Krzysztof Sołoducha

Challenges in developing data-driven ethics for artificial general intelligence machines (AGI): One of the biggest challenges in creating systems of AGI (artificial general intelligence) type is the question of the method for developing decision-making patterns for such machines operating in autonomous mode. The need to build active trust in their functioning forces an ART (accountability, responsibility, transparency) approach, which prefers bottom–up methods in ethics. On the other hand, such descriptive methods expose culturally conditioned, non-egalitarian patterns of behaviour that may be morally objectionable and rather indicate the need to use a top–down approach that applies normative ethical expectations. The paper examines the challenges of using both methods and outlines the need to develop a hybrid approach. The correct functioning of machines using such a hybrid system should be examinated by using an ethical testing process — at the level of output signal. At the end of the paper we present some philosophical assumptions that should be taken into account in the construction of such an ethical test.

The Turing test, which is a verbal test of the indistinguishability of machine and human intelligence, is a historically important idea that has set a way of thinking about the AI (artificial intelligence) project that is still relevant today. According to it, the benchmark/blueprint for AI is human intelligence, and the key skill of AI should be its communicative proficiency – which includes explaining decisions made by the machine. Passing the original Turing test by a machine does not guarantee that the machine is, from the point of view of a human, trustworthy; on the contrary, the idea of a machine capable of “fooling” or “outsmarting” a human is inherent within the concept of the test. We postulate, that a test that guarantees a high level of trust should be: a) non-imitative, b) non-behavioral, c) focused on the ability to explain, taking into account, however, the design and rules of operation of the machine (and not just human expectations), d) focused on the machine’s ability to learn.

In meinem Artikel versuche ich die theoretische Verbindung zwischen dem Programm der diltheyschen Kritik der historischen Vernunft und dem Einsatz der hermeneutischen Logik von Georg Misch zu finden. Diese Relation ist eher kompliziert. Da gibt es sowohl Kontinuität als auch einen radikalen Bruch. Georg Misch, von einer Seite, weiter entwickelt Wilhelm Diltheys Programm von Lebensphilosophie als Herstellung des theoretischen Zusammenhanges von Logos und Ethos, von anderer Seite aber findet eine ganz neue Form dafür. Und zwar die Form der Logik des Ausdrucks – hermeneutischen Logik. Damit ist Mischs neue Lebensphilosophie sehr tief verbunden mit dem sprachphilosophischen Bruch in der Philosophie des XX Jahrhunderts.

Transcendental logic is asking about the problem of the constitution of all objectivity. One answer sounds as follows: meeting of all objectivity always takes place in frames of the certain linguistic perspective understood as the categorization top down. This model of categorization however doesn’t let to evaluate different perspectives. They are simply completely equal of oneself, and, in a little bit cynical Feyerabend’s analysis, the one will turn out to be stronger, which is winning in the rhetorical or aesthetic clash. So we are applying to them quite normal rules of the pop culture. For solving this problem of the contemporary theory of the knowledge it is so necessary to put the problem of different models of the categorization, for example the bottom – up model of categorization and problem of conditions of the possibility of presumption sentences. In my text I am trying to show the paths of solving this problem as the condition for realization of idea of knowledge which can anew link logos and ethos

In meinem Artikel versuche ich die theoretische Verbindung zwischen dem Programm der diltheyschen Kritik der historischen Vernunft und dem Einsatz der hermeneutischen Logik von Georg Misch zu finden. Diese Relation ist eher kompliziert. Da gibt es sowohl Kontinuität als auch einen radikalen Bruch. Georg Misch, von einer Seite, weiter entwickelt Wilhelm Diltheys Programm von Lebensphilosophie als Herstellung des theoretischen Zusammenhanges von Logos und Ethos, von anderer Seite aber findet eine ganz neue Form dafür. Und zwar die Form der Logik des Ausdrucks – hermeneutischen Logik. Damit ist Mischs neue Lebensphilosophie sehr tief verbunden mit dem sprachphilosophischen Bruch in der Philosophie des XX Jahrhunderts

The aim of the text is historical as well as systematic. At the historical layer it is the continuation of my long-term work on presenting the intellectual heritage of the group of philosophers dealing with hermeneutical logic. It was intended for Polish readers. Hans Lipps plays a signifi cant role in this movement however, his activity is rather unknown in Poland. From this point of view the text attempts to fill up a gap in the Polish philosophical tradition. Moreover, at the systematic layer the text with reference to is also an attempt to investigate certain uses of the emergence concept in a hermeneutical cognitive theory

In this paper, we focus on the analysis of Eliezer Yudkowsky’s concept of “coherent extrapolated volition” (CEV) as a response to the need for a post-conventional, persuasive morality that meets the criteria of active trust in the sense of Anthony Giddens, which could be used in the case of autonomous machines. Based on the analysis of the results of the Moral Machine project, we formulate some guidelines for transformation of the idea of a coherent extrapolated volition into the concept of a coherent, extrapolated and clustered volition. The argumentation used in the paper is intended to show that the idea of CEV transformed into its clustered version can be used to build a technically and socially efficient decision-making pattern database for autonomous machines.

The aim of the text is to consider Gianni Vattimo's claim that hermeneutics needs to be more rational due to its criticised relativism and aestheticism. From this perspective, the author considers the projects proposed by Bartosz Brożek and Chrysostomos Mantzavinos, based on the assumption that the cognitive phenomena underlying the understanding of human behaviour and the resulting artefacts can be described using naturalistic methods. Finally, the question is considered whether these attempts, coming from outside the hermeneutic movement, offer hope for eliminating the flaws of hermeneutics mentioned by Vattimo, and what the prospects are for further research on this issue.