Ashoka University
  •  552
    Faith and the Structure of the Mind
    Sophia 53 (4): 467-477. 2014.
    Faith, broadly construed, is central to the political, social and personal life of any rational agent. I argue for two main claims: first, that a typology of faith based on the fine-grained Indic categories of bhakti, śraddhā, prasāda, abhisaṃpratyaya and abhilāṣa dissolves many of the philosophical problems associated with the nature of faith; second, that this typology of faith has elements that cannot be encompassed in a belief-desire psychology. The upshot is that the structure of the mind i…Read more
  •  185
    Does Mole’s Argument That Cognitive Processes Fail to Suffice for Attention Fail?
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5 487-505. 2018.
    Is attention a cognitive process? I reconstruct and critically assess an argument first proposed by Christopher Mole that it cannot be so. Mole’s argument is influential because it creates theoretical space for a unifying analysis of attention at the subject level (though it does not entail it). Prominent philosophers working on attention such as Wayne Wu and Philipp Koralus explicitly endorse it, while Sebastian Watzl endorses a related version, this despite their differing theoretical commitme…Read more
  •  103
    Meditative Attention to Bodily Sensations: Conscious Attention without Selection?
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6): 156-178. 2018.
    Prominent figures in the philosophical literature on attention hold that the connection between attention and selection is essential (Mole, 2011), necessary (Wu, 2011; 2014), or conceptual (Smithies, 2011). I argue that selection is neither essentially, necessarily, nor conceptually tied to attention. I first isolate the target conception of selection that I deny is so tightly coupled with attention: graded intramodal selection within consciousness. I analyse two visual cases: analysis of the fi…Read more