Konstantin Deininger

Die Stadtforschung begreift Tiere zunehmend als Teilnehmende am urbanen Leben. Doch bleibt offen, wie ihre Präsenz politisch gedacht und infrastrukturell abgesichert wird. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, wie urbane Infrastrukturen die Bedingungen tierlichen Lebens in der Stadt prägen und mit welchen Formen von Anerkennung und Fürsorge dies verbunden ist. Am Beispiel der Fledermäuse in Wien – die zu den institutionell am stärksten geschützten urbanen Tieren Europas zählen – entwickelt der Artikel ein Verständnis von Naturschutzmaßnahmen und Fürsorgepraktiken als Infrastrukturen der Hoffnung, die als materielle, rechtliche und soziale Gefüge bestimmte Vorstellungen von Multispezies-Zukünften tragen. Die Gegenüberstellung speziesorientierter Naturschutzinfrastrukturen und individuenzentrierter Fürsorgeinfrastrukturen zeigt, dass fragmentierte Infrastrukturen das Fortbestehen von Fledermäusen im urbanen Raum sichern, ohne ihnen eine kohärente Form politischer Zugehörigkeit zu verleihen. Während speziesorientierte Infrastrukturen auf den Erhalt von Populationen und ökologischen Funktionen ausgerichtet sind, zielen individuenzentrierte Infrastrukturen darauf, einzelne Individuen zu schützen und Verantwortungsbeziehungen zu stabilisieren. Zusammen bringen diese Infrastrukturen Formen urbaner Inklusion hervor, die materiell bedeutsam, politisch jedoch unvollständig sind. Der Artikel argumentiert, dass tierzentrierte Infrastrukturen der Hoffnung das Recht auf Stadt als fortdauerndes und ungleich realisiertes politisches Projekt sichtbar machen – und damit sowohl die Möglichkeiten als auch die Grenzen des gegenwärtigen urbanen Zusammenlebens von Menschen und anderen Tieren offenlegen. Urban scholarship has increasingly recognized animals as active participants in city life, yet questions remain about how their presence is politically imagined and materially sustained. This article examines how urban infrastructures shape the conditions under which animals are able to remain in the city, and with what forms of recognition and care. Drawing on the case of bats in Vienna — among the most institutionally protected urban animals in Europe — the article conceptualizes conservation measures and care practices as infrastructures of hope: material, legal, and social arrangements that embed particular visions of multispecies futures. Through an analysis of species-oriented conservation infrastructures and individual-focused care infrastructures, the article shows how bats are sustained through fragmented sets of infrastructure that enable their continued presence without consolidating a coherent form of political membership. While conservationist-focused infrastructures prioritize population survival and ecological function, individual-focused infrastructures orient hope toward the continuity of individual lives and relations of responsibility. Together, these infrastructures produce forms of urban inclusion that are materially significant yet politically incomplete. The article argues that attending to animal-focused infrastructures of hope provides a pragmatic way to assess animals’ right to the city as an ongoing and uneven political project, revealing both the possibilities and limits of contemporary multi-species urbanism.

Das Lehrbuch gibt einen Überblick über wichtige Ansätze der Tierethik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Seine Leitfrage ist, wie der abendländische Anthropozentrismus überwunden und den Tieren moralischer Status zuerkannt werden kann. Jedes der acht Kapitel bietet im Anschluss an eine verständliche und klar strukturierte Darstellung einiger ethischer Ansätze einen oder mehrere Quellentexte mit Fragen sowie ein praktisches Fallbeispiel für die Diskussion unter Studierenden. Ein umfangreiches Literaturverzeichnis und ein Glossar mit allen einschlägigen Fachbegriffen sind weitere Hilfen für das Studium. Dabei wendet sich das Lehrbuch an Studierende aller Fachrichtungen, von der Veterinärmedizin bis zur Philosophie, von der Biologie bis zur Theologie.

This dissertation explores how Cora Diamond’s moral philosophy can be read as a positive account of animal ethics. It departs from her critique of the reductionistic and rationalistic orientation of mainstream animal ethics (i.e., moral individualism). Although Diamond is one of the early figures of modern animal ethics, and one of the first critical voices of the pioneers in animal ethics, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, the full scope and force of Dia-mond’s moral philosophy has, with a few exceptions, not received much attention in animal ethics so far. The aim of this dissertation is to fully flesh out its potential. My main argument is that a practice-oriented approach to animal ethics inspired by Dia-mond’s moral philosophy is superior to moral individualism as it properly captures how we as humans encounter moral issues in human–animal interactions. It takes seriously that moral thinking is situated, i.e., that it is possible and limited by where it comes from. Contrary to the reproach that practice-oriented approaches are not able to promote radical change in our dealings with animals, I will argue that our well-established practices and shared concepts provide rich resources to critically examine and change how we think of and treat other ani-mals. This requires, as Diamond points out, a precise description and understanding of moral life and what is shared as morally significant in it. Contrary to moral individualism’s de-tached moral point of view, the approach developed here appreciates the variety and contra-dictions of moral thinking, particularly when it comes to our dealings with other animals. To support this argument, I shall first show that rationalistic approaches to animal ethics fail to account for emotional responses and fail to represent how harm to animals can be properly accounted for. Second, I shall explore Diamond’s peculiar concept of animals as fellow crea-tures and how it relates to her claim that the concept of being human is crucial for moral thought. I shall show that Diamond invites us to re-imagine the seemingly unified concept of being human which allows for seeing animals both in their similarities with and differences to humans. Third, I shall defend that a situated view is to be favored over a detached point of view if we are to understand why we are touched by other animals’ lives in respect of their suffering. We take it as morally significant as it is mediated through our understanding of our own vulnerability. Fourth, I shall claim that taking practice as the starting point of critical reflection does not lead to moral conservatism but rather provides a foundation for radical critique by showing that the conceptual demarcation lines confining animals are not rigid. Finally, I shall explore the limits of moral thinking as discussed by Diamond and ethicists who argue, inspired by Wittgenstein’s last writings, for moral certainties. This final step shows that some chains of moral reasoning end with certainty, providing morality with an ultimately binding character.

This paper examines the challenges posed by confronting the topic of animal suffering in animal husbandry. The predominant positions within animal ethics mainly focus on the moral status of humans and animals, arguing that killing farm animals is morally wrong due to specifiable intrinsic properties that grant farm animals significant moral status. Such positions are derived from a detached perspective that advocates for rational consistency. This paper opposes this detached perspective. By drawing on Cora Diamond’s concept of a difficulty of reality, it contends that facing animal suffering, including changing one’s habits and attitudes towards this suffering, is instead best accomplished by adopting a situated perspective. Being affected by animal suffering is mediated by our own existential condition as an embodied being exposed to vulnerability. This embodied perspective, which more generally informs our encounters with the world, is derived not from rational principles, but from our immersion in a specific worldly context. Effectively criticizing norms of animal treatment requires engaging with the world with all of our moral capacities, such as imagination and emotional response, from a non-detached perspective.

In this paper, we identify and explain three kinds of bedrock in moral thought. The term "bedrock," as introduced by Wittgenstein in §217 of the Philosophical Investigations, stands for the end of a chain of reasoning. We affirm that some chains of moral reasoning do indeed end with certainty. However, different kinds of certainties in morality work in different ways. In the course of systematizing the different types of certainties, we argue that present accounts of certainties in morality do not reflect their diversity. Our analysis yields three types of moral certainty: QUASI-UNDOUBTABLE CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, and TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES. We show that the first two types can, at least to some extent, be intelligibly doubted. Therefore, they do not possess the characteristics that would classify them as bedrock in the strictest sense. TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES cannot likewise be doubted because they are rules that enable moral thinking. Thus, deviating from them is unintelligible. We shall argue that all three types reflect ways in which moral language games come to an end, while only one, TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES, displays the characteristic of being solid bedrock.

This paper explores the phenomenon of moral distress in veterinary practice, particularly in environments like animal husbandry, where real-life barriers are in conflict with veterinarians’ moral beliefs. This paper draws controversial parallels, at least on first sight, with Just War Theory, which is understood as a non-ideal theory in response to morally non-ideal circumstances. The paper examines how veterinarians, corresponding to combatants, can navigate moral conundrums within their profession. It discusses the limitations of general ethics in guiding professionals like veterinarians who operate, just like soldiers, in morally non-ideal circumstances. It argues that while general ethics offers universal claims, it fails to address the complexities of real-world barriers faced by veterinarians, such as conflicting interests, economic pressures, and legal regulations. Using Just War Theory as a framework, the paper distinguishes between systemic factors and individual conduct in understanding moral distress. It suggests that veterinarians are not responsible for changing the system but are best advised to ensure ethical conduct within their profession. This perspective acknowledges the tension between moral beliefs and professional demands, highlighting the importance of maintaining agential integrity while recognizing the limitations in effecting systemic change. Ultimately, the paper concludes that veterinarians are permitted to focus on fulfilling their professional duties while remaining cognizant of their moral beliefs.

When it comes to invasive manipulation of animals on the biological level, reactions of disgust are common and often influential on people’s moral judgments. As a case in point, the Belgian Blue, a breed of hyper-enhanced cattle which will serve as a case study for the present article, has historically been met with revulsion. Traditionally, in bio- and animal ethics, this ‘yuck factor,’ has been denied any productive role in proper moral justification, since rationalism is still a dominant paradigm in those disciplines. This is not surprising since rationalism offers the fulfilment of certain expectations we have of morality, like universality, intersubjective communicability, and objectivity. Increasingly, however, the preconceptions of rationalism have been brought into question, both through empirical as well as philosophical insights. In this paper, we will explore a way in which researchers who are, accordingly, critical of rationalism, and who wish to take seriously the role disgust plays in the formation of moral judgments when it comes to biological manipulation of animals, can do so without abandoning those virtues of rationalism which make it such an appealing position. We will do so by offering what we call a ‘tempered’ kind of rationalism, that is, one which conceives of rationality in the terms of Mary Midgley, not as distinct from, but as a possible function of, well-ordered emotion.

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any (fundamental) change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally and unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique.

Dieser Artikel stellt Cora Diamonds Begriff des Mitgeschöpfs dar und untersucht dessen Relevanz für tierethische und tierpolitische Diskurse. Die traditionelle Tierethik hat eine rationalistische, naturalistische und reduktionistische Tendenz. Diamonds Moralphilosophie stellt dem einen praxissensitiven Ansatz gegenüber, der Emotionen und die moralische Imagination umfasst, wobei Diamond die Bedeutung des Menschseins betont. Letztere entspringt zwar einem epistemischen Anthropozentrismus, jedoch folgt aus diesem keine Mensch-Tier-Hierarchie: Diamond plädiert dafür, andere Tiere als Mitgeschöpfe, als Gefährten auf sterblichen Pfaden, zu begreifen. Dabei zeigt Diamond an ihrer Interpretation von J.M. Coetzees The Lives of Animals, wie Konzepte von anderen Tieren auf das eigene Selbstverständnis rückwirken. Abschließend erörtert der Artikel den Vorwurf des Quietismus und die Schwierigkeit der politischen Umsetzbarkeit in Diamonds Philosophie. [This article outlines Cora Diamond’s concept of the fellow creature and examines its relevance for animal ethics and animal politics. Diamond’s moral philosophy contrasts the rationalistic, naturalistic, and reductionistic tendency of traditional animal ethics with a practice-oriented approach that encompasses emotions and the moral imagination. Diamond emphasizes the importance of being human, which emanates from an epistemic anthropocentrism, but from which no human-animal hierarchy follows: She pleads for recognizing other animals as fellow creatures, as companions on mortal paths. In her interpretation of J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, Diamond shows how conceptualizing other animals influences one’s own self-understanding. Finally, the article discusses the reproach of quietism and the difficulty of political feasibility in Diamond’s philosophy.]

Intense or industrial animal husbandry is morally bad. This consensus in animal ethics led to the emergence of veganism which is recently in decline in favour of ‘conscientious carnivorism’ which advocates eating animal products from animal-friendly animal husbandry in response to the moral problems of industrial farming. Advocates of animal-friendly husbandry justify rearing and killing ‘happy animals’ by highlighting that the animals live pleasant lives and would not have existed if not reared for human consumption. In this paper, I tackle this ‘logic of the larder’ by showing that it serves as a purification strategy to conceal the harm that animals experience in this alleged animal-friendly type of farming. Defenders of ‘happy meat’ claim that animal-friendly animal husbandry is in the animals’ best interests and that it is in effect a ‘win-win situation’ for humans and farm animals alike. Departing from two critics of animal-friendly animal husbandry, I will show that the problem of this logic is that it evades the fact that moral residuals, which is the experienced harm by the animals, remain by engaging in this practice. Even if there may be strong reasons for the consumption of meat and derivatives of ‘happy animals’, the experienced harm for the animals will not be extinguished. I will denote the detachment that derives from the strategy of rendering the animals’ experienced harm in animal-friendly animal husbandry invisible as guilt. I will conclude that instead of purifying eating animals the ‘good way’, we should face the responsibility we have when killing ‘happy animals’ for ‘happy meat’.