Konstantinos Morfis

This paper examines the link between Immanuel Kant’s notion of transcendental self-consciousness and Dan Zahavi’s notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness in order to address the problem of reflection. Zahavi emphasizes the identity in pre-reflective self-consciousness, according to which the subject is conscious of itself as the one undergoing an experience, that is the ‘for-me-ness’ of experience. Reflection marks a difference between the subject and its experience, objectifying the experience. The problem of reflection has to do with how the identity in pre-reflective self-consciousness makes possible a difference in reflection. The preliminary solution Zahavi gives is to consider pre-reflective self-consciousness as internally differentiated. However, a more systematic account is needed. We turn to Kant and adopt a first-order reading of transcendental self-consciousness, according to which self-consciousness is intrinsic to the act of synthesis rather than a second-order consciousness of it. Transcendental self-consciousness is a formal givenness—an immediate, non-objectifying mode through which I am conscious of myself. We argue that Kant’s distinction between transcendental self-consciousness and the self-consciousness of the intuitive understanding offers resources to solve the problem. Transcendental self-consciousness is outward while the self-consciousness of the intuitive understanding is inward. The outwardness of transcendental self-consciousness amounts to its self-enlargement, accounting for the internal differentiation of pre-reflective self-consciousness. The proposed solution not only clarifies the transition from pre-reflective self-consciousness to reflection but also underscores the relevance of Kantian insights for phenomenological discussions on subjectivity