Kristina Lekic

Knowledge can be acquired through the processes of listening or reading testimonies of other agents. How and, particular, to whom, one ascribes trustworthiness when listening or reading a testimony is of special interest in this paper, especially in terms of societal-epistemic deviations that appear in the form of epistemic injustice. Neurotypicals, individuals with typical neurological states and developmental pathways, perceive individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder as an aberration from neuro-normativity, unable to contribute on an equal basis to the pool of epistemic resources and shared meanings. The latter is related to the stereotypes of the unreliability of autistic persons’ testimonies about their own experiences and conditions. Given that atypical social and behavioural conditions autistics share are clinically classified as a disorder, the question of whether we can justify the failure to extend trust to the autistics arises.

The paper aims to shed light on Searle’s notion of collective intentionality as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of “we-intentionality”. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders. The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle’s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism.

This paper proposes a novel method for identifying the public evaluative standards that contribute to the classification of certain conditions as mental disabilities. Public evaluative standards could contribute to ascertaining disabilities by outlining characteristics whose presence beyond a threshold is fundamentally important for the life of a person and whose absence or reduced occurrence constitutes a disability. Additionally, they can participate in determining disabilities by delineating particularly grave difficulties, impairments, or incapacities. Our method relies on a model of public justification of evaluative standards that is inspired by Gerald Gaus’s theory of public reason. Thus, our approach recommends the justification of evaluative standards through sound deliberative routes from reasons accessible to all persons who participate in the process of justification and the convergence of what is justified in this way to each of them. We deem that disabilities could be caused both by problems in the internal characteristics of a person as well as by unfairness or a lack of hospitality in external circumstances. This is why the method of justification is applied to the assessment of those circumstances as well. If social or environmental circumstances cannot be justified through the convergence of reasons accessible to all persons involved in the process of justification, we have reasons to exclude the presence of a disability and ascertain the presence of inadequate external conditions.

awls’ theory of justice is the subject of numerous criticisms due to the impossibility of adequately including people with mental disabilities, either as legislators or as beneficiaries of the principle of justice. Martha Nussbaum’s criticism is directed at the question of the legislative group and the possibility of including the interests of persons who, due to the criteria of rationality and reasonableness, are excluded from the process of forming fundamental principles of justice. In this paper, I recognize the problems that Rawls’s theory faces in light of the above criticisms, and as a solution, I propose a constructive and positive interpretation of his theory of justice. Such an interpretation will allow us to expand the group of legislators through the inclusion of those individuals with mental impairments who, according to Nussbaum, are capable of participating in the selection of principles of justice. Furthermore, the offered interpretation will include people with the most severe forms of mental disorders within the scope of justice, through an extended list of reasons relevant to the justification of fundamental rights and principles of justice.