Kristen Hessler

This symposium focuses on Pablo Gilabert’s Human Dignity and Social Justice, in which Gilabert extends his Dignitarian Approach from a minimalist account of human rights to a maximalist account of liberal democratic socialism grounded in the labor rights and dignity of workers. While the commentators in this symposium are broadly sympathetic to Gilabert’s vision of socialist justice, they each raise important questions about the central arguments of the book, ranging from concerns about the normative structure of Gilabert’s dignitarian approach to the institutional implementation of his vision of democratic socialism. Gilabert’s replies clarify and extend some of the central ideas and arguments of the book itself. The symposium illuminates and further develops analytical philosophical scholarship about socialist justice.

This chapter has four main points. First, I argue that the human rightsHuman rights approach to public health ethicsEthics, championed by Jonathan MannMann, Jonathan and others, needs to engage with philosophical accounts of moral human rights. Second, I argue that, while both interest-based and agencyAgency accounts of moralRightshumanhuman rightsHuman rights are defensible as philosophical accounts of human rights, and both have advantages as the foundation for a human rights approach toRightshealth public health ethics, the interest-based approach is a natural fit for this approach. Third, I illustrate how engagement with the philosophical accounts of the structure of moral rights can help respond to the criticism that certain rights underpinning the human rightsHuman rights approach to public health ethics, such as the right to health, cannot be justified. Finally, I argue that the human rights approach to public health ethics promises to contribute to our understanding of both health and human rightsHuman rights.

A complete theory of interpretation for human rights law must answer two kinds of questions. First: Who should interpret international human rights law? Second: What principles should guide the interpretation of human rights law? ;Individual governments frequently claim the right to interpret international law as it applies to them, but this claim is contested by many United Nations subgroups and by nongovernmental organizations like Amnesty International. I argue that international institutions are more likely to give a fair hearing to people's human rights than are their own governments. Accordingly, we can conclude as a general rule that international institutions should be assigned authority to interpret international human rights law. ;The general rule has an exception, however. Democratic states that protect basic freedoms of speech and assembly will promote and protect their own citizens' human rights better than undemocratic states. Moreover, free democratic states, by giving a voice to all citizens, can take advantage of local knowledge about particular human rights problems and solutions, and so are more likely than international institutions to interpret human rights law with a sensitivity to the human rights of all citizens and to the locally important human rights issues. Therefore, unlike other states, liberal democratic states should have the authority to interpret international human rights law as it applies within their borders. ;What principles should guide the interpretation of human rights law? The answer depends on whether we take a short- or long-term perspective. Currently, the institutions of international law are relatively ineffective when compared to most domestic legal systems. While this remains the case, a principle allowing interpreters to use their judgment about moral human rights in interpreting human rights law can be justified on the basis of the contribution this would make to global deliberation about the proper understanding of moral human rights. As human rights law develops more effective, less voluntaristic institutions, this principle of interpretation should be phased out.

Federal policies on human subjects research have undergone a progressive transformation. In the early decades of the twentieth century, federal policies largely relied on the discretion of investigators to decide when and how to conduct research. This approach gradually gave way to policies that augmented investigator discretion with externally imposed protections. We may now be entering an era of even more stringent external protections. Whether the new policies effectively absolve investigators of personal responsibility for conducting ethical research, and whether it is wise to do so, remains to be seen.

Agricultural biotechnology has long been criticized from an environmental justice perspective. However, an analysis, using golden rice as a case study, shows that golden rice is not susceptible to the main criticisms that are appropriate when directed at most products of agricultural biotechnology, and that golden rice has important humanitarian potential. For these reasons, an environmental justice evaluation of golden rice may need to be more nuanced and complex than a more traditional environmental ethics can provide. Study of the complexity of this issue may pay off in a more effective environmentalism on its own terms.