University of Bialystok
  •  35
    McKay & Dennett (M&D) look for adaptive misbeliefs that result from the normal, though fallible, functioning of human cognition. Their account can be substantially improved by the addition of two elements: (1) significance of a belief's testability for its functionality, and (2) an account of reason appropriate to understanding systemic misbelief. Together, these points show why religion probably is an adaptive misbelief
  • Regarding the Mind Nautrally (edited book)
    with Milkowski Marcin and Talmont-Kaminski Konrad
    Cambridge Scholars Press. 2013.
  •  24
    Regarding Mind, Naturally (edited book)
    Cambridge Scholars Press. 2013.
    Naturalism is currently the most vibrantly developing approach to philosophy, with naturalised methodologies being applied across all the philosophical disciplines. One of the areas naturalism has been focussing upon is the mind, traditionally viewed as a topic hard to reconcile with the naturalistic worldview. A number of questions have been pursued in this context. What is the place of the mind in the world? How should we study the mind as a natural phenomenon? What is the significance of cogn…Read more
  •  55
    Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity (edited book)
    with Marcin Młlkowski
    College Publications. 2010.
    The contributors to this volume engage with issues of normativity within naturalised philosophy. The issues are critical to naturalism as most traditional notions in philosophy, such as knowledge, justification or representation, are said to involve normativity. Some of the contributors pursue the question of the correct place of normativity within a naturalised ontology, with emergentist and eliminativist answers offered on neighbouring pages. Others seek to justify particular norms within a na…Read more
  •  31
    Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically significant content of experience
    with John D. Collier
    In Johann Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society Xii, Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg. 2004.
    To account for a perceived distinction it is necessary to postulate a real distinction. Our process of experiencing the world is one of, mostly unconscious, interpretation of observed distinctions to provide us with a partial world-picture that is sufficient to guide action. The distinctions, themselves, are acorrigible (they do not have a truth value), directly perceived, structured, and capable of being interpreted. Interpreted experience is corrigible, representational and capable of guiding …Read more
  • Philip Johnson-Laird, How We Reason (review)
    Philosophy in Review 28 (6): 416-418. 2008.
  •  52
    Religious beliefs, it has been noted, are often hard to disprove. While this would be a shortcoming for beliefs whose utility was connected to their accuracy, it is actually necessary in the case of beliefs whose function bears no connection to how accurate they are. In the case of religions and other ideologies that serve to promote prosocial behaviour this leads to the need to protect belief systems against potentially disruptive counterevidence while maintaining their relevance. Religions tur…Read more
  •  15
    Sellars’ argument against The Given has set the scene for much of the discussion of the role of experience in justification. Susan Haack tries to avoid the objection presented by Sellars and to give experience a role in the justification of beliefs. Her approach is to put forward a double aspect theory of justification consisting of a logical/evaluative aspect and a causal aspect. Like other double aspect theories, her approach is led astray by the possibility of deviant causal chains. Her argum…Read more
  •  1
    Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language: A Biological Model Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 26 (5): 367-368. 2006.
  •  382
    Naturalizing the Mind
    In Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kamiński (eds.), Regarding Mind, Naturally, Cambridge Scholars Press. 2013.
    The introduction to the volume and the overview of the idea of naturalizing the mind.
  •  61
    Formal pragmatics plays an important, though secondary, role in modern analytical philosophy of language: its aim is to explain how context can affect the meaning of certain special kinds of utterances. During recent years, the adequacy of formal tools has come under attack, often leading to one or another form of relativism or antirealism. Our aim will be to extend the critique to formal pragmatics while showing that sceptical conclusions can be avoided by developing a different approach to the…Read more
  • Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language: A Biological Model (review)
    Philosophy in Review 26 367-368. 2006.
  •  3
    Prof. Wójcicki calls his position ‘radically pragmatist’. I will argue, however, that it is not nearly pragmatic enough. In particular, I will argue that his view is not pragmatist enough in three vital respects - even though it greatly improves upon how these issues have been traditionally dealt with.
  •  5
    Famously, Pascal described human beings as ‘thinking reeds’, weak in flesh but magnificent in mind. While it is a poetic image, it is also an ambivalent one and may suggest an inappropriately dualist view of human nature. It is important to realise that not only are we thinking reeds but that we are thinking because we are reeds. In fact – while being every bit the marvel that Pascal wondered at – rationality is reed-like itself, very much of a kind with the rest of human nature.
  •  2
    Pears' Two Dogmas of Russell's Logical Atomism
    Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 18 (2). 1998.
  •  40
    Communication is an essentially cooperative activity. However, cooperation only makes sense in a particular kind of environment – one in which cooperation leads to shared benefits. This can be seen once we take Grice’s Cooperative Principle and consider its implications in the general context of game theory. The effect is that something like metaphysical realism underpins normal human discourse, such discourse becoming impossible without that presumption.
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  •  2
    I will put forward a short, simple argument for a pair of realist claims: metaphysical realism and what I will refer to as epistemological realism. The argument will rely upon nothing more than our apparent memories. Having presented the argument, I will go on to consider possible objections to it, of which there will be a number but none of which will do more than complicate the matter. The argument I present borrows from Peirce’s view that the world’s capacity to surprise us plays a vital role…Read more
  •  18
    Epistemology and Emotions
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2): 229-233. 2010.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  15
    Thinking reeds and the ideal of reason: Outline of a naturalized epistemology
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 13 (2): 161-169. 2006.
    Pascal described human beings as ‘thinking reeds’, weak in flesh but magnificent in mind. While it is a poetic image, it is also an ambivalent one and may suggest an inappropriately dualist view of human nature. It is important to realise that not only are we thinking reeds but that we are thinking because we are reeds. In fact, rationality is reed-like itself, very much of a kind with the rest of human nature. It is now more than two and half centuries since David Hume first pointed out the lac…Read more