•  71
    Above All Things Human: Bestimmung in Salomo Friedlaender’s Kant for Children
    In Salomo Friedlaender (ed.), Kant for Children, De Gruyter. pp. 121-140. 2024.
    Kant’s commitment to universalism has been called into question since increasing attention has been paid to his work on race in the last 20 years. This worry can easily be applied to Kant’s work on education: when Kant describes education as allowing humanity to fulfill its Bestimmung (vocation), scholars might reasonably conclude that such a claim only applies certain racial groups. Yet Salomo Friedlaender claims that if Kant’s moral theory is taught to children, “Every person is valued accordi…Read more
  •  17
    Negative emotions like anger, spite, contempt, and envy are widely seen as obstacles to a good life. They are like the weeds in a garden that need to be pulled up before they choke out the nice plants. This book argues that bad feelings aren't the weeds; they are the worms. Many people are squeamish about them and would prefer to pretend they aren't there, but the presence of worms mean the garden it thriving. I draw on insights from the history of philosophy to show what we've gotten wrong abou…Read more
  •  182
    Shame, Gender, and Self-Making
    In Alessandra Fussi & Raffaele Rodogno (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Shame, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 205-220. 2023.
    Although moral philosophers have argued that shame is a valuable moral emotion, feminist philosophers have been skeptical. From the feminist perspective, shame appears to be an emotion more mediated by social circumstances than moral philosophers acknowledge. It is, they will argue, not an accident that shame occurs more frequently in people with marginalized identities. If who I am is a social subordinate, this would explain why women feel more shame. This argument relies on the assumption that…Read more
  •  227
    Alienated Emotions and Self-Knowledge
    In Alba Montes-Sánchez & Alessandro Salice (eds.), Emotional Self-Knowledge, Routledge. pp. 39-55. 2023.
    Our emotions can be revealing. They can not only reflect our character traits and our judgments, but they can also tell us things about ourselves that we do not fully realize or may not want to admit. In this chapter, I am particularly interested in how we relate to what I will call alienated emotions: emotional experiences that are unusual, surprising, or even disturbing. What, if anything, do our alienated emotions tell us about who we are? I argue here that alienated emotions lead to import…Read more
  •  173
    The Moral Necessity of Anger
    In The Ethics of Anger, Lexington Books. pp. 83-101. 2020.
    Moral philosophers have defended anger as an important part of our moral lives. In spite of these defenses, skeptics have nonetheless argued that it would be better all things considered to get over anger to the extent that we can. They will often point to moral exemplars like Martin Luther King, Jr. or Gandhi to show both (a) that we can successfully overcome our feelings of anger and (b) that we would be morally better off doing so. In this chapter, I argue against this aspiration. Those who a…Read more
  •  11
    Worldly shame: Ethos in action
    Contemporary Political Theory 23 (1): 184-186. 2024.
  •  287
    How Should We Feel About Recalcitrant Emotions?
    In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge University Press. 2022.
    In everyday moral experience, we judge ourselves for our emotional responses. Most of the philosophical literature on recalcitrant emotions focuses on (a) whether and how they are possible or (b) whether and how they are irrational. My interest here is in the ways we blame ourselves for recalcitrant emotions. I aim to show that it is harder than it looks to explain self-blame for recalcitrant emotions. I argue recalcitrance alone does not give us a reason to feel any particular way about our emo…Read more
  •  13
    Response to Kurth and Nelson
    Philosophical Psychology 35 (1): 141-144. 2022.
  •  766
    The Moral Risks of Online Shaming
    In Carissa Véliz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2023.
    Shaming behavior on social media has been the cause of concern in recent public discourse. Supporters of online shaming argue that it is an important tool in helping to make social media and online communities safer and more welcoming to traditionally marginalized groups. Objections to shaming often sound like high-minded calls for civility, but I argue that shaming behavior poses serious risks. Here I identify moral and political risks of online shaming. In particular, shaming threatens to unde…Read more
  •  1806
    Kant’s conception of mental illness is unlikely to satisfy contemporary readers. His classifications of mental illness are often fluid and ambiguous, and he seems to attribute to human beings at least some responsibility for preventing mental illness. In spite of these apparent disadvantages, I argue that Kant’s account of mental illness can be illuminating to his views about the normative dimensions of human cognition. In contrast to current understandings of mental illness, Kant’s account is w…Read more
  •  605
    The Symbol of Justice: Bloodguilt in Kant
    Kantian Review 26 (1): 79-97. 2021.
    One of the more notorious passages in Kant occurs in the Doctrine of Right where he claims that ‘bloodguilt’ will cling to members of a dissolving society if they fail to execute the last murderer (MM, 6: 333). Although this is the most famous, bloodguilt appears in three other passages in Kant’s writings. These have received little attention in Kant scholarship. In this article, I examine these other passages and argue that bloodguilt functions as a symbol for the demandingness of justice. I th…Read more
  •  15
    Emotion, Reason and Action in Kant by Maria Borges
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (2): 411-412. 2020.
    Despite the fact that emotions have become an important part of Kant scholarship in the last thirty years and counting, few books are devoted to the topic. Borges's book remedies this lacuna. Kant scholars who are familiar with her work will be happy to see her account of emotions connected to other discussions of Kantian moral psychology.The book begins with a general account of actions, reasons, and causes. Given this background, Borges then raises the question: what role do emotions play in t…Read more
  •  828
    I’ll Show You: Spite as a Reactive Attitude
    The Monist 103 (2): 163-175. 2020.
    Spite is typically considered a vicious emotion that causes us to engage in petty, vindictive, and sometimes self-destructive behavior. Even though it has this bad reputation, I will argue that spite is a reactive attitude. Spite is emotional defiance of another’s command: to spite you, I will do something exactly because you told me not to. Our liability to feelings of spite presupposes that we recognize others as having practical authority, which is why it qualifies as a reactive attitude. I c…Read more
  •  352
    Wild chimeras: Enthusiasm and intellectual virtue in Kant
    European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2): 380-393. 2019.
    Kant typically is not identified with the tradition of virtue epistemology. Although he may not be a virtue epistemologist in a strict sense, I suggest that intellectual virtues and vices play a key role in his epistemology. Specifically, Kant identifies a serious intellectual vice that threatens to undermine reason, namely enthusiasm (Schwärmerei). Enthusiasts become so enamored with their own thinking that they refuse to subject reason to self-critique. The particular danger of enthusiasm is t…Read more
  •  61
  •  31
    Kant on Persons and Agency ed. by Eric Watkins
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1): 175-176. 2019.
    This new essay collection edited by Eric Watkins features distinguished and established scholars, and it will be an attractive volume for those who work in the field. The essays are divided under three headings: Part I contains essays on agency, Part II features essays on freedom, and Part III is dedicated to essays on persons. An essay by Karl Ameriks on Kant’s work “The End of All Things” concludes the collection. Most of the essays in the collection were originally presented in early form at …Read more
  •  36
    Responding to Ethical Loneliness
    Philosophy Today 62 (2): 707-715. 2018.
  •  32
    How We Hope: A Moral Psychology
    The European Legacy 24 (1): 114-116. 2018.
  •  13
    Shame is a Jekyll-and-Hyde emotion--it can be morally valuable, but it also has a dark side. Thomason presents a philosophically rigorous and nuanced account of shame that accommodates its harmful and helpful aspects. Thomason argues that despite its obvious drawbacks and moral ambiguity, shame's place in our lives is essential.
  •  356
    A Good Enough Heart: Kant and the Cultivation of Emotions
    Kantian Review 22 (3): 441-462. 2017.
    One way of understanding Kant’s views about moral emotions is the cultivation view. On this view, emotions play a role in Kantian morality provided they are properly cultivated. I evince a sceptical position about the cultivation view. First, I show that the textual evidence in support of cultivation is ambiguous. I then provide an account of emotions in Kant’s theory that explains both his positive and negative views about them. Emotions capture our attention such that they both disrupt the min…Read more
  •  22
    Moral Psychology and War: Introduction
    Essays in Philosophy 18 (2): 203-206. 2017.
  •  279
    Guilt and Child Soldiers
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1): 115-127. 2016.
    The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of g…Read more
  •  605
    Shame, Violence, and Morality
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1): 1-24. 2014.
    Shame is most frequently defined as the emotion we feel when we fail to live up to standards, norms, or ideals. I argue that this definition is flawed because it cannot explain some of the most paradigmatic features of shame. Agents often respond to shame with violence, but if shame is the painful feeling of failing to live up to an ideal, this response is unintelligible. I offer a new account of shame that can explain the link between shame and violence. On my view, shame arises out of a tensio…Read more
  •  132
    Forgiveness or Fairness?
    Philosophical Papers 44 (2): 233-260. 2015.
    Several philosophers who argue that forgiveness is an important virtue also wish to maintain the moral value of retributive emotions that forgiveness is meant to overcome. As such, these accounts explicate forgiveness as an Aristotelian mean between too much resentment and too little resentment. I argue that such an account ends up making forgiveness superfluous: it turns out that the forgiving person is not praised for a greater willingness to let go of her resentment, but rather for her fairne…Read more
  •  252
    The Moral Value of Envy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1): 36-53. 2015.
    It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy is not merely morally permissibl…Read more
  •  306
    Kant’s non-voluntarist conception of political obligation has led some philosophers to argue that he would reject self-government rights for indigenous peoples. Some recent scholarship suggests, however, that Kant’s critique of colonialism provides an argument in favor of granting self-government rights. Here I argue for a stronger conclusion: Kantian political theory not only can but must include sovereignty for indigenous peoples. Normally these rights are considered redress for historic injus…Read more
  •  48
    Review of "Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice" (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 18 (1): 191-198. 2017.
  •  529
    Shame and Contempt in Kant's Moral Theory
    Kantian Review 18 (2): 221-240. 2013.
    Attitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not the humanity within a person, b…Read more