept and reveal four of its features. First, the prototype of this concept is Buddhist rather than Confucian. Second, Confucian colouration became distinct after the mid-17th century, reaching its peak in the early 20th century. Third, Aristotle’s notion of virtue has been warmly welcomed by Japanese intellectuals since the late 19th century. Fourth, since the late 20th century, this concept has become an amalgam of Buddhist, Confucian, and Western-Christian notions of virtue.

ABSTRACT For almost 80 years, post-war Japanese moral education has adopted a dual-process structure, which states morality is taught through two processes: one through all aspects of school education and the other through a special moral education class. The necessity and effectiveness of this structure were theorised by Eijiro Inatomi. However, it has been almost neglected that his theory is largely based on Aristotle’s theory of virtue. This paper examines Inatomi’s Aristotle-inspired theory and its significance. After reviewing the social and historical background of his theory, I argue that Inatomi successfully adopted Aristotle’s theory of virtue in three respects: human definition, intellectual virtue, and ethical virtue. Finally, I suggest that post-war Japanese moral education can be understood as a nationwide social implementation experiment on the efficacy of Aristotelian virtue ethics and that Inatomi’s notion of cosmos can serve as a conceptual device to enhance the social feasibility of Aristotle’s virtue ethics.

Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory claims that admiration for a person is a necessary condition for her to be a moral exemplar. I argue that this claim is empirically unsupported. I provide two counterexamples, astronauts and brain data. I demonstrate that they play the role of exemplars well but receive no admiration and, accordingly, are entitled to be called nonadmirable moral exemplars. I conclude that my argument suggests why Aristotle, distinct from Zagzebski, does not emphasise the role of the praiseworthiness of virtue in his theory of virtue development in the Nicomachean Ethics.

I investigate how isolated and confined environment research in human space exploration informs performance management in terrestrial organizations and workplaces and to what extent space neuroscience can contribute to such research and management. Space life science studies of astronauts’ performance management during long-duration missions under isolated and confined environment started in the mid-1990s. This research merits further scrutiny, as scientific knowledge on life in space has been successfully applied to support people in related terrestrial environments. However, space neuroscientists have yet to fully explore the potential of research on the neural substrates of human behavioral health in isolated and confined environments. I demonstrate why research on these neural mechanisms can and should be conducted, identifying five principal reasons. This kind of research will contribute to facilitate the establishment of a more responsive behavioral health program in the workplace and organization, change the organizational culture, and solve issues related to international or multicultural work environments. Further neuroethical considerations are also required, since such research can be used for unethical purposes, such as augmenting workers to continue working under unhealthy workplace conditions. In conclusion, space neuroscience, in combination with other fields, can make a distinctive research contribution not merely to elucidate how the human mind, body, and brain affect ethical performance in various terrestrial, isolated, and confined settings but also to improve performance management and establish ethically sound organizations.

Incorporating various perspectives on the Japanese notion of virtue, Alternative Virtues investigates and expands our current understanding of virtue and presents a foundational case study of an alternative approach to virtues. The study of virtue has long been dominated by a Western cultural (i.e., Christian) and/ or far-Eastern cultural (i.e., Confucianism) point of view. However, Japanese thinkers and scholars have struggled with these traditions. And although the rise of cultural intermingling has created a unique culture and code of values in Japan, these virtues have grown from their own historical and cultural origins and sources other than the Christian and Confucian traditions. Viewed through the filter of Japanese history and culture, and focusing on different contexts in Japan, the book investigates both moral and epistemic virtues as well as discussing the practical and educational implications that such alternative virtues may have on our lives, with the goal of reforming the current research trends in virtue theory and encouraging the wider public to consider the notion of virtue from a fresh perspective. Due to the content and scope of the book, it will appeal to a variety of readers - both locally and internationally - interested not only in Japanese historical, cultural and philosophical investigations of virtues, but also those wanting to learn more about alternative perspectives on virtues and Japan itself. This readership includes scholars and university students (both undergraduate and postgraduate) in the fields of philosophy and education, and educational practitioners interested in teaching virtues and values in schools.

Shigeki Nishimura (1828–1902) is a Japanese moral philosopher and activist during the late Edo and early Meiji periods. He has been portrayed in previous academic literature and current high-school textbooks authorised by the Japanese government as a key figure in promoting the Confucian approach to moral education in the Meiji era. Although recent research has begun to interpret him as more than just a proponent of feudalism, his moral philosophy remains underexplored. This paper examines two of his major works, Japanese Moral Theory (1887) and Lectures on Virtue Theories (1895–1901), to investigate the core elements of his moral philosophy. By analysing passages in these and other texts that have been largely overlooked in previous studies, six central features of his moral philosophy are identified: (1) theory for practice, (2) respect for traditional opinions, (3) respect for empirical evidence, (4) emphasis on enterprising virtues, (5) universality of moral theory, and (6) interest in individual virtues. This analysis suggests that Nishimura’s moral theory is less feudalistic than traditionally assumed but reflects empirical and liberal dimensions.

Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, considers how one becomes virtuous. However, when asking the question of how, he does not refer to ‘by friend’ as an option; all he refers to are ‘by learning’, ‘by training’, ‘by habituation’, ‘by god’ and ‘by luck’. Why does he not do so? First, I point out the fact that both Aristotle and Plato do not refer to the option of ‘by friend’ when asking the question of how. Second, I argue that Aristotle does not overlook the educational role of friendship. He understands that one needs friends. Third and finally, I consider the reason why Aristotle hesitates to emphasize the educational role of friendship and indicate that his theory of the mean causes it. This reveals the strained relationship between his theory of the mean and that of friendship in his ethical theory.

This short article is based on my special lecture entitled "Aristotle and the Philosophy of Education" at Tamagawa University Research Institute in Tokyo on September 19, 2015, through a recording of the spoken language transcribed in written form with some corrections. The lecture delivered on that day consists of two parts: referring to historical research and a statistical survey, the first half focuses on uncovering the fact that the philosophy of education has been slighted both in Japanese and Western academia and that this fact is valid for both Aristotle's and contemporary studies on the philosophy of education; the second half endeavors to describe two possible research projects - namely, a classical-philosophical and interpretative study of Aristotle's philosophy of education and a contemporary-philosophical and Aristotelian study of the philosophy education. Some of these topics have been published but others have not. This short article concerns the first half of the lecture and measures the gap between philosophy and the philosophy of education in Japan through a statistical survey of the largest competitive research funding database in Japan: KAKEN.

Some skeptics question the very possibility of moral bioenhancement by arguing that if we lack a widely acceptable notion of morality, we will not be able to accept the use of a biotechnological technique as a tool for moral bioenhancement. I will examine this skepticism and argue that the assessment of moral bioenhancement does not require such a notion of morality. In particular, I will demonstrate that this skepticism can be neutralized in the case of recent neurofeedback techniques. This goal will be accomplished in four steps. First, I will draw an outline of the skepticism against the possibility of moral bioenhancement and point out that a long-lasting dispute among moral philosophers nourishes this skepticism. Second, I will survey recent neurofeedback techniques and outline their three features: the variety of the target human faculties, such as emotion, cognition, and behavior; the flexibility or personalizability of the target brain state; and the nonclinical application of neurofeedback techniques. Third, I will argue that, by virtue of these three unique features, neurofeedback techniques can be a tool for moral bioenhancement without adopting any specific notion of morality. Fourth, I will examine the advantages and threats that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement may have. Finally, I will conclude that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can become a new and promising tool for moral bioenhancement and requires further ethical investigations on its unique features.

Recent neuroscience studies have reported that neurofeedback training with the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging enables the regulation of an individual’s cognitive, emotion-related, and behavioral states through a real-time representation of her brain activities. Since this technique has been applied not only to clinical research to, for example, mitigate mental or psychiatric symptoms but also to non-clinical research to, for example, change the cognition or preferences of a so-called healthy participant, neurofeedback-based cognitive and/or moral enhancements may be realized in the future. However, neurofeedback-based human enhancement is not the only issue that requires neuroethical consideration. I examine why and to what extent the dual application of neurofeedback technique will blur the lines between the mental, the social, and the moral, threatening some social norms, such as individual freedom and diversity. First, I consider the link between the mental and the social in psychiatry. Examining the definition of “mental disorder” provided by the American Psychiatric Association, I show that the mental is partly defined through social performance. Second, I make explicit the link between the social and the moral and argue that moral evaluation of an activity is gently but positively correlated with its social evaluation. Third, I demonstrate the links between the mental, the social, and the moral. In spite of a great deal of effort to distinguish these notions, the possibility of the dual application of this technique blurs the lines between them. Fourth, I examine whether such blurred lines signal sociocultural evolution or dystopia and argue that it can be understood as a beginning of the second advent of ethical virtue. I conclude that further cautious consideration of neuroethics is required because the establishment of this technique may have unique influences on our society.

Scientific progress in recent neurofeedback research may bring about a new type of moral neuroenhancement, namely, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement; however, this has yet to be examined thoroughly. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrates that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate. First, I survey this debate and extract the typical structural flow of its arguments. Second, by applying structure to the case of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement, I examine the ethical, legal, and social issues to show that this technique is unique and traditionalist, which makes it compatible with almost all our conservative notions, so that it, accordingly, can be seen as an ethically acceptable option. Third, by rejecting the premise in the moral enhancement debate that bio/neuro-enhancement has its unique ELSI that traditional methods would never create, I demonstrate that, by virtue of its traditional or conservative features, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be incorporated into the traditional moral education network. Finally, I conclude that, being a part of the traditional moral education network, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be a unique and ethically acceptable option of moral neuroenhancement.

Human space exploration requires massive budgets every fiscal year. Especially under severe financial constraint conditions, governments are forced to justify to society why spending so much tax revenue for human space exploration is worth the cost. The value of human space exploration might be estimated in many ways, but its social significance and cost-effectiveness are two key ways to gauge that worth. Since these measures should be applied country by country because sociopolitical conditions differ in each country and must be taken into consideration, the study on the social significance of human space exploration must take the coloration of a case-study. This paper, focusing on the case of Japan with surveying Japanese literary and national documents as well as taking its sociopolitical conditions into account, examines the social significance of human space exploration. First, we give an overview of the circumstances surrounding Japan's human space exploration program. Derived from the statements of such relevant parties as scholars, journalists, policy makers, and astronauts, this overview indicates that the main concerns about human space exploration in Japan are its social significance and cost-effectiveness (Section 1). Next, an overview of behavioral science—an essential field for human space exploration (referred to in this paper as space behavioral science) that provides support for astronauts—is presented from the perspective of stress research in isolated and confined environments (Section 2). We then give two examples of where such knowledge from space behavioral science research has been applied to terrestrial isolated and confined environments. One is JAXA’s support in 2009 for people who were vulnerable to infection by a new strain of flu and accordingly placed in an isolated and confined facility under the Infectious Disease Law and the Quarantine Law. The other is NASA's support in 2010 for Chilean mine workers who were trapped 700 m underground after a mining accident (Section 3). Based on these case studies, we illustrate the further social utility of such knowledge through a discussion of potential applications in other situations in Japan. Focusing on Japan for its geographical and social features in being an earthquake-prone archipelago and having the world's preeminent aging society, we show that refugees living in evacuation centers and people in an elderly-elderly homecare situation pose socially problematic situations specific to Japan. We then argue that space behavioral scientific knowledge can be applied to support people under these and other isolated and confined environments in various ways (Section 4). Finally, we demonstrate that such an application can be understood as an ethical contribution to Japanese society and that this contribution can be embedded in Japan's space policy (Section 5). We conclude that human space exploration can be a socially significant and cost-effective endeavor that is worthy of tax revenue expenditures because space behavioral science is highly likely to provide unique and useful knowledge to help address various social problems concerning terrestrial isolated and confined environments and support people in sufferings there.

Neuroscientific claims have a significant impact on traditional philosophy. This essay, focusing on the field of moral neuroscience, discusses how and why philosophy can contribute to neuroscientific progress. First, viewing the interactions between moral neuroscience and moral philosophy, it becomes clear that moral philosophy can and does contribute to moral neuroscience in two ways: as explanandum and as explanans. Next, it is shown that moral philosophy is well suited to contribute to moral neuroscience in both of these two ways in the context of the problem of ecological validity. Philosophy can play the role of an agent for ecological validity, since traditional philosophy shapes and reflects part of our social reality. Finally, based on these arguments, I tentatively sketch how a Kantian account of moral incentive can play this role.