Kok-Chor Tan

In this paper, I respond to one aspect of Elizabeth Barnes’s argument in The Minority Body: a Theory of Disability. To do this, I first explain her argument as it applies towards children: in order to have a genuine “mere-difference” view of disability, one may not cause nor remove disability. The consequence of this theory is that it is impermissible for parents to choose to remove their child’s disability. I argue this is incorrect. Barnes’s assumption relies on a non-interference framework, which is inappropriate when applied to children. When we use an interest-protection framework instead, it becomes at least permissible for parents, and in some situations obligatory, to choose to remove their child’s disability. Because the permissibility or obligation is situationally dependent, this view is consistent with Barnes’s overall argument for the mere-difference view of disability.

In Lockean social contract theory, the state exercises its authority over territory through property rights. The state has territorial authority over the property it and its citizens claim. This authority is legitimate when the state has the consent of the governed and effectively governs. In this paper, I argue that there is an irreconcilable tension between these concepts of authority and legitimacy. I argue that because Locke's view is property‐based, his view cannot justify more than a piecemeal territory. A piecemeal territory, however, makes the government's job of protecting life, liberty, and property nearly impossible. If we push to have a unified account of territory, the consent of the governed is undermined. Either the Lockean loses legitimacy by failing to protect life, liberty, and property, or they lose legitimacy by failing to have the consent of the governed. If I am correct, then the Lockean has to give up either legitimacy or territorial authority—neither of which is a workable option. This leaves us with having to either look elsewhere to justify territorial authority, give up the idea of territorial authority, or explore political alternatives to the state.

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls sets out his normative conception of global justice. The book remains a foundational text for scholars in the field. In recent years, however, new issues have arisen in the global justice literature, which Rawls did not consider. Moreover, his view has been rejected by many. So, as we move forward, does Rawls’ The Law of Peoples deserve to retain this foundational status? I argue that we have two weighty reasons to afford it this status. As we consider the future directions of global justice, we should do so by returning to The Law of Peoples.

How does one’s racialized experience affect whether a person persists over time? Several philosophers have explored this question with respect to numerical personal identity. However, Derek Parfit famously objected to the focus on personal identity, instead arguing that Relation-R mattered for continued existence. If Parfit was correct, then how does one’s racialized experience affect Relation-R? In this paper, I contend that one’s racialized experience can affect the extent to which one persists over time. I consider three cases—those involving changes to one’s racial identity, those involving changes to how one is racialized, and those involving a mismatch between one’s racial identity and how one is racialized—in which one’s racialized experience affects the extent to which one persists. I then consider various objections to my view.

Is it morally permissible for states to impose economic sanctions on states that continue to emit greenhouse gases, contributing to climate change? In this paper, I argue that we have reason to believe that imposing such economic sanctions is pro tanto morally permissible. Such economic sanctions can satisfy two moral constraints that are necessary for economic sanctions to be morally permissible: They can satisfy the just cause constraint and the proportionality constraint. Given that economic sanctions can satisfy these two constraints, I argue that they can be pro tanto morally permissible. However, I contend that these economic sanctions must be sensitive to three other considerations. These considerations – our views about causation, our views about what emissions are morally permissible, and our views about climate justice more generally – affect whether economic sanctions are morally permissible in the face of climate change.

I argue for the conditions that eco-sabotage (sabotage involving the protection of animals or the environment) must meet to be a morally permissible form of activism in a liberal democracy. I illustrate my case with Jessica Reznicek and Ruby Montoya’s oil pipeline destruction, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society’s whale hunt sabotage, and the Valve Turners’ pipeline shut-off, climate necessity-defense. My primary contention is that just as it is permissible to destroy an attacker’s weapon in self- or other-defense, it is permissible to engage in some forms of eco-sabotage. Taking inspiration from just war theory, I use the conditions of just cause, reasonable chance of success, proportionality, necessity, and discrimination to both conceptualize eco-sabotage as defense and illustrate the justificatory burden the eco-saboteur must meet. Often eco-sabotage is doubly pro-tanto wrong because it is illegal and involves property destruction. Overcoming these hurdles is particularly difficult because in seemingly bypassing democratic means of dispute resolution, the eco-saboteur seemingly coerces the other members of society by forcing idiosyncratic views upon them. Non-anthropocentric eco-sabotage grounded in defense of animal rights has mixed results regarding the democratic objection just described. I argue that anthropocentric eco-sabotage, grounded in defense of human rights, has the best chance of overcoming this objection, provided a persuasive case can be made for its reasonable chance of success. Passing a reasonable chance of success also causes problems for non-anthropocentric eco-sabotage grounded in species defense, while non-anthropocentric eco-sabotage grounded in defense against animal suffering has a lighter justificatory burden.

In order to be eligible for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual must have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. A major problem with this condition for refugee status is that it leaves significant protection gaps, for it is generally agreed that individuals fleeing indiscriminate violence or generalized harm do not satisfy this requirement. In this paper, I evaluate existing arguments both defending and critiquing the persecution condition, and then outline my own account of the criteria that should replace it. I argue that my view is preferable to alternatives suggested in the literature because it satisfies three key desiderata: 1) it eliminates protection gaps; 2) it is feasible to implement in a world like ours; and 3) it preserves the importantly political nature of the institution of refugeehood.

Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, there are two necessary conditions for refugeehood: a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and alienage – that is, being outside of one’s country of nationality or habitual residence. In 1985 Andrew Shacknove famously argued that both of these conditions should be rejected. Shacknove’s paper prompted much debate about the suitability of the persecution condition, but his rejection of the alienage requirement has received significantly less attention. In this paper I argue, against some recent defenders of the Convention, that Shacknove was right to claim that the alienage condition should be rejected. On my view, people who would be granted refugee status if they crossed a border, but who remain in their country of nationality, should also be eligible for refugee status.

A handful of scholars have offered explanations for why states with otherwise restrictive immigration laws should relax their demands for people applying to immigrate for family reasons. However, much less has been said about the family unification rights of refugees. This paper extends the existing discussion on family-based immigration to refugees, arguing that: (1) states have stronger duties to reunite refugee families; (2) some refugees should be entitled to reunite with their “extended” family; (3) refugee family reunion should not be subject to financial conditions; and (4) the right to family reunion is especially strong for refugee children.