Kuizhi Lewis Wang

Yogācāra or mind-only (cittamātra) Buddhism has traditionally been read as a form of ontological idealism, but this reading has been challenged by recent Anglophone scholarship on Indian Yogācāra texts. To develop a Buddhist case for ontological idealism that philosophers today can engage with, I turn to Xuanzang's Cheng Weishi Lun, a Yogācāra treatise that is canonical in East Asia but underexplored in the West. From this text, I reconstruct two arguments that can, on their own, establish that nothing exists mind-independently. The Eliminative Argument does so by ruling out the mind-independent existence of anything permanent, physical, or neither-physical-nor-mental. The Tetralemma Argument, which takes the form of a tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi), shows that there is no mind-independent existent because a mind-independent existent is neither identical, nor not identical, nor both, nor neither, to the property of existence. Furthermore, I explore the Buddhist defenses of the premises of these two arguments and the metaphysical principles underlying them, such as the Impossibility of Change, Ockham’s Razor, mereological nihilism, and the Identity of Indiscernibles.

This paper focuses on how photographs that depict violence and suffering (PVS) may morally impact us, and what we should do with them in the present age. Specifically, through a critical discussion of the works of Susan Sontag, I argue that we have two imperfect duties towards PVS. Firstly, I argue that we have a duty to keep our exposure to PVS to a moderate amount. I echo the early Sontag’s worry that overexposure to PVS may desensitize the viewers, but I also argue, by analogy to Nussbaum’s account of moral novels, for Sontag’s later view that some familiarity with PVS is important for our moral development. Consequently, I maintain that we have an imperfect duty to make ourselves familiar with some PVS, but we also ought to prevent ourselves from being overexposed to PVS. Secondly, I discuss Sontag’s skepticism of the ethical capacity of PVS to change our moral beliefs. I first argue in support of Sontag’s claim that photographs lack any inherent moral meaning. I then claim, in partial agreement with a recent objection to Sontag by Susie Linfield, that if photographs have no inherent moral meaning, then it is plausible to claim that the viewers have a moral duty to actively engage with PVS and construct their moral meaning. Pace Linfield, however, I argue that this duty can only be an imperfect duty, as such a perfect duty is too demanding.

This paper focuses on how photographs that depict violence and suffering (PVS) may morally impact us, and what we should do with them in the present age. Specifically, through a critical discussion of the works of Susan Sontag, I argue that we have two imperfect duties towards PVS. Firstly, I argue that we have a duty to keep our exposure to PVS to a moderate amount. I echo the early Sontag’s worry that overexposure to PVS may desensitize the viewers, but I also argue, by analogy to Nussbaum’s account of moral novels, for Sontag’s later view that some familiarity with PVS is important for our moral development. Consequently, I maintain that we have an imperfect duty to make ourselves familiar with some PVS, but we also ought to prevent ourselves from being overexposed to PVS. Secondly, I discuss Sontag’s skepticism of the ethical capacity of PVS to change our moral beliefs. I first argue in support of Sontag’s claim that photographs lack any inherent moral meaning. I then claim, in partial agreement with a recent objection to Sontag by Susie Linfield, that if photographs have no inherent moral meaning, then it is plausible to claim that the viewers have a moral duty to actively engage with PVS and construct their moral meaning. Pace Linfield, however, I argue that this duty can only be an imperfect duty, as such a perfect duty is too demanding.

The Combinatorial Problem is the problem of how to combine epistemic and practical reasons for belief together into an all-things-considered verdict on what one ought to believe. It is a problem primarily for inclusivists about reasons for belief, who take there to be both genuine epistemic reasons for belief and genuine practical reasons for belief. Steglich-Petersen and Skipper (Mind, 129(516), 1071–1094, 2020) have recently proposed a novel epistemic instrumentalist solution to the Combinatorial Problem. According to them, if we accept the view that epistemic reasons are a species of instrumental reasons, then we will have no problem weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief against each other. In this paper, I argue against this solution. I first object that, due to the transitivity of transmission of reasons, this solution could give rise to too many reasons for belief. I then discuss two possible replies to my objection. Both fail, I argue, because they lead Steglich-Petersen and Skipper to the same dilemma of making their instrumentalist solution to the Combinatorial Problem either question-begging or moot.

In the first Critique, Kant famously holds a novel practical notion of Belief (Glauben) as assent justified not by evidence but by practical considerations. This paper examines the early development of Kant’s practical notion of Belief prior to the first Critique. It aims to make clear what prompted Kant to develop this notion in the first place, and how this notion came to assume its crucial role in Kant’s critical system. This development, I argue, has two main steps. The first is his introduction of a practical notion of Belief in mid-to-late 1760s. I argue that he did so because he regards this notion as a useful tool to get ordinary people to justifiably commit to the existence of God and an after-life. The second step is Kant’s abandonment of the objective validity of his logical proof of God around 1772. This step elevated Belief from a merely useful means to the only justified way to commit to the existence of God and an after-life. This second step, I argue, is closely connected to Kant’s pivot to the view that the objective validity of concepts requires sensibly given objects, and it is motivated by Kant’s concern with subject-cancelling real repugnance.

This paper explores Kant’s account of propositional content and its implications for the relationship between his notions of knowledge (Wissen) and cognition (Erkenntnis). While previous commentators commonly read Kant as holding a Fregean theory of propositional content, in this paper I argue that Kant’s theory of propositional content aligns more closely with Peter Hanks’ recent account. According to my reading, Kant holds that individual acts of judging are both ontologically and explanatorily prior to propositions or Kantian judgments (Urteil). Furthermore, on my reading, acts of judging for Kant are acts of assertively predicating a property of an object rather than merely acts of neutral predication. This reading challenges the lately popular view that Kant’s notions of knowledge and cognition are not only distinct but also disjunct. I instead suggest that we should regard Kantian knowledge that requires cognitions as its grounds as a species of Kantian cognitions.