-
Kris McDaniel argues that there are different ways in which things exist. For instance, past things don't exist in the same way as present things. Numbers don't exist in the same way as physical objects; nor do holes, which are real, but less real than what they are in. McDaniel's theory of being illuminates a wide range of metaphysical topics.The Fragmentation of BeingOxford University Press. 2017. -
Quantifier Variance, Ontological Pluralism and Ideal LanguagesPhilosophical Quarterly 69 (275): 277-293. 2019.Kris McDaniel has recently defended a criterion for being an ontological pluralist that classifies the quantifier variantist as one. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. There is an important difference between the two views, which is sometimes obscured by a common view in the metaphysics of fundamentality. According to the simple analysis, a language is ideal—it allows for a maximally metaphysically perspicuous description of reality—just in case all its primitives are perfectly natur…Read more
-
I describe a number of views in which metaphysical fundamentality is accounted for in normative terms. After describing many different ways this key idea could be developed, I turn to developing the idea in one specific way. After all, the more detailed the proposal, the easier it is to assess whether it works. The rough idea is that what it is for a property to be fundamental is for it to be prima facie obligatory to theorize in terms of that property.Normative Accounts of FundamentalityPhilosophical Issues 27 (1): 167-183. 2017.
-
Syracuse UniversityProfessor
-
University of Notre DameDepartment of PhilosophyWilliam J. and Dorothy K. O'Neill Professor of Philosophy
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
| 20th Century Philosophy |